


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28 March 1983

## Near East/South Asia Report

No. 2728



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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28 March 1983

## NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2728

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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### SAUDI-YEMENI RELATIONS SAID IMPROVED AFTER SALIH'S VISIT

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 739, 16-22 Feb 83 pp 14-19

[Article by 'Amir al-Jabiri: "Searching for Qualitative Improvements in Relations"]

[Text] Last week Yemen Arab Republic president 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih made an official visit to the kingdom. After the visit a joint Saudi-Yemeni communique was issued stating the similarity of positions in San'a' and Riyadh concerning issues of the hour and the region.

It can be said that the trip made to the kingdom last week by Yemen Arab Republic president Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih came during a period of unusual circumstances for the Gulf and Yemen and, therefore, importance was attached to it on all levels. Results of the visit were quickly observed by various political circles who are concerned with any Arab activity during this phase, especially if this activity comes at the highest level.

Actually, no one expects a significant change in the Saudi or Yemeni position concerning the Middle East issue, for example, from the already well-known position of these two countries on this issue, especially the Palestinian peoples' rights for a homeland. This position was reemphasized in the joint communique.

The communique stressed the importance of maintaining unity among the groups of the Palestinian revolution and the importance of supporting them materially and morally free of any outside influences since they represent the basis for a solution to the Palestinian problem according to the Fes resolutions which emphasized that the Palestinians must have the right of self-determination and the right to establish an independent state led by their sole legitimate representative, the PLO.

What everyone undoubtedly does expect is that there will be more cohesion, coordination and cooperation on bilateral levels in a way that would represent a qualitative change in relations between Riyadh and San'a' since it was stated clearly to the Yemeni government and people that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is Yemen's best ally through thick and thin.

Saudi Arabia represents first and foremost the only entity which has established, with San'a', a coordination council chaired by a personality high in

the Saudi leadership. The first and basic mission of the council is to organize relations and see to it that Saudi aid arrives in a regular and organized fashion according to a program centering on the size of the Yemen Arab Republic's annual budget. The needs of the budget will be taken into consideration and fulfilled to the greatest extent possible.

Also, Riyadh was the quickest to respond by providing aid by air to the victims of the recent Dhamar earthquakes. In the latest joint communique the Yemeni side expressed its deep thanks and appreciation to the kingdom for the unlimited support it has provided to the victims of the earthquake in Yemen. This aid had a great impact on the Yemeni people.

Those who are anticipating and expecting, even hoping for a qualitative improvement in Saudi-Yemeni relations, which would give these relations more depth, breadth and strength, do not base their calculations only on the kind and amount of aid which the kingdom provides to the Yemen Arab Republic. They consider other factors which may be more informative and more important such as the Saudi view that aid from Riyadh to San'a' is an obligation and not something requiring thanks.

Furthermore, these calculations concerning only Yemen are the result of fundamental political developments which the Yemen Arab Republic has seen in the recent past as demonstrated by the first General People's Conference and the results it produced.

At this conference which was held at the end of last year a number of fundamentals of Yemeni policy were established, the most important being that the people of the Yemen Arab Republic have decided in no uncertain terms that they reject all forms of violence in the streets of Yemen. This violence is what certain parties were thinking of and even carrying out in efforts aimed at political change through coercion and violence.

This was at a time when the greatest and strongest Yemeni powers were prepared, through special means, to respond to those who were calling for violence, the supporters of the left. Therefore, the streets of Yemen were undoubtedly prime candidates for dangerous and destructive clashes.

At this time came President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's call for the first General People's Conference after a period of preparation lasting about 2 years. The conference was held and had outstanding results, the most prominent being:

- 1) An affirmation that the current Yemeni political phase is a peaceful phase in which all political powers are included in the same melting pot of political activity called the National Charter. Through the National Charter political activity can be carried out and any deviation from it will be considered a rebellion and may be observed and treated.

- 2) A strengthening of the leadership of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih through the first General People's Conference which included 1,000 delegates, the majority of whom were chosen by the Yemeni people from all districts. A chairman of the conference was chosen first and then a secretary general of

the Permanent Central Committee which was elected from among the delegates to the conference itself.

It is true that the political powers which the people commonly associate with the left generally went along with the first General People's Conference in the Yemen Arab Republic and they grudgingly accepted its results and resolutions. However, they continue to be a limited power, especially after the conference which approved the National Charter as the sole outlet for political activity in Yemen.

These are the new and important factors which, besides other factors, everyone expects will result in a qualitative change in Saudi-Yemeni relations.

The Yemeni president visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia last week and his leadership was stronger than ever. The state of his country was more cohesive and stable than ever before, politically, of course.

This means that he will be better able to convince and act and make decisions which serve the Yemeni people's true interests which in word and deed are embodied in increased coordination, cooperation, mutual understanding and harmony among all the states of the Arabian Peninsula and, specifically, between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Arab Republic.

CSO: 4404/260

EFFORTS AIMED AT WITHDRAWAL OF DENIAL OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 24 Feb 83 p 2

[Text] As we mentioned in our previous issues, on 14 January, at the invitation of the Armenian Assembly, nearly 200 representatives of Armenian organizations in California met at one of the conference rooms of the Universal Sheraton Hotel in Los Angeles where they were told by the Armenian Assembly about the steps that body has taken for the retraction of [the denial] of the Armenian genocide published in the August 1982 issue of the State Department BULLETIN.

At the meeting, reports were read by Nubar Dorian, Set Momjian, Hrayr Hovnanian and Aram Kalustian, who, together with Harry Sachaklian, had a meeting with high-level State Department officials in Washington on 2 January to express their protests and to ask for a public and official retraction.

The speakers at the meeting in Los Angeles also included Congressman Charles "Chip" Pashayan, Ross Vartanian and Dr Mihran Aghababian, who was also the chairman of the meeting.

Congressman Pashayan said in his speech: "As long as I am in Congress, I will do my best to make sure that Armenian history will not be rewritten and will not be distorted."

Apart from discussing the issue of rectifying the article in the official newsletter of the State Department, the participants also had the opportunity to hear about the decisions and steps being taken in connection with taking up the issue of the Armenian genocide with the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.

We now hear that at the said meeting the Armenian Assembly distributed packages of documents on these issues to the participants and that after a lively exchange of ideas in the form of questions and answers the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

Expressing the feeling and conviction of the appended list of officers of the Armenian-American Organizations in California with respect to the Department of State's remarks in the August 1982 issue of the Department of State BULLETIN that "because the historical record of the 1915 events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish government committed a genocide against the Armenian people",

WHEREAS the Armenian genocide was conceived by the Turkish government and perpetrated between 1915 and 1923 resulting in the annihilation of 1.5 million Armenian men, women and children, the deportation of an additional 500,000 survivors and the elimination of the Armenian people's presence of more than 2,000 years in their historic homeland,

WHEREAS the Armenian genocide is amply documented in the archives of the United States as well as Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain and many other nations,

WHEREAS U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau was among the first to expose the program of race extermination and to lead worldwide condemnation including protests from Turkey's allies,

WHEREAS an organization known as Near East Relief, chartered by an act of Congress, contributed millions of dollars and thousands of relief workers from 1915 to 1930 to aid the survivors of the Armenian genocide, and whereas 132,000 orphans became foster children of the American people,

WHEREAS the reality of the Armenian genocide was confirmed in Senate Resolution 359, dated 13 May 1920, which stated in part that "the testimony adduced at the hearings conducted by the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations have clearly established the truth of the reported massacres and other atrocities from which the Armenian people have suffered",

WHEREAS the reality of the Armenian genocide was also confirmed in House Resolution 148, dated 18 April 1975, which stated in part "that April 24, 1975 is hereby designated as 'National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity to Man,' and the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe such day as a day of remembrance for all the victims of genocide, especially those of Armenian ancestry who succumbed to the genocide perpetrated in Turkey in 1915, and in whose memory this date is commemorated by all Armenians and their friends throughout the world",

WHEREAS former President Jimmy Carter in a 16 May 1978 speech at the White House stated in part: "I feel very deeply that I, as President, ought to make sure that this [the Armenian genocide] is never forgotten",

WHEREAS the United States, during a 13 and 14 March 1979 debate in a session of the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, voted to reinsert Paragraph 30 of a report entitled "Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", which stated: "Passing to the modern era, one may note the existence of relatively full documentation dealing with the massacres of Armenians",

WHEREAS the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, an independent federal agency, unanimously resolved on 30 April 1981 that "the Armenian genocide should be included in the Holocaust Museum Memorial",

WHEREAS President Ronald Reagan, in Proclamation 4848, dated 22 April 1981, stated in part that "like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it--and like too many other persecutions of too many other peoples--the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten",

WHEREAS Department of State officials advised an Armenian-American delegation during a 12 January 1983 meeting that denial of the Armenian genocide is not Department policy,

WHEREAS the reality of the Armenian genocide has been documented, affirmed and reaffirmed for over six decades,

WHEREAS the Department of State's abuse of Armenian and American history is unacceptable to the Armenian-American community of California,

Now therefore be it RESOLVED by the California Armenian organizational officers gathered in Los Angeles on this 14th day of January 1983 that we call upon each member of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives from the State of California to urge the Department of State to retract forthwith its denial of the Armenian genocide.

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CSO: 4605/32

## 'DECLINE' OF FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY ANALYZED

Berirut AZTAG in Armenian 23 Feb 83 p 5

[Text] The prediction of those who expected that the influences of the French Communist Party (PCF) would inevitably decline following the strengthening of the Socialist Party (PS) is gradually coming true. It is a fact that the number of voters supporting the socialists has visibly increased at the expense of voter support for the communists. Even worse, the PCF had more members and more popular support during the days of the Resistance than today, a time when it participates in the government with the socialists with four ministers.

The leadership of the PCF is so worried that, apart from having this problem permanently on the agenda of its meetings, it has turned to polling organizations and institutions which study public opinion trends in order to find out about the true mood of large segments of society.

Testimony to this trend was the meeting of the PCF Central Committee, which concluded its work on 11 January 1983. At the meeting, Politburo member (Paul Loran) presented an extensive speech which contained proposals for party strategies to be endorsed during the upcoming local elections in March. According to (Loran), the PCF must clarify three issues to the voters:

- a) The communists are working in harmony with the PS;
- b) The communists support the government's moves toward the socialization of France;
- c) The media are distorting the truth when they maliciously paint a dark picture of the communist countries.

Behind this election campaign strategy, one can easily see the realization that the PCF today enjoys the support of only 12 percent of the voters while only recently that figure was around 20 percent. This 8-percent loss benefited mainly the PS. In this situation, the PCF has weight in the French political life only from the perspective that it supports the socialists and reinforces their popularity with the French left. Otherwise, the PCF in itself has become a secondary faction.

A noteworthy phenomenon that follows this weakening of the PCF is that the Soviet press has not only covered up the crisis of its French ideologists, but also, on 5 January PRAVDA said with admiration that "the flow of new strength into the

French Communist Party is growing" and that "the youth are joining the ranks of the PCF."

The Soviet approach to cover up the truth can be explained by the fact that the French communists paid a very high price for supporting the Soviet policy of crushing the labor movement in Poland. The French working classes did not forgive Marchais' party for turning its back on a just workers' cause and for taking a stance of loyalty to the Kremlin at any cost.

It was probably this same analysis that led (Loran) to stress counteraction against the media and conveyance of the true state of the communist countries in his election strategy proposals.

By endorsing such a strategy the PCF is simply choosing to distance itself further from its voters, because it is incapable of displaying the essential flexibility of independent opinion following the example of its Italian counterpart.

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CSO: 4605 28

## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

### ARMENIANS URGED TO REACT AGAINST AID TO BE GIVEN TO TURKEY

Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 23 Feb 83 pp 2,3

[Article by Ara Kalayjian reproduced from the Boston BAYKAR]

[Text] On February 4, the U.S. government announced its 1984 "foreign military assistance" bill, which, according to well-informed sources, will be approved by Congress with difficulty and only after being amended.

According to the proposed bill, in 1984 the United States will provide \$9.2 billion in military assistance to various countries of which Israel, Egypt and Turkey are ranked as the first three.

In 1984, Turkey will receive \$930 million in military assistance, compared to \$765 million this year. This increase will significantly upset the military balance between Turkey and Greece, particularly since Greece will receive no increase over this year for its 1984 allocation.

In recent years, the U.S. Congress has used a 10 to 7 ratio--always in favor of Turkey--with respect to appropriations for the two countries. In 1983, U.S. assistance for military purchases to Turkey and Greece was \$400 million and \$280 million, respectively, which is in step with the 10 to 7 guideline. But the amounts proposed for 1984, \$755 million and \$280 million, represent a sharp departure from this guideline.

In addition to this sum of \$755 million Turkey will also receive \$175 million in "economic assistance funds" to be used for the payment of interest on that country's foreign debts.

As is seen, assistance to Greece remains at \$280 million compared to a total of \$930 million for Turkey.

Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou sharply protested this situation in a letter he sent to President Reagan on 5 February. In his letter, Papandreou stated that with the doubling of U.S. assistance to Turkey talks between the United States and Greece about the future of U.S. bases in Greece will not produce positive results. Papandreou stressed in his letter that upsetting the military balance between Turkey and Greece that has existed for many years will produce a dangerous situation in that part of the Mediterranean which may lead to unforeseen consequences.

According to a U.S. State Department official, Turkey needs this massive assistance immediately in order to modernize speedily its entire military structure as well as its army and navy. In particular, Turkey needs tanks, missiles and air defense systems.

Ironically, no government official asks what Turkey has done with the assistance it has received for so many years--or, rather, how Turkey has wasted that aid. Turkey has for years been, and continues to be, the spoiled child of the United States and Germany. Since the 1950's, it has received over \$5 billion in military assistance from the United States. As a NATO member, Turkey also receives large amounts of aid from that organization. In November 1982, NATO and the U.S. government announced that they will build new military bases in eastern Turkey and that they will renovate existing military airbases in that country.

What does Turkey have to show for all this assistance? Only a military machine that is limping with outmoded weapons and equipment.

With the millions that it receives, Turkey threatens Greece, which, as a member of NATO, is its ally theoretically. It was 40,000 Turkish soldiers, armed thanks to those millions of dollars, who invaded the Greek island of Cyprus in 1974 and who still keep that part of that island under their harsh occupation.

Those millions, as well as the incredible sum of \$930 million proposed on 4 February, provide Turkey with the means to point its weapons and bombers against our land, Armenia.

We, the Armenian-Americans, are duty-bound to use every peaceful and strategic means available to block this military assistance to Turkey, because we know that Turkey is the most unreliable of U.S. allies, the most backward and the least capable to put its economy and military machine in working order.

In particular, Turkey is a military dictatorship where basic human rights are crudely violated and trampled upon every day. The independence and freedom of universities and other institutions of higher learning are severely restricted. A state of self-censorship has been imposed upon the press; "dissenting" publications are shut down and prosecuted, as recently happened to the daily CUMHURIYET. The prisons and the military detention camps are overflowing with inmates. With the insistence of the military authorities, the death penalty has been implemented since the end of September 1980. This year alone, 15 people were executed, all convicted of political offenses.

Turkey does not deserve American assistance.

Therefore, we must all contact the U.S. senators and congressmen in our districts and ask them to block the \$930-million military assistance package to Turkey in Congress. We must contact again and again our congressmen, with letters, by phone or in person, in order to prevent appropriations to a country whose soldiers unjustly and illegally occupy a part of Cyprus, crudely oppress Turkey's minorities, violate the human rights of their own people and have been holding on to Western Armenia since the Great Genocide.

We have a task to fulfill. Let us use our loyal citizenship rights to block the proposed military assistance to Turkey. Let us contact the representatives of our districts. Let us also contact the Armenian Assembly to do its part and, with persistent work, convey the position of the Armenian-Americans on this important matter.

TURKISH MEDIA REPORT ON VISIT OF ARMENIAN TOURISTS

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 2 Feb 83 p 2

[Text] We reported previously about the 14 Armenian-Americans who paid a touristic visit to Turkey in August 1982 and who were searched at [Istanbul's] Yesilkoy airport by security officials at the time of their departure from the country.

The officials found on the visitors maps of Armenia, chunks of collected soil, film strips and various publications. The tourists were allowed to depart only after all these items were confiscated.

[The Istanbul] TERCUMAN reports this incident as a front-page item and says that 14 Armenian-American leaders toured the eastern provinces [of Turkey] disguised as tourists and tried to gather information to be used for anti-Turkish propaganda.

The said article is naturally full of distortions and errors. Twice, it refers to [the Los Angeles] ASBAREZ, but that is nothing new.

"Despite Turkey's good will and permissive attitude, Armenian-Americans have been getting increasingly insolent and have displayed their ulterior motives. Recently, 14 Armenian tourists toured eastern Anatolia and tried to gather information to justify Armenian terrorism. It was found out, however, that among these tourists were leading organizers of the anti-Turkish propaganda being waged in the United States. The said tourists entered Turkey on U.S. passports, and, therefore, they did not need special papers to tour the eastern provinces. They paid supposedly touristic visits to various cities, mainly Kars and Erzurum, but their chief objective was entirely different. They took pictures of NATO installations and gathered chunks of earth in small bags. On 17 August, security officials at the airport found on them fictitious maps of Armenia, photographs of NATO installations and bags full of soil. These items were confiscated but they were allowed to depart. After their departure, they used this incident as a pretext to allege that they were treated very badly in Turkey and that even the souvenirs they had bought were confiscated.

"In this connection, an article against Turkey was published in ASBAREZ, a paper published by the Tashnag party [Armenian Revolutionary Federation].

"Despite the good will shown, it was seen that among the tourist group were the organizers and implementers of anti-Turkish propaganda in the United States. Two

of them were the sons of [University of California at Los Angeles professor] Richard Hovhannesian, the supposed scientist who organized the threats against Professor Stanford Shaw and who had him removed from his job [at University of California at Los Angeles].

"Richard Hovhannesian's elder son, Raffi Hovhannesian graduated from the history department of the University of California at Los Angeles in 1980 and became a specialist in Armenian history. He is a member of the youth branch of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and is the chairman of the said organization for the western district of the United States.

"Furthermore, like many other members of the touristic group, Raffi Hovhannesian is a member of the Armenian Assembly in Washington and teaches courses there to Armenian youth. One of the goals of the Armenian Assembly is to train young men and women who will take an active part in American political life. Raffi Hovhannesian was trained in his specialty as an aide to Congressman Nicholas Mavroulis who is of Greek origin. This case alone points to Armenian-Greek collaboration.

"Richard Hovhannesian's younger son, Armen Hovhannesian was admitted to the University of California at Berkeley in 1980 after graduating from high school in Los Angeles. He worked very hard to have a film shown to high school students about the Armenian genocide.

"Also in the group was Mark Malkhasian who is one of the leading figures in the anti-Turkish propaganda campaign being waged in the United States. He is the founder of the papers THE ARMENIAN MOVEMENT and THE HORIZON. He has a degree in history and frequently publishes articles in ASBAREZ about the Armenian genocide and the Armenian lands. He wrote four separate articles in the 48-page supplement published by Armenians in the Los Angeles HERALD EXAMINER [on 24 April 1982] dedicated to the Armenian genocide. He is also one of the organizers of the 24 April [Armenian Martyrs' Day] demonstrations.

"Also in the group was Professor Ara Avakian who came to Turkey in 1968 with a 32-member group and toured the eastern provinces and who was expelled from Turkey on charges of having waged anti-Turkish propaganda. In 1970, he entered Turkey again through the Soviet Union even though his entrance into the country was banned. He was expelled from Turkey through the Iranian border. When he returned to the United States, he wrote articles against Turkey. He teaches at various institutions of learning in the United States poisoning young minds with the idea of a fictitious Armenia."

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CSO: 4605/25

OPERATING BUDGETS FOR 1965-1983 ANALYZED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 989 4-10 Feb 83 pp 19-34

[Report by G. Boutaleb: "Growth of the Operating Budgets (1965-1983) - Priority to Educational and Social Services"]

[Text] The state is responsible for the living conditions of each citizen. It meets his material and moral needs and, in particular, his requirements for dignity and security (Constitution, Article 33).

Therefore, the National Charter enjoins the state, among other things, "to ensure social and cultural progress; make education available to all; guarantee the health of all its citizens; and watch over the constant improvement of their welfare."

Moreover, it has become obvious to all that the pursuit of economic development depends on meeting the citizens' basic needs.

Since the independence, the steady rise in the state's expenses, and more specifically those relating to its operating budget, was due to demographic growth, consolidation of services, the subsequent increase in the number of state employees, their reclassification, salary and pension increases, taking over vocational training work, management of new construction at national and local levels, and implementation of projects executed within the successive plans.

This growth, however, occurred in stages because it reflected not only the public authorities' decisions, based on the socio-economic situation, but also the fluctuations of the international economic situation (worldwide inflation, higher prices for imported goods and services, oil price revaluations or hazards of the hydrocarbon market, higher interest rates, etc).

Furthermore, the impact of these fluctuations was directly linked to the state's ability to meet its expenses, operating ones in particular, with appropriate resources (current tax revenues) generated by the country's economic activity.

Expressed in current dinars [DA] since 1965 (the first state budget denominated in the national currency), the growth of the operating budgets could only be meaningful within the context of an analysis by periods linked to the various phases of a national planning process influenced, however, by the world economic situation.

Discussed and adopted by the APN [National Popular Assembly], the 1965 appropriation bill introduced the monthly supply vote under the operating budget. The expansion of its headings made it possible to follow that of the state institutions. The presidency then regrouped the ministry of the interior, general finances, the information and planning administrations and the vocational training commissariat that were to become so many different ministers as early as 1966.

Henceforward, the appropriation bill was promulgated as an order until 1978.

Nineteen hundred and sixty-seven was a turning year because it introduced an overall development strategy with the launching of the first three-year plan (1967/1969). Operating credits were roughly 20 percent higher than those of 1966 and the development rate exceeded 100 percent, a fact which was to remain an exception.

Until 1968 however, current state revenues were to prove manifestly insufficient to meet current state expenses which, at the time, represented a very high percentage of total expenses. Therefore, despite a steady increase in current taxation, tied to the increase in economic activity, it already became necessary to draw on oil tax revenues (which, in this case represented only one-fifth to one-fourth of total state revenues) to ensure the performance of state services.

	(1) B. fonction. (2) (réalisations)	% accroissem. (3)	% réalisé (4)	(5) B Total Etat (réalisations) (2)	% B Total / (6) % Fisc ord / (7) (6) B. total (6) B total	
65	2 757		90.3 %	3 321	83 %	71.5 %
66	2 845	+ 3.1 %	88.9 %	3 649	77.9 %	65.5 %
67	3 397	+ 19.4 %	101.9 %	4 025	84.3 %	62.1 %
68	3 404	+ 0.2 %	96.1 %	4 612	73.8 %	62.5 %
69	3 687	+ 5.1 %	91.1 %	5 901	60.6 %	59.3 %

1. Operating budget; 2. Appropriations; 3. Increase rate; 4. Development rate;  
5. Total state budget; 6. Total budget; 7. Current taxation.

Yet, by the end of the three-year plan, the contribution of the state sector (837 million DA) to total state revenues (14.1 percent) reached a level never to be reached again. Having become too insignificant by 1975, no longer was it even to be collected.

It was however mostly from 1970 on that the operating budget began to grow steadily and substantially due to the impact of the implementation of projects executed within the framework of the three-year plan and to repercussions on the operating budget of the launching of a sizable investment program undertaken within the framework of the first four-year plan (1970/1973).

#### 1970/73: Coverage of Current Expenses by Current Revenues

In addition, the oil tax share was to increase considerably following the historical 1971 decisions (nationalization of the oil industry) and the oil price revaluation

# Growth of Operating Budgets (1965/1983)

(1)	Propositions des Finances	Réalisations (2)	% de réalis. (3)	% d'augmentation (réalisations) (4)	Budget total de de l'Etat (réalisation) (5)	% B. de fonctionne. (6) /B. total (7)	% Fiscalité ordinaire (8) /B. total (7)
1965	3.052	2.757	90,3 %		3.321	83 %	71,5 %
1966	3.200	2.845	88,9 %	+ 3,1 %	3.649	77,9 %	65,5 %
1967	3.332	3.397	101,9 %	+ 19,4 %	4.025	84,3 %	62,1 %
1968	3.539	3.404	96,1 %	+ 0,2 %	4.612	73,8 %	62,5 %
1969	3.890	3.578	91,9 %	+ 5,1 %	5.901	60,6 %	59,3 %
1970	4.447	4.253	95,6 %	+ 18,8 %	6.468	65,7 %	64,1 %
1971	4.915	4.686	95,3 %	+ 10,1 %	8.982	52,1 %	48,9 %
1972	5.600	5.384	97,5 %	+ 14,4 %	9.206	58,2 %	56,2 %
1973	6.430	6.270	97,5 %	+ 16,8 %	11.070	56,8 %	52,8 %
1974	7.673	7.220	94 %	+ 15,1 %	23.417	30,8 %	34 %
1975	13.168	12.272	93,1 %	+ 69,9 %	25.252	48,5 %	38,6 %
1976	14.600	13.193	90,3 %	+ 7,6 %	26.861	49,1 %	42,3 %
1977	15.850	15.268	96,3 %	+ 15,7 %	35.236	43,3 %	42,6 %
1978	18.165	17.580	96,7 %	+ 15,1 %	38.581	45,5 %	51,3 %
1979	20.621	20.096	97,4 %	+ 14,3 %	47.681	42,1 %	41 %
1980	27.775	26.940	96,9 %	+ 34 %	62.040	43,4 %	33,9 %
1981	36.195	34.204	94,4 %	+ 26,9 %	80.743	42,3 %	33,8 %
1982	42.238	42.238		+ 23,4 %	(85.000)	(49,6 %)	31,3 %
1983	50.421			+ 19,3 %	(98.667)	(51,1 %)	31,4 %

de 74 à 83 : x 6,9

de 79 à 83 : x 2,5 Estimated figures in parenthesis

1. Appropriation bill proposals; 2. Appropriations; 3. Development rate; 4. Increase rate; 5. Total state budget; 6. Operating budget; 7. Total budget; 8. Current taxation

begun at the end of 1973. The share contributed by the oil taxes was even to become dominant. As a matter of fact, as percentage of total revenues, it grew from 18.3 percent in 1971 to 34.6 percent in 1972 and to 57.2 percent in 1974. Furthermore, it was not to reach a similar level until 1979/1980 when a new revaluation of the price of brut occurred.

	Fiscalité pétrolière (1)	% d'accrois (2)	% des recettes totales de l'Etat (3)
1970	1.325	+ 0,3%/69	20,4%
1971	1.648	+ 24,3%	18,3 %
1972	3.188	+ 93,4%	34,6 %
1973	4.116	+ 29,1%	37,1%
1974	13.402	+ 325 % x 3,2	57,2%

1. Oil taxation; 2. Increase rate; 3. Total state revenues

In 1972 however, direct taxes (despite the dispensation of lowest incomes) and indirect taxes paid to the state by the taxpayers (current taxes) were almost enough to meet expenses incurred by the performance of public services such as education, public health, domestic and foreign intelligence; justice, various technical administrations, as well as many transfer expenses of a social nature which already characterized the current budget.

Moreover, meeting operating expenses through current taxation was to be practically the rule until 1975, and this, despite the many state services in socio-economic areas.

Current budget appropriations amounted then to 5,364 million DA (development rate: 97.5 percent), an increase of 14.4 percent as compared to 1971 (more than 10.1 percent for 1971 as compared to 1970 and 18.8 percent for 1970 as compared to 1969).

In this case, they represented 58.2 percent of total state expenses.

Educational and vocational training expenses (roughly one-third of the operating budget) came to 1,725,5 million DA and the amount of transfers of a social nature (especially credits to free medical care and better pensions paid to former Mojahedin) reached 1,418 million DA (between 1979 and 1972, health-related expenses increased by more than 25 percent).

In the area of internal accumulation, the general state budget was to be executed with a revenue surplus (over 1,033 million DA) which was to allow the state to repay its debts to the entire banking sector.

In 1973, the operating budget, executed at 97.5 percent as in 1972, exceeded 11 billion DA (16.8 percent more than in 1952).

Tax reliefs (dispensation for people with an annual income below 3,600 DA) were to affect 1,182,202 taxpayers (capital loss estimated at 173 million DA for local communities and the state).

Many industrial products, such as pharmaceutical products manufactured in Algeria or imported, cement and capital goods, were also exempted from customs duties.

Despite all these exemptions, current taxes increased by 12.8 percent as compared to 1972.

Educational and vocational training expenses always represented one-third of the operating budget and estimated public health expenses increased by 10.6 percent as compared to the previous year. In summary, during the period pertaining to the first four-year plan (1970/1973), the state budget grew from 6,468 million DA to 11,070 million DA (over 171 percent) and the operating budget, from 4,253 million DA to 6,270 million DA (over 147 percent)

	(1) B de fonct. (réalisation) (2)	Tx de réalisation (3)	% d'accrois (4)	B total(5) (réalisation) (3)	(1) % B. de fonct./ (5) B. total	Fiscalité ordinaire/ (5) (5) B. total
70	4 253	95.6%	+ 18.8%/61	6 468	65.7%	64.1%
71	4 686	95.3%	+ 10.1%	8 982	52.1%	48.9%
72	5 364	97.5%	+ 14.4%	9 205	58.2%	56.2%
73	6 270	97.5%	+ 16.8%	11 070	56.6%	52.8%

1. Operating budget; 2. Appropriation; 3. Development rate; 4. Increase rate;  
5. Total budget; 6. Current taxation

The major portion of the expenses were met by current tax revenues. Recourse to other taxes, especially oil, proved to be marginal.

Special Contribution of State Enterprises  
To Total Revenues (in Million DA)

70	71	72	73
722 (11.1%)	682 (7.5%)	610 (6.6%)	742 (8.7%)

The special contribution of the state enterprises to total revenues declined steadily. In 1972, the appropriation bill even called for the treasury not to offset (already!) losses due to bad management, i.e., the deficit of a state enterprise over 7 years old.

The very sizable growth of the oil tax during the first four-year plan (multiplied by more than 3) was to help finance an overall program of increased investments. As for the investment budget, it then grew from 1,961 million DA in 1970 (a level appreciably equal to that of 1969) to 3,719 million DA in 1973 (over 89 percent): 1,875 million.

The state budget balance (41 million DA), weak in 1971, was to show for 2 consecutive years, in 1972 and 1973, sizable surpluses (1,033 and 1,021 million DA) that were to allow the state to repay its debts to the public treasury and the banking sector.

Having been given priority during the period under consideration, 1970/1973, the socio-educational sector absorbed roughly one-third of the credits used under the operating budget.

Education-Vocational Training Expenses  
(in Million DA)

70	71	72	73
1173.6 (27.5%)	1466.7 (31.2%)	1725.5 (32.2%)	1976.3 (30.7%)

National education which was part of the national orientation ministry in 1964, became a ministry in its own right in 1966 and was then subdivided into two, even three, ministries during the first four-year plan, namely, the ministries of primary and secondary education, higher and scientific education and native and religious studies. Estimated credits allocated to education, roughly 549 million in 1964, were to reach, for the three ministries, a total of 1,652 million DA in 1973.

Henceforward, a trend emerged that was to continue during the period under consideration (1970/1983): Credits allocated annually to the ministry of higher education

and scientific research increased by roughly 30 percent due to the weakness of the infrastructure inherited at the onset, expanded basic education, proliferation of university centers, etc.

In addition, all the ministries, especially those with an economic bent, allocated a share of their budget to vocational training.

Furthermore, the estimated credits of the Ministry of Information which had become the Ministry of Information and Culture, were to grow from 59.4 million DA in 1970 to 91.4 million DA in 1973 (over 54 percent).

The state's "social services" also grew steadily from 1970 to 1973. Credits to which they were entitled, especially in the area of public health and pensions paid to former Mujahedin and their beneficiaries, grew from 643 million DA in 1970 to 1,049 million in 1973 (over 63 percent) and represented then 16.7 percent of the operating budget (14.9 percent in 1970).

The priority given the socio-educational sector (roughly half of the spending under the operating budget) and the gradual strengthening of the state's structures were to confer quite naturally an important place to "personnel expenses" in the classification by type.

The latter, estimated at 1,440 million DA (estimates) in 1965, reached 2,065 million in 1970 and 2,873 million in 1973 (over 39 percent between 1970 and 1973 but, in this case, they represented only between 45.8 and 45.8 [sic] percent of the operating budget expenses as compared to 52.2 percent in 1965, due to the diversification of state interventions.

	Management Expenses	Motor Pool	Equipment and Performance of Services	% / Operating Budget
			Total	
65	117	25	345	12.5 %
66	98	21	290	10.1 %
67	106	25	278	8.1 %
68	104	42	315	9.2 %
69	114	53	329	9.1 %
70	133	80	379	8.9 %
71	138	85	383	8.1 %
72	150	68	397	7.4 %
73	174	81	449	7.1 %
74	190	75	484	6.8 %
75	260	93	872	7.1 %
76	319	97	913	6.9 %
77	376	181	1,203	7.8 %
78	386	183	1,467	8.3 %
79	583	330	2,132	10.6 %
80	774	369	2,522	9.3 %
81	742	389	2,968	8.0 %
82	859	317	2,624	6.2 %
83	966	374	3,012	5.9 %

Between 1975 and 1983: x 3.45

Between 1977 and 1983: x 2.5

In this case, operating budget between 1975 and 1983: x 4.1

between 1977 and 1983: x 3.3

As for the heading "equipment and performance of services," even though its absolute value grew from 278 million DA in 1967 to 379 in 1970 and 449 million DA in 1973 (over 18.4 percent between 1970 and 1973), its relative share declined during the whole period and particularly during the first four-year plan (8.9 percent of the operating budget in 1970 and 7.1 percent in 1973).

On the other hand, the relative share of the subsidies was to increase: 387 million in 1970 and 761 million in 1973 (over 96.6 percent) or respectively 8.9 percent and 12.1 percent of the total operating budget expenses. It also increased with regard to the public debt service (portion chargeable exclusively to the public treasury).

(in Million DA)

1969	1970	1973
145 (3.9%)	283 (8.5%)	407 (6.4%)

The public debt increase (estimated at 8 billion DA in 1972 or 11.5 percent of external revenues and 9 billion in 1973) was due, in particular, to loans contracted to finance a greater number of projects (infrastructures in particular) within the framework of the first four-year plan.

The development rate imparted by the first four-year plan was to grow from 1954 on. In fact, it was estimated that the first year of the four-year plan would be a very propitious year for Algeria. The full effect of the oil price revaluation which occurred late in 1973, was, in this case, felt both domestically and abroad.

#### 1974/1977: Two-Fold Increase of the Operating Budget

Oil taxes grew from 4,116 million DA in 1973 to 13,402 million in 1974 (a multiplication by 3.25). Moreover, the general state budget of 23,417 million DA (over 15.1 percent in 1973), with 7,220 million designated for the operating budget, was to show a surplus of roughly 12 billion DA which were used by the treasury to finance the planned investments of the enterprises and, above all, to meet (already!) in the amount of 3.5 million DA, the rehabilitation of enterprises showing a deficit. The public treasury then repaid its debts to the Central Bank of Algeria (its position even became that of a creditor). The surplus balance of payments amounting to roughly 2 billion DA made it possible to strengthen foreign exchange reserves.

This favorable situation in the area of foreign finances was also to allow a 300 million SDR repayment to the International Monetary Fund or 1.5 billion DA under borrowing contracted on the 1973 Eurodollar financial market.

The operating budget remained geared to social services and vocational training. Former *Mojahedin* and government employees whose salaries were ridiculously low as compared to those paid by public enterprises were to benefit through the distribution

of national revenues (wage increases for white-collar workers and pensions for, among others, 75,000 widows and 95,000 persons of Mojahedin ancestry).

Activities of the health sector became particularly noticeable with the introduction of free medical care begun on 1 January 1974. Moreover, the first four-year plan had made great stride toward that end by rechanneling investments and their distribution throughout the national territory. Credits allocated for public health reached 564 million DA in 1974 or 27.7 percent more than in 1973.

Education and vocational training remained the privileged area of state services: over one million additional children and students attended schools during the first four-year plan which, furthermore, made a gigantic effort to set up facilities and their infrastructures for the coming years.

Education and vocational training was allocated 2,311 million DA in 1974 (30 percent of the operating budget).

Other measures of a social nature were also adopted in 1974:

Cancellation of the single total production tax and tax relief for some items (cement, household goods, educational material);

Creation of a new tax levied on luxury items (cars, small appliances, cigarettes, beer, etc): in 1974, the specific additional price support rate allowed the collection (estimates) of 445 million DA to subsidize production (23 million DA) or import staple commodities (cereals, milk, dried legumes, etc). Moreover, the disproportion between these two figures made it possible to measure the perennality of future efforts in this area.

	Fiscalité ordinaire (1)		Fiscalité pétrolière (3)		(4) Recettes totales	% Fiscalité pétrolière (3) / Recettes totales (4)		(5) Contribution du secteur d'Etat
	% d'excès (2)		% d'excès (2)			% des recettes totales		
65	2 376		447		3 121	13.4 %	44	1.3 %
66	2 292	+ 0.8 %	632	+ 41.3 %	3 649	17.3 %	195	5.3 %
67	2 502	+ 4.5 %	890	+ 39.2 %	4 025	21.8 %	280	6.4 %
68	2 888	+ 15.3 %	1 112	+ 26.3 %	4 612	24.1 %	351	7.6 %
69	3 503	+ 21.3 %	1 320	+ 18.7 %	5 901	22.3 %	437	14.1 %
70	4 151	+ 18.4 %	1 325	+ 0.3 %	6 480	20.4 %	722	11.1 %
71	4 397	+ 5.9 %	1 644	+ 24.1 %	6 997	18.3 %	682	7.5 %
72	5 180	+ 17.8 %	3 188	+ 93.4 %	9 205	34.6 %	610	6.6 %
73	6 846	+ 32.0 %	4 116	+ 29.1 %	11 070	37.1 %	742	6.7 %
74	7 876	+ 14.8 %	13 402	+ 32.6 %	23 417	57.2 %	1 524	6.5 %
75	9 771	+ 23.9 %	13 482	—	26 253	63.3 %	1 194	4.7 %
76	11 387	+ 16.6 %	14 340	+ 6.7 %	26 061	63 %		
77	16 017	+ 31.6 %	16 019	+ 26.6 %	36 216	61.1 %		
78	19 808	+ 31.8 %	17 345	+ 3.7 %	38 581	46 %		
79	19 880	+ 1.2 %	20 518	+ 6.8 %	47 881	55.8 %		
80	21 040	+ 7.6 %	37 688	+ 42 %	62 040	60.8 %		
81	27 314	+ 29.7 %	60 954	+ 35.3 %	80 743	83.1 %		
82	28 536	+ 2.6 %	168 829	—	188 000	188.8 %		
83	31 090	+ 18.3 %	169 485	—	188 000	188.2 %		

1. Current taxation; 2. Increase rate; 3. Oil taxation; 4. Total revenues; 5. Contribution from the state sector.

Moreover, the contribution of local communities, social security agencies and socialist enterprises (or roughly 2 billion DA in 1954 for the entire social budget) should also be taken into account if the impact of the social services is to be grasped comprehensively.

As early as 1975, however, the state budget was seen in a much less favorable context and projection (setback in oil revenues, galloping inflation and worldwide food shortages). Gains due to the revaluation of oil prices were practically wiped out by the spiraling price increases of food, imported products and consumers goods.

The total state budget, however, reached 25,252 million DA and the operating budget, which represented 48.5 percent of the total expenses, reached 12,272 million DA (development rate: 93.1 percent) and increased by 64.9 percent as compared to 1974. In this case, current taxes represented only 38.6 percent of total revenues. The contribution of the state sector, 1,194 million DA in 1975, then represented only 4.7 percent of total state revenues. SONATRACH and Air Algerie were the only ones to contribute an inflow to the state, after tax deductions.

The rehabilitation of companies showing a deficit (2.5 billion DA) by the public treasury which also granted them basic and working capital, continued in 1975. Furthermore, it became necessary to make a call for foreign loans to finance planned investments.

In addition, a 3.2 billion DA subsidy, to be used actually to meet 1974 and 1975 deficits, was planned under a strict price support policy for staple commodities, a policy inaugurated in 1975 to defend the population's buying power, despite the price explosion of products trading on the international market.

	Operating Budget	Personnel Expenses		Social Services		Public Debt		Subsidies	
		(1)	% / B.F.	(1)	% / B.F.	(1)	% / B.F.	(1)	% / B.F.
65	2 757	1 440	52.2 %	607	18.3 %	93	3.3 %	175	6.3 %
66	2 845	1 540	54.1 %	472	16.6 %	85	2.9 %	228	8 %
67	3 197	1 882	49.5 %	786	23.4 %	99	2.9 %	278	8.1 %
68	3 404	1 786	52.4 %	689	17.3 %	139	4 %	284	7.7 %
69	3 687	1 859	50.4 %	694	18.1 %	145	3.9 %	330	8.9 %
70	4 312	2 066	47.8 %	643	14.9 %	283	6.5 %	387	8.9 %
71	4 777	2 319	48.5 %	735	15.3 %	288	6 %	421	8.8 %
72	5 579	2 602	46.8 %	863	15.4 %	355	6.3 %	587	10.1 %
73	6 270	2 873	45.8 %	1 049	16.7 %	407	6.4 %	781	12.1 %
74	7 319	3 356	45.8 %	1 076	14.7 %	582	7.9 %	970	13.2 %
75	12 782	4 088	31.9 %	1 178	9.2 %	869	6.7 %	4 072	31.8 %
76	13 193	4 539	34.4 %	2 669	20.2 %	1 827	12.2 %	1 117	8.4 %
77	15 068	5 374	35.6 %	2 810	18.6 %	1 390	9.2 %	1 433	9.5 %
78	17 580	6 614	37.6 %			1 671	9.5 %	1 703	9.6 %
79	20 095	8 887	44.2 %	3 008	14.9 %	1 992	9.9 %	2 035	10.1 %
80	26 937	11 436	42.4 %	5 133	19 %	2 652	9.8 %	2 793	10.3 %
81	34 204	13 749	40.1 %	7 688	22.4 %	2 948	8.6 %	3 217	9.4 %
82	(42 238)	17 453	41.3 %	10 823	25.6 %	3 557	8.4 %	3 652	8.6 %
83	(50 421)	(19 892)	42.7 %	(8 092)	18 %	(5 029)	9.9 %	(4 301)	8.5 %
						+(41.3%/82)			

1. Operating budget

The 1975 operating budget also bore the burden of the revaluation of salaries and wages begun in 1974 and of the decentralization (estimate: creation of 20,000 new jobs, 13,000 of which in the teaching profession).

Educational and vocational training expenses reached 4,250 million DA (33 percent of the operating budget). All the ministries, however, also allocated for vocational training an often sizable portion of credits designated as operating credits (planning: 56.4 percent; youth and sports: 59 percent; agriculture and commerce: 15 percent; national defense: 20 percent, half of which for military service).

The 1975 appropriation bill also introduced many tax exemptions: suspension of all taxes affecting farmers; dispensation for wage earners with monthly salaries lower than or equal to 500 DA; and suspension of customs duties and the TUGP [Single Total Production Tax] for imported staple commodities (tax loss: 540 million DA).

In 1976, the operating budget executed at 90.3 percent (the lowest since 1966) reached 13,193 million DA (over 7.5 percent as compared to 1975, which actually represented a stagnation of expenses).

Fifty percent of the allocated credits were designated for expenses of a socio-educational nature. Due to a drop in the price of foodstuffs on the world market, price support spending was reduced by roughly 2 billion DA as compared to 1975.

The rehabilitation of enterprises continued, especially in the iron industry sector. The appropriation bill set forth that payment of the special contribution from public enterprises (which, as yet, has not been reinstated) would be suspended in 1976 because it had become too insignificant.

The external debt charged to the state budget grew from 6.7 percent of the operating budget in 1975 (869 million DA) to 12.2 percent in 1976 (1,622 million DA) which is mainly explained by the call for outside financial assistance to ensure the financing of productive investments scheduled under the terms of the ambitious development plan inaugurated in 1974 (over 100 billion DA) and, more specifically, designated for the development of natural gas and the increase of oil exports.

The 1977 appropriation bill, the last to be approved by the government and to be presented to the national and international press by the finance minister, provided for operating expenses higher than the 15.1 percent of the preceding year (15,268 million DA) due, mainly, to: The index point increase (over 9.6 percent) applicable to government employees' wages as of 1 January 1977; increase in school attendance; extension of free medical assistance; and higher pensions paid to former Mojahedins and their beneficiaries. The amount for price supports continued to decline (1,311 million DA) due to the steady decline of the price of commodities on the international market.

Education and vocational training received 27.4 percent of the current budget. The number of students in primary and secondary schools was to increase by 343,043, 88,275 of which came from the private education sector.

The ministries of higher education, labor and vocational training estimated their credits at 3,889 million dinars. Credits designated for public health amounted to 930 million DA (over 15.4 percent as compared to 1976).

When presenting the appropriation bill to journalists in 1977, the minister of finance declared among other things: "In the current international economic situation, it has been deemed urgent and essential to intensify the national production effort to alleviate foreign dependency on, in particular, foodstuffs, and to allow the pursuit and rationalization of a high investment rate which, alone, is capable of ensuring, in the long run, a worthy economic and social progress."

In summary, during the second four-year plan (1974/1977) the operating budget grew from 7,220 million DA in 1974 to 15,268 million DA in 1977. It was, therefore, multiplied by 2.1.

(The development rate ranged from 90 to 96 percent.) The relative share of the operating budget as compared to the total state budget was lower than that of the first four-year plan. This meant that the state allocated a larger share of the state budget to its investment effort; however, it should nevertheless be noted that a sizable portion of the scheduled investments was executed relying heavily only on outside sources (which showed the increase in the state's external public debt service: 582 million DA in 1974 and 1,390 million in 1977). Furthermore, a sizable drop in the relative share of current taxes in the overall state revenues (lower than those of the operating budget in the total expenses) could be noted with the result that, to break even, oil taxes had to be used extensively in 1975 and 1976 (between one-seventh and one-fifth of the amount of the operating budget).

The sums designated for "equipment and performance of services: (an average of 7 percent of the 1974/1977 operating budget) grew from 494 million DA (of which 190 million were designated for management expenses) to 1,203 million (management expenses: 376). They were therefore multiplied by 2.43. "Personnel expenses" (more than 62 percent over the same period) reached 5,354 million DA in 1977 as compared to 3,356 million in 1974 (increase in the number of employees, especially in the teaching profession; revaluation of government workers' wages; decentralization).

Growth of Expenses for Educational, Vocational Training and Social Services  
(in Million DA and in Percentage of the Operating Budget)

(1)	74	75	76	77
Education formation, (2)				
action sociale (3)	- 30 %	33 %	25,3 %	27,4 %
(Santé anciens moudjahidins). (4)	- 14,7 %	9,2 %	20,2 %	18,6 %

1. Education; 2. Training; 3. Social services; 4. (Health; former Moudjahedins).

This sector which benefited from the major portion of the investments appropriated since 1967, did not, as yet, participated in the accumulation-of-capital process (chargeable exclusively to the oil sector); on the other hand, this non-participation led to substantial budget levies (rehabilitation subsidies; allocation of operating funds; etc) which helped feed domestic inflation.

	(1) (2)	B de fonct. (réalisation)	Taux de réalisat. (3)	% d'accroît. (4)	B. Total 5) (réalisat.) (2)	% B. fonct. (1) B. total (5)	% Fiscalité ordinaire/ (6) B total (5)
74		7 220	94 %	+15.1%/73	23.417	30.8 %	34 %
75		12 272	93.1 %	+69.9%	25.252	48.5 %	38.6 %
76		13.193	90.3 %	+ 7.5%	26.861	49.1 %	42.3 %
77		15.268	96.3 %	+15.7%	35.236	43.3 %	42.3 %

1. Operating budget; 2. (Appropriations); 3. Development rate; 4. Increase rate; 5. Total budget; 6. Current taxation.

Concurrent with the economic development induced by the implementation of the second four-year plan, current tax revenues grew from 7,956 million DA in 1974 (already more than 36.4 percent over 1973) to 15,017 million DA in 1977 or a growth of 88 percent, but, at the same time, expenses related to the operating budget were multiplied by 2.1.

#### Growths Recorded Between 1970 and 1977 (in Million DA)

	1970/73	1974/77	1970/77
Budget général de l'Etat (1)	+ 71%	+ 50%	X 5.4
Budget de fonct. 2	+ 47%	X 2.1	X 3.5
Fiscalité ordin. 3	+ 16%	+ 88%	X 3.6
Fiscalité pétro. 4	X 3.1%	+ 34%	X 13.5
Budget d'équip. 5	+ 89%	X 2.5	X 5.4

1. General state budget; 2. Operating budget; 3. Current taxation; 4. Oil taxation; 5. Investment budget.

As for the oil taxes, they were to reach 18,019 billion DA in 1977 (more than 34 percent over 1974 or a 13,402 million contribution). The amount of total revenues provided by the oil taxes during the second four-year plan reached 59,120 million DA, as compared to 10,277 million during the first four-year plan: It was therefore multiplied by 5.75.

When presenting its 1978 appropriation bill to the APN, the finance minister specified, among other things, that nearly 30 percent of an overall increase in operating expenses proposed for 1978 was designated for education and vocational training activities; now, in 1977, the relative share of the educational and vocational training expenses in the operating budget already constituted one of the highest percentage in the world.

**Educational and Vocational Training Expenses  
(in Million DA)**

1977	1978
4.250	4.905 soit 15.4% de + qu'en 1977

	Public Health		Moudjahidin\$	
		% ↑		% ↑
1966	280		280	
1967	280		279	
1968	287	+ 2,8 %	300	
1970	324	+ 12,7 %	330	
1972	406	+ 25,1 %	379	
1973	449	+ 10,6 %	417	
1974	564	+ 25,7 %	399	
1975	725	+ 28,3 %	432	
1976	805	+ 11,1 %	427	
1977	930	+ 15,4 %	473	
1978	1 033	+ 11 %	486	
1979	1 225	+ 8,9 %	659	+ 35,5 %
1980	1 564	+ 27,6 %	1 280	+ 94,2 %
1981	2 044	+ 30,6 %	1 764	+ 37,8 %
1982	2 516 (2 229)	+ 9, %	2 070	+ 17,3 %
1983	2 405	+ 7,8 %	2 276	+ 10 %

\*Estimated figures taken from the appropriation bill.

Public health from 1974 (free medical care) to 1983: Credits x 4.26.

Moudjahidin\$ from 1978 (first budget discussed and adopted by the APN) to 1983.

→ credit appropriations x 4.68

"Allocating a relative share larger than in 1978 for the training of men is a deliberate and voluntary political choice which, among state services, gives priority to investments for the betterment of man." Obviously, it also included the wage revaluation factor (announced in September 1977) and its corollary, pension increases; the ITS cancellation for monthly wages lower than or equal to 800 DA (650 DA in 1977); as well as increases in the health budget.

Executed at 96.7 percent, the operating budget reached 17,580 million DA (or 45.5 percent of total state expenses). Current taxes which, in this case, supplied 51.3 percent of total revenues allowed, the adequate coverage of these operating expenses.

Oil taxes, however, declined as compared to the previous year (-3.7 percent), dropping from 18,019 million DA to 17,365 million before undergoing a spectacular recovery in 1979 due to the new revaluation of oil prices which occurred that year: 26,512 million DA or 52.6 percent more than in 1978 and, as relative share, the highest percentage since 1974 of total state revenues, namely, 55.6 percent.

In 1979, the operating budget (development rate: 95.6 percent) amounted to 20,096 million DA (more than 14.3 percent over 1978) and current taxes (41 percent of total state revenues) were, alone, almost enough to cover its expenses which represented 42.1 percent of state expenses.

The 1979 appropriation bill began a decentralization effort in favor of local communities by transferring to them certain expenses which, until then, had been assumed by the state budget. Beginning with 1 January 1979, the maintenance of junior and secondary schools was transferred to the governorates and that of elementary schools to the communes which also became responsible for the maintenance of local mosques. To allow the communities to meet these new expenses, the state transferred to them the portion of the across-the-board payment collected for its benefit.

The overall estimated educational and vocational training expenses amounted to 5,694 million DA (4,231 million DA for education, more than 26.3 percent over 1978; 1,150 million for higher education and scientific research, more than 30.2 percent over 1978; and 313 million for the ministry of labor and vocational training).

Funds for social activities exceeded 3 billion DA (over 14.9 percent of the operating budget expenses).

Credits allocated to the Ministry of Health, 1,225 million DA (more than 8.9 percent over 1978) and granted to the Mojahedins increased by over 35 percent in one year, going from 466 million in 1978 to 659 in 1979. It was one of the areas which came under the APN's legislation. (Without question, Article 151 of the Constitution pertains to the general rules relative to the protection of Mojahedins and their beneficiaries.)

Price supports (900 million DA) for staple commodities were maintained at the 1978 level. In addition to this measure for the support of mass consumer goods, a subsidy for school and university books appeared for the first time in 1979, thus ending the aid given in that area to the National Pedagogic Institute and the University Publication Office.

Particular consideration was given to the Ministry of Housing and Construction whose operating budget was increased by 28.6 percent in 1 year, to allow the development and consolidation of its structures. The 1979 appropriation bill called for (Article 5) an interest subsidy (on the basis of taxable revenues) granted by the public treasury on CNEP [Algerian National Savings and Insurance Bank] loans designated for construction and the purchase of housing units sold by public promoters.

The revaluation of oil prices which occurred in 1979 and the launching of the five-year plan marked a new phase in the development of the operating budget, following an interlude of nearly 2 years from the theoretical end of the second two-year plan in 1977.

(in Million DA)

	(1) B. fonct. (réalisation) (2)	Taux de réalisations (3)	Taux d'accroiss. (4)	B. total (5)	% B. fonct. / (1) (5) B. total	(6) % Recettes ordinaires/ (5) B. total
77	15.268	96,8 %	+ 15,7%	35.236	43,3 %	42,6 %
78	17.580	98,7 %	+ 15,1%	38.581	45,6 %	51,3 %

1. Operating budget; 2. (Appropriation); 3. Development rate; 4. Increase rate;  
5. Total budget; 6. Current revenues.

In 1980, the operating budget reached 26,940 million DA (more than 34 percent over 1979) and captured 43.4 percent of total state expenses. Although current revenues proved to be much higher than estimated (over 28 percent), due to tax adjustments executed in 1979, current taxes, however, supplied only 33.8 percent of state revenues.

#### 1980/1984: Greater Recourse to Oil Taxation

A very large number of tax exemptions and reductions of applicable rates had indeed been offered these past few years, either to promote or stimulate a given sector or to reduce expenses in another given sector or product. It was the case, in particular, of agriculture, mining, certain industrial sectors, educational and cultural services, sports, small producers, merchants, persons benefiting from service allowances for mass consumers goods, equipment and raw materials. It was, therefore, roughly one-fourth of the operating budget that needed to be covered by levies on oil taxes (37,658 million DA in 1980 or over 60 percent of total state revenues).

The homogenization of the oil tax system occurred in 1980: oil taxes were henceforward applicable to the entire oil sector, whether liquid or gaseous, (a rate uniformly set at 85 percent of realized profits).

Obviously, priority continued to be given to education and vocational training (7,941 million in 1980) and social services.

Still, the appropriation bill noted that technicians trained to participate in the production effort were very often assigned in large numbers to administrative duties and that, very often, a training facility would train its students for the use of a single company. Estimated credits allocated to the Ministries of Health (1,564 million or more than 27.6 percent over 1979) and of Mojahedins (1,280 million or more than 94.2 percent over 1979) increased substantially.

Moreover, the proposed levy on social security funds (or 1,126 million DA) actually matched the financing of medicines, overall expenses for medical personnel and 61.8 percent of the expenses for paramedical personnel. In addition, the share of the Central Algerian Pharmacy which appeared for the first time in the budget of the health and sanitation sector "matched the exceptional profits achieved by that organization in its medicines purchasing and distribution operations." (Appropriation bill.) Such a situation, however, can only be puzzling taking into account the difficulty of obtaining supplies noted over the last months of 1979 and the social extent of pharmaceutical products' sales.

"The largest increases in the operating budget must go to the sectors which the nation has decided to promote, namely, education, vocational training and health," so declared the finance minister during the presentation of the budget to the APN, prior to stressing the "sacred nature of the duties due to the Mujahedins and their beneficiaries."

Additional credits were allocated to increase price supports for staple commodities; their total amount grew from 900 to 1,945 million DA. The public debt service increased by 33 percent over 1979 to reach 2,652 million DA (or 9.8 percent of the operating budget in 1980).

Moreover, during budget discussions, the parliamentaries gave special consideration to the problem of participation of socialist enterprises in the required accumulation of capital. Noting that a sizable portion of the tax revenues was being used to meet operating expenses and that, to finance economic and social investments, the state was forced to call up so-called temporary resources of domestic (partly through money creation) and foreign (loans) origins, the elect earnestly requested that important measures be adopted, particularly in the area of control.

Within the framework of the restructuralization of socialist enterprises, the 1980 appropriation bill (Article 7) authorized the finance minister to grant loans not exceeding 4 billion DA, for financial restructuralization and creation of complementary working capital for self-managed farms and national enterprises of the public sector.

The 1981 appropriation bill lifted the ceiling to 6 billion DA and also authorized the minister to consolidate the permanent liabilities of the socialist enterprises by increasing their own funds through conversion of the state's assistance from temporary (and therefore reimbursable), granted until 31 December 1979, to permanent.

In its presentation of the 1981 appropriation bill, the finance minister once again reported on "the still inadequate financial accumulation of the production sector."

The operating budget which grew from 26,937 million DA in 1980 to 34,204 million in 1981 (over 34 percent), absorbed, in this case, 41.3 percent of total state expenses (current taxes: only 31.2 percent of revenues).

The sizable portion of the operating budget designated for social services was essentially evident in the following sectors: education and vocational training (estimated credits: 4,033 million DA); health and sanitation services (more than 2,044 million DA allocated to public health or 39.6 percent over 1980); services for the population (as scheduled 1,764 billion or more than 37.8 percent over 1980); price supports (authorized ceiling set at 2,325 million DA); and wage revaluations.

Up to 30 and 33 percent of the 1980 and 1981 operating expenses were met through levies on oil tax proceeds. The 1982 reserve ratio called for in the presentation-of-the-budget report was 18.4 percent.

According to estimates, the 1982 operating budget (more than 23.4 percent over 1981) reached 41,307 million DA or 49.6 percent of total expenses, whereas current taxes represented only 31.4 percent of total revenues. Moreover, the report indicated that "operating expenses increase faster than oil revenues whose growth it follows and lags."

Revenues estimated at 56,829 million DA for oil taxes alone (smaller by roughly 2 billion DA) did not materialize and the same uncertainty hangs over those for 1983 (estimates: 59, 465 million DA). The 1983 appropriation bill indicates that "Budget revenues generated from oil taxes (over 60 percent of expected total revenues) are very uncertain, due to the substantial decline being currently experienced on the international money, as well as oil, market."

Price supports for mass consumers good and staple commodities were 3 billion DA in 1981. A credit for 3,850 million DA was entered in 1982 under a subsidy to the Price Support and Equalization Fund. A 10 percent tax on the price of foreign travel tickets will be allocated to that fund in 1983. Furthermore, the 1982 and 1983 appropriation bills, like the two previous ones, propose a whole series of measures chiefly aimed at the financial rehabilitation of enterprises (restructuralization credits, budgetary aid, etc).

The 1983 operating budget of 50,421 million DA (more than 19.3 percent over 1982) represents 51.1 percent of the total expenses of the state budget.

Current taxes, however, despite a rather substantial increase (more than 16.3 percent over 1982), represent only 31.4 percent of the revenues available to the state budget or 31,000 million DA, according to estimates (under consideration, a recourse to oil taxes: 27 percent). Moreover, the 1983 appropriation bill proposes a whole series of tax readjustments showing a willingness to focus on a tax system based on a search for objective elements to set up the tax base; a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, especially through a more vigorous action against tax fraud; and a distribution of the tax burden on the basis of priorities assigned by the plan to promote some sectors.

In summary, the 1980's initiated a new course of action which could prove dangerous should the emerging trend fail to be quickly reversed. Operating budgets are indeed increasing at a very rapid rate which nevertheless seems to be slowing down in 1983. As it stands, this growth does not correspond to a development consistent with the economic activity (or rather, the latter is not always fiscally mastered) since, as compared to the total expenses, current taxes which declined by 41 percent in 1979, went to 31.4 percent in 1983. Concurrently, revenues generated by the oil taxes (roughly 60 percent of total revenues), while still sizable in 1980 and 1981 (over 42 percent and 35.3 percent respectively), seem to be getting substantially smaller. Taking into account recent development in the oil market (failure of the latest OPEC conference, lower prices for crude on the free market which has become dominant and the difficulties encountered during negotiations on gas contracts), it is likely that the trend will continue.

In addition to the growing number of non-reducible expenses reflecting all the priorities assigned by the country's high authorities to the many-sided services of the state, a very sizable increase is also noted in the expenses reflecting the international economic and financial situation (price increases of imported goods and services, rising interest rate, etc). Thus, in 1983, the "public debt" heading is able to show a sizable increase in absolute value (the percentage did not change very much in relation to the operating budget, 8.9 percent); it grew from 2,656 million DA in 1980 to 5,029 in 1983 (over 89.3 percent) due to a rise in the price of credits and to the repayment of intergovernmental loan annuities which had fallen due. As a matter of fact, credits entered under this heading are designated for the repayment of the foreign debt, as well as for the payment of interests to the

(2)	(1) B. fonct. (réalisation)	taux de réalis. (3)	Taux d'accroiss. (4)	B. total (5) réalis. (2)	% B. fonct. / (1) B. total (5)	% Fiscalité ordinaire/ (5) B. total (5)
80	26 940	96.9 %	+ 34%/79	62.040	43.4 %	33.9 %
81	34 204	94.4 %	+ 26.9%	80.743	42.3 %	33.8 %
82	(42 238)		(+ 23.4%)	(85 000)	(49.6%)	(31.3 %)
83	50.421		(+ 19.3%)	(98.667)	(51.1%)	(31.4 %)

Estimated figures in parenthesis

1. Operating budget; 2. (Appropriation); 3. Development rate; 4. Increase rate;  
5. Total budget; 6. Current taxation

domestic debt which increased by 1,300 million DA (interests on treasury deposits, treasury bills and capital assets).

Yet, as in previous years, the 1983 operating budget continues to be characterized by the implementation of the austerity policy, especially in the area of purchase of "equipment and performance of service," a heading which, in this case, represents only 5.9 percent of the operating budget. Whereas the operating budget increased by over 87.1 percent from 1980 to 1983, expenses under that heading advanced by only 19.4 percent. It should be noted, however, that, in the long run, restrictions in that area may prove detrimental to the smooth performance of services (such is the case, in particular, of customs and the tax administration).

In other respects, measures relative to the application of the Worker's General Statute, wage revaluations and the priority given to the educational, vocational training and health sectors lead to a substantial increase in "personnel expenses" (roughly 40 percent of the operating budget from 1980 to 1983, which grew from 8,887 million in 1979 to 19,895 million DA in 1983; a multiplication by 2.2). In the interim, to be sure, the operating budget was multiplied by 2.5.

As for "social services" expenses, reflecting the state's effort in the redistribution of revenues as well as the protection of the workers' buying power, and regrouping, mainly, scholarships and student grants, pensions, free medical care as well as other forms of services undertaken under the ministry of health and the secretariat of state for social affairs, they were multiplied by 2.7 from 1979 to 1983 and the subsidies by 2.1.

Appropriations to the Ministry of Health (multiplied by 4.26 since 1974) grew from 1,225 million DA in 1979 to 2,405 in 1983 (over 96.3 percent) and credits allocated to the Ministry of Mojahedins were multiplied by nearly 3.4. Moreover, since 1978, date of the first budget discussed before and adopted by the APN, credits were multiplied by 4.68.

Finally, with regard to the educational and vocational training sector (Ministry of Education, Higher Education, Labor and Vocational Training), estimated overall expenses reached 4,232 million DA in 1979 and 11,798 million DA in 1983 (or a little less than one-fourth of the operating budget, not counting the vocational training expenses of the other ministries); therefore, they almost tripled in the interim.

Estimated credits allocated to the Ministry of Information and Culture (individualized in 1983) increased by 63 percent, growing from 270 million DA in 1979 to 442 million in 1983.

Current state budget revenues (direct and indirect taxes, registrations and stamps, various business taxes and customs duties) express quantitatively and qualitatively the ability of any national system of production to show surpluses. Therefore, the effort of any country anxious to ensure its economic independence must lead to the steady growth of the current tax system, not through tax increases, but through economic production and productivity levels, as suggested in the series of reports submitted by the APN's planning and finance commission and in the series of state-budget-presentation reports. As a matter of fact, in the worthy prospect of a stable budget balance, ensuring the totality of the operating expenses rests with the current tax system which is closely dependent on the profit-earning potential of the system of production.

It may be difficult to reach this goal taking into account the emerging trend of the past few years.

Still, it should be stressed that, until now, the allocation of oil revenues to cover operating expenses made it possible to meet some of the basic needs of the population. Meeting social needs is one of the determining factors of development. On the other hand, it was noted that, until now, no surpluses could be accumulated when oil revenues were allocated to investment spending and that large sums of money had been wasted due to the lack of mastery over the system of production already in place.

Return to a sound situation, i.e., the coverage of operating expenses by current state revenues, therefore implies a better use of resources through a selective spending policy enabling the state to continue its services in areas eminently useful to society (education and vocational training, health, security and aid to the extremely underprivileged) and to curb non-priority spending (creation of establishments taking the place of existing services).

A better profit-earning potential for revenues through mastery of the system of production is, moreover, deemed essential. The huge investments already allocated should indeed, finally begin to show a profit and contribute to increasing revenues from current taxes as well as ensure an accumulation of capital currently charged exclusively to the oil sector (exhaustible resources).

This profit-earning potential is deemed the more essential as other causes, such as the gradual implementation of the SGT, compulsory education (for all children up to the age of 16) and the measures adopted to benefit the health and cultural sectors in accordance with the resolutions of the Central Committee, are superimposed on the traditional causes of growth of the operating budget. Obviously, all these measures have a direct impact on the operating budget as well as on the implementation of projects executed within the plan, the gradual implementation of measures pertaining to decentralization and the management of new structures at regional and local levels.

6887

CSO: 4519/145

POLICE ACTION AGAINST BEN BELLA ANALYZED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 272, 7 Feb 83 pp 26-27

[Article by Al-Salami al-Hasani: "Franco-Algerian Relations Have Improved: Raid on Ben Bella's Home Preceded by Theft in Which His Personal Guard Participated"]

[Text] In the aftermath of the raid by French police on the home of the former Algerian president Ahmad Ben Bella and their arrest of those found there during Ben Bella's absence while he was living in Geneva, questions have multiplied concerning the true motives and goals of the operation. The French police and the authorities maintain that the affair has nothing to do with politics at all. Rather, it had to do with an investigation into a burglary in which one of the persons arrested in the house of the former Algerian president was involved. At the same time, Ahmad Ben Bella's friends charge that the French authorities had tried via the foreign ministry to convince him to leave France. However, the strike by Renault workers and the statement by Pierre Moreau, the French premier, concerning "elements of an Islamic nature which have nothing to do with the social situation in France" have added new dimensions to this issue. Is there any relationship between the two issues? Is the goal of the whole operation to get rid of Ahmad Ben Bella in a quiet and peaceful manner?

The facts of the case go back to a burglary committed against a French businessman in which an Algerian citizen by the name of Yusef Hashim had a role. The incident happened on June 5, 1981. During the investigation, the French police discovered that Hashim had started working in the special security unit charged with protecting the former Algerian president Ahmad Ben Bella, and that he began this new job only a few months after the theft, which had not produced much in the way of profit for those who had committed it. However, the police who had not arrested Hashim after finding out where he lived, namely, in Ahmad Ben Bella's house, left the matter and merely informed the French intelligence agency, which had been investigating the activity of the former Algerian president on request from higher authorities. Last month a representative of Gaston Defferre, the French minister of the interior, contacted Ahmad Ben Bella with a request from the Algerian authorities that he cease his political activities and 'suggested' that he leave France. In fact Ahmad Ben Bella did leave for Geneva, Switzerland. On Tuesday, the 20th of January 1983, the French

criminal police received orders from higher authorities to raid the house of the former Algerian president, which is located in Mounarcie in the suburbs of Paris, in order to arrest a suspect who had participated in a burglary in 1981. A warrant for his arrest was issued. The orders contained precise information concerning the house and its inhabitants which asserted that those present within were carrying firearms of various types and that it would be necessary to stage the raid at night. In fact the police unit assigned the task did raid the house and discover quantities of arms. The five men found in the house offered no resistance. In fact, one of them asked the police if they wanted to drink any tea. Rather than just arresting Yusuf Hashim, the police arrested everyone else present in the house, they being Ahmad Ben Bella's private guards: Muhammad 'Aidi, the former Algerian general director of national security during Ben Bella's time in power; Yunis Makbul; Muhammad Kalthumi; and the brother of Yusuf Hashim. After interrogating them, Yusuf Hashim was put in prison, while the others were expelled to Switzerland, which refused to accept them. They were still, at the time this report was being prepared, in the international zone under the observation of the French border police.

Three additional points must be added to the raid at Ahmad Ben Bella's house. First of all, the higher French authorities know very well indeed that Ahmad Ben Bella is surrounded by an armed personal guard and that he has been since he came to France, because the former president of Algeria, according to his own statements, does not trust the French police, whom he knows very well. Secondly, the raid occurred at a suspicious time since it preceeded the trip by French President Francois Mitterrand to Morocco, by only two days, where it was expected that he would discuss a number of important topics, especially the issue of the Western Sahara. Considering that the orders for the break-in came from higher authorities, it is not pushing things to suppose that Paris wanted to present a gift to the Algerian authorities in order to 'buy' their silence concerning Mitterrand's visit to Morocco and the results expected to emerge from this visit, especially since the 'Algerian lobby within the Socialist Party has made Mitterrand look like King Hasan II's biggest ally, and has made it seem that he has abandoned the essence of his "socialist policy." This 'gift' consisted of peacefully compelling Ahmad Ben Bella to leave France, especially since the French socialist government has some views of its own on the activities of the former Algerian president. The third matter connected with the raid on Ahmad Ben Bella's home was made clear by Premier Pierre Moreau in his statement concerning the strike by immigrant workers and their use of Islam to incite people to strike, lies hidden in his activity in France. The French authorities doubt that Ahmad Ben Bella had any tie to the recent demonstration in which the Renault workers went on strike and asked as part of their demands that a place for them to pray in be set up inside the factory. Indeed, the police noticed that the strikers practiced religious observances during the general meetings which they held in the factory and that most of this movements leaders were Algerians or Moroccans.

There is no doubt that the Algerian authorities frankly asked the French government to work on expelling Ahmad Ben Bella from France because he

had begun to pose a great danger to the Algerian emigrant colony whose numbers now exceed one million (officially 800,000). President Chadli Bendjedid did not, during his short visit to Paris last December, conceal the existence of differences between France and Algeria on the matter of emigration, the crux of these differences lying in the presence of an Algerian personality around whom the Algerian colony was oriented. Neither Algeria nor Paris doubt that the first president of independent Algeria aims by means of his activities on the 'three continents', as the newspaper Al-Mujahid says, to "return to power in his country in order to save it from dictatorship, humiliating conditions, and weakness," according to one of the publications put out by the comrades of Ahmad Ben Bella abroad. Indeed, those who follow the activity of the former Algerian president note that he has recently begun to focus more on the Algerian situation, which has begun to be marked by domestic disturbances as a result of the escalating wave of opposition to the regime of Chadli Bendjedid, who has accused Ahmad Ben Bella of being behind the recent disturbances and those people recently arrested by Algerian authorities for setting up 'Islamic societies' with the aim of carrying out 'sabotage'. Tape cassettes and documents seized by the police all speak of Ahmad Ben Bella. Some of the tapes, which are recorded in his own voice, call for 'change' in Algeria. This activity and orientation, which draw forth the anger of the Algerian authorities, do not please the French socialist government either, whose leaders want to atone for French guilt in the Algerian war by setting up excellent relations with the existing Algerian authorities.

Ahmad Ben Bella's chances of returning to power might be rather slim at present, but his chances of taking revenge on those who arrested him seem fairly good, since he is prepared to use any means to attain that goal. It seems that he has discovered in Islam, whether sincerely or merely as a political tactic, his great goal which may lead him one day to power, and for one reason: Islam, as it is understood by the Algerian people, is nothing but an expression of secret desires which the political forces such as the Liberation Front Party or the Marxist opposition forces allied with or opposed to it which live in secrecy, have been unable to express or fulfill. Islam in Algeria does not differ much from Ahmad Ben Bella's understanding of it, which amounts to Arabism, the revolutionary spirit, liberation and 'applause' for any revolution in the world, no matter what its nature, as well as sympathy for minorities. In the absence of any secular thought in Algeria capable of producing solutions to the country's difficult problems, the return to the intellectual roots of the Algerian Liberation war, to which Ahmad Ben Bella is still tied by bonds of emotion seems to be the best and easiest solution for all those outside the power structure in Algeria, who feel resentment toward the regime founded by Houari Boumedienne and inherited by Chadli Bendjedid.

Now that Ahmad Ben Bella has left France and been isolated, probably temporarily, from the Algerian emigrant colony by means of an operation he describes as "a political operation with the aim of expelling me from France," and which the French authorities describe as "an operation subordinate to common justice and having no political connotation," the case of Ahmad Ben Bella has become, perhaps despite him and despite even the French administration, a French issue after having caused wide-ranging

reactions on the political and journalistic levels, and after Pierre Moreau slipped up by linking the affair with the phenomenon of those involved in the strikes using the emigrant workers. At any rate, it is certain that no operation such as this will deter Ahmad Ben Bella from his opposition to the regime of Chadli Bendjedid. Rather, it has strengthened him in his role as a 'martyr' to the alliance between the Algerian and French authorities against him, the man who "does not want power, but is satisfied with defending his thoughts and the oppressed of the world," as he himself put it.

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CSO: 4594/211

## ALGERIA

### WAVE OF ARRESTS EXAMINED

London AL-DUSTUR In Arabic No 273, 14 Feb 83 pp 29-30

[Article by Al-Salami al-Hasani: "Via Arrests and Security Measures in Algeria: Interpol Is Looking for Bouteflika In the Home of Masmoudi in Paris"]

[Text] Algeria these days is living through great and unprecedented transformations and changes, which are felt by the foreign visitor who notices the numerous extraordinary measures enacted which give the capital of Algiers an air of being in a state of emergency. For the first time since Ahmad Ben Bella was overthrown in 1965, travelers are being subjected to intensified searches in the airport and at border crossings by the security forces and the army.

Certain information obtained in Paris says that the internal security forces have been called out several times during the first month of this year as part of the search for fugitives in the weapons and explosives case and in the 'religious tendency' case. However, the most important step taken by the Algerian authorities, and on which they have remained silent, has been the arrest of a number of important army and security officers and their removal to areas outside of their influence, to which they were appointed at the start of the reign of the late president Houari Boumedienne.

After these changes, a group of officers issued a statement of solidarity with those who had been transferred. President Chadli Bendjedid described the statement as showing weakness and submissiveness to domestic and foreign pressure and issued orders for the arrest of every suspect person within the ranks of the army.

As part of these measures, Massaoud Zeghar was arrested. He is a well known Algerian businessman who was among those close to President Houari Boumedienne and used to undertake, in an unofficial capacity, political missions assigned him by Boumedienne. Zeghar began his life accumulating wealth when he was an assistant to Boussoul, the person responsible for purchasing weapons during the war of liberation. After independence,

Zeghar found that his contacts qualified him to be the Algerian intermediary for all kinds of purchases, especially from the United States. He was Boumediene's man in his contacts with American circles, just as he was responsible for concluding a number of American contracts with Algeria. However, Massaoud Zeghar acquired a big reputation when he boarded his private airplane to kidnap his sister from Canada after she had married a Frenchman. He brought her to Algeria to marry her off to an Algerian citizen against her will. Algerian security made things easy for him because Boumediene imagined that this marriage would be an opening in his inner circle for various powers, especially French circles. But the woman fled and returned to her original husband, and the issue was put to rest. As for Zeghar's arrest today, it has no link to this subject but rather to opposition to corruption, bribery and the exploitation of influence which Chadli Bendjedid has gradually been amenable to since the start of his term, and which has now reached the inner circle of Houari Boumediene including the former minister of foreign affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, against whom the Algerian courts have issued an international warrant for his arrest and return via Interpol, after his bad behavior and exploitation of his position for the purpose of gaining great wealth had been proven. The whereabouts of Abdelaziz Bouteflika are currently unknown. He moves between various countries in the Arab West and in Europe. It is said that he is a guest of Mohamed Masmoudi, the former Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, in the house owned by the latter in Paris. If it becomes certain that Bouteflika is in Paris, it would not be surprising for the French authorities to turn him over or ask him to leave the country, as they recently did to Ahmad Ben Bella.

Current information among Algerian circles abroad confirm that several big changes have encompassed the state apparatus, the army and the security apparatus, and that they are targeted precisely against those loyal to Houari Boumediene.

On the basis of this preliminary information, it seems that there are a number of motives and causes which have pushed Chadli Bendjedid to decide to finally do away with the hesitation that characterized him before in this regard. Among these motives are the degree of the danger which the authorities found involving arms and explosives smuggling operations, and the matter of the maneuvering of the 'religious tendency' within the state apparatus and army. After the discovery of this matter and the clashes that followed in the suburbs of the capital of Algiers, the official authorities felt the dangerousness of the situation and announced call-ups several times within the security forces and the army. It is well known that in this kind of situation, these forces become directly subject to the personal orders and directives of President Chadli Bendjedid. In addition, there is President Chadli Bendjedid's determination to clean out the strongholds of corruption which have come to be used as a support for the nurturing of domestic opposition, especially now that it has become clear to the higher Algerian authorities that Ahmad Ben Bella's activity abroad has revived his image, which has allowed him to attract certain sectors which see in him the probable deliverer of an Algeria lost in domestic labyrinthes and problems piled one on the other.

It seems that the thing which compelled Chadli Bendjedid to take a definitive decision in this matter was his fear that Houari Boumediene's group, who no longer hide their opposition to the Chadli regime, would join with the other elements of the opposition and consequently come to form a bigger menace, in view of their presence in sensitive centers of the state and army.

As for the reason preferred by numerous observers, it is that Chadli Bendjedid wanted to hit more than one bird at once. He wanted to get rid of the strongholds of corruption and strike both the new and the old opposition, while at the same time freeing himself from old obligations and preparing to hold the Algerian-Moroccan summit suggested by French President Francois Mitterand as a way of ending the conflict over the Western Sahara. Chadli Bendjedid, by means of the recent changes, was aiming at the centers of power that hinder such a meeting.

The palpable improvement in Algerian-Tunisian relations and the Algerian coldness vis-a-vis the Steadfastness and Resistance Front--especially after the recent meeting in Damascus between the representatives of Iran, Syria and Libya at which Iran was called to join the front, a matter which found no approval in Algeria, and was rejected as well by the PLO--also support this tendency.

It seems that the Algeria of Chadli Bendjedid is beginning through these measures to trend the path of a more realistic policy in its relations with the Arab West.

Moreover, one ought not to ignore the struggle for power within Algeria, where the most recent meeting of the central committee decided that this committee, which is the supreme authority in the Algerian Liberation Front Party, will meet once every three months instead of once every six, in order to prepare the way for the coming conference of the Liberation Front Party which will be held at the end of this year.

It is well known that the party conference appoints the president or presidential nominee. Therefore, Chadli Bendjedid might want to clear up some of his domestic problems before the conference is held, so as to insure that he receives the right to rule once again.

As for the activities of the Algerian opposition abroad, they possess a definite effectiveness in increasing the tension in the internal Algerian political situation as well as raising numerous questions concerning the fate of the country in the near future. In addition to the issue of Ahmad Ben Bella and his expulsion from France, and it is an issue which has brought together all the elements of the Algerian opposition, there is the emergence of a new and heretofore unknown group which up until now has issued two statements from Brussels and calls itself the "Revolutionary Rally." It includes comrades of Houari Boumediene and calls for an overthrow of the regime by the army, whose situation is made unstable due to the transfers and changes which have encompassed important officers recently, in addition to some arrests.

Thus, Algeria is today confronting a number of dangers, as well as witnessing at the same time the start of a military movement by the comrades of Houari Boumediene, and even disturbances led by the opposition gathered around former president of Algeria Ahmad Ben Bella. These dangers threaten as well the policy of President Chadli Bendjedid, which depends on cleaning up the centers of corruption and following a rational policy within the Arab West and in the Arab world, as well as freeing him from the heavy inheritance which has weighed down his shoulders, especially insofar as the Western Sahara is concerned. Therefore, events in Algeria in the days and months to come will be important in relation to the country's future and the future of relations between the different countries of the Arab West. At the same time, they will decide the political future of Ahmad Ben Bella after the courts have finished looking into the case of the 'religious tendency' and the case of the arms and explosives. The latter case is expected to possibly never be presented to the courts, if the situation remains as tense as at present, since it has already been postponed several times.

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CSO: 4504/213

## ALGERIA

### ABDELGHANI TALKS WITH BURUNDI LEADERS

PM092325 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25-26 Feb 83 p 16

[APS report: "Prime Minister's Visit to Burundi"]

[Text] At the end of an official 2-Day Visit To Burundi, Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani, member of the National Liberation Front [FLN] party and [Algerian] prime minister, left Bujumbura at 0930 hours local time yesterday morning for Kigali (Rwanda).

The prime minister was seen off by Mandi Stanislas, minister attached to the presidency, and by other members of the Burundi government.

During the talks which President Bagaza had with Mr Abdelghani, according to the press communique issued in Bujumbura, the two sides "praised the measures advocated by the latest meeting of the 12 countries in the contact group which has just met in Nairobi to solve the crisis which the OAU is at present experiencing"--measures which relate to the convening of the 19th summit in May or June 1983 in Addis Ababa and the invitation to all OAU member states to take part.

At the bilateral level the communique specifies that the two interlocutors reaffirmed their respective governments' determination to strengthen cooperation.

With regard to the international situation, the press communique points to the two countries' attachment to the fundamental principles of the UN and OAU Charters. In addition it expresses Algeria's and Burundi's joint support for the SDAR and their commitment to defend that state's admission into the OAU and other international organizations.

The reaffirmation of total and unconditional support for the just liberation struggles in Namibia, under SWAPO's leadership, and in South Africa under ANC leadership, is also highlighted by the communique which, with regard to the Middle East question, stresses the two countries' grave concern over the situation prevailing in this region. "They praised the latest Palestine National Council session and reaffirmed their respective governments' support for the Palestinian people's cause under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative, in deciding the ways and means of liberating the usurped homeland and creating an independent Palestinian state."

The two sides also condemned the massacres perpetrated in Sabra and Shatila and the occupation of all the Arab territories, including Jerusalem, by the Zionist entity.

The press communique also stressed that on the occasion of the talks between President Bagaza and Mr Abdelghani views were exchanged on preparations for the nonaligned summit which will be held at a "time when the world is passing through a particularly serious crisis."

At the economic level the two sides recognized the need to strengthen and speed up the implementation of the Lagos plan of action and of the resolutions of the nonaligned countries and Group of 77 as a prelude to the establishment of a new and more just world economic order.

In conclusion the press communique specifies that President Bagaza has accepted an invitation to visit Algeria at a date to be fixed through diplomatic channels.

Finally, it should be noted that after attending a cultural evening Thursday, the prime minister and the delegation accompanying him made a visit to the Bujumbura region, with the emphasis on historic sites.

Mr Abdelghani was then granted an audience by President Jean Baptiste Bagaza, to whom he handed a personal message from President Chadli Bendjedid. During that meeting they reviewed the development of bilateral cooperation, the situation on the continent and, finally, preparations for the nonaligned summit to be held in New Delhi shortly.

At the end of the meeting the Burundian head of state gave a lunch in Mr Abdelghani's honor--a lunch which was attended on the Algerian side by Mohamed Lemkani, deputy speaker of the People's National Assembly, and Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state for foreign trade, and on the Burundian side by Mandi Stanislas, minister attached to the presidency and the national education minister and cochairman of the Algerian-Burundian Joint Commission.

In the afternoon the prime minister visited development projects in the Limbo region.

CSO: 4500/127

INTERVIEW WITH BOUALEM BENHAMMOUDA

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 9, 28 Feb 83 pp 7-8

[Text]

In an exclusive interview with *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO's* Randa Takieddine conducted in Vienna following the recent ministerial meeting of the OPEC Fund for International Development, Algeria's Finance Minister Boualem Benhammouda assesses the effect of declining oil prices on his country's development plans. He explains why Algeria has been able to weather the difficulties faced by oil exporters and outlines the Algerian government's economic and social priorities. The text of the interview follows.

Q: What are the effects on Algeria of the decline in world oil prices? Have you had to cut back your development plans?

A: Without a doubt Algeria, like other countries, has been affected by the change in the direction of oil prices in the world market, but Algeria has resisted (the effects of lower oil revenues) and has managed to pursue its development activities without the slightest alteration to its development plans.

Q: Apart from gas and oil, what sectors of the Algerian economy have been given priority in development plans?

A: Algeria's economic policy has not relied solely on oil and gas. It has always taken various other sectors of the economy into consideration. The energy sector has been a temporary means of boosting economic development by using revenues from this sector to support the development of agriculture and industry. Thus Algeria has made tremendous efforts over the last 20 years to establish an industrial infrastructure, covering such fields as iron and steel, petrochemicals, mechanical and electronic industries and construction materials. These industries are considered the basic elements of an industrial infrastructure in any country.

This does not mean, however, that we have neglected the agricultural sector, which has been given special importance. In recent years we have reorganised agriculture

and important measures have been taken to boost investment in it in the light of the strategic importance of the food sector.

**Q** Would you say that Algeria's oil revenues dropped drastically in 1982? What revenues from oil and gas are expected for 1983?

**A** Algeria's oil and gas revenues did not change much in 1982 because Algeria respected OPEC's official prices and gave no discounts. Our gas revenues increased in 1982 after we changed the pricing structure, linking it to oil prices. Algeria has also been exporting large quantities of refined products that we sell on the world market according to the law of supply and demand.

Despite all this, the last OPEC conference in Geneva could affect the situation in the future and lead to a world crisis, but we hope that the disagreement that prevailed in this meeting will be overcome at a future OPEC meeting and that a suitable agreement will be reached.

In Algeria's 1983 budget, government revenues from oil and gas are projected at AD 57.5 billion (\$12.32 billion), while the total budget is AD 98.667 (\$21.13 billion).

**Q** Housing has been a big problem in Algeria. What is being done to improve this sector?

**A** There has been delay in this sector, but things have changed a lot in the last three years since the start of a huge building programme. In 1982 alone more than 80,000 housing units were completed. This is going to continue in the years to come until we have completely eliminated the crisis resulting from the housing shortage. The latest development plan gives a lot of importance to social projects such as housing, road construction, health care and sewage.

To help relieve problems in the housing sector, the government took the initiative two years ago to give property rights to citizens who were renting houses left by French landlords after Algeria's independence. Under the measure, which affects about half a million housing units, the government gave citizens long-term 20-year loans at very low, nominal rates of interest to enable them to buy these houses. In addition, there is a housing company that undertakes the building of new units and distributes them to citizens, who are able to buy them with the assistance of long term soft loans.

**Q** You attended the OPEC Fund Ministerial meeting in Vienna. What did it achieve concerning the replenishment of resources and in regard to the appointment of a new director-general to replace the Fund's present head, Dr Ibrahim Shihata?

**A** The OPEC Fund resources allocated in the past reached a satisfactory level, enabling the Fund to continue its activities in the coming years. The decline of oil revenues in OPEC countries, which will lead to a general deficit in

national budgets and balance of payments, will make it more difficult, for the time being at least, to increase the Fund's resources, but I think this is a temporary problem.

The issue of the appointment of a new director-general has been postponed to an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the OPEC Fund on May 24. We hope that the choice of a new director-general will contribute to the successful continuation of the Fund's activities. The postponement of the appointment was due to the fact that more consultations are needed to choose between the two candidates.

CSO: 4500/130

## ITALO-ALGERIAN GAS NEGOTIATIONS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 9, 28 Feb 83 pp 9-10

[Text]

Attempts were being made last week to tie up the last loose ends of Italy's agreement to purchase up to 12.5 billion cubic feet of Algerian gas a year for the next 25 years. Italy's Foreign Trade Minister Nicola Capria was due to visit Algeria to try to complete the deal following the adoption by the Italian government of a decree-law authorising payment of a rebate to SNAM, the natural gas subsidiary of Italy's state-controlled ENI hydrocarbons group of companies. The rebate of up to \$0.50 per 1 million British Thermal Units (BTUs) will bring down the price paid by SNAM for Algerian gas from the \$4.41 per 1 million BTUs for the Algerian-Tunisian frontier agreed with Algeria's SONATRACH last September to \$3.91.

The rebate is acknowledged to be a "political" one in a deal which has been fraught with politics on the Italian side. SNAM officials were quoted last year as saying that the agreement initially in September would only be signed by the company's executives "if the government is pointing a revolver at their necks" (*An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo*, October 4, 1982). At that time, Italian experts calculated that the international price of gas was \$3.62 per 1 million BTUs and they complained that they were being yoked to a contract obligating them to accept huge quantities of gas that would be uncompetitive with other sources of energy, notably gas oil and fuel oil. The \$4.41 price for Algerian gas was also \$0.40 more expensive than the \$4.01 per 1 million BTUs agreed with the Soviet Union for 8 billion cubic feet of Siberian gas a year, beginning in 1984.

The decree-law must be approved by both chambers of Italy's legislature within 60 days or else it will lapse. Its terms commit the government to pay SNAM up to Lire 840 billion (\$390 million) between now and the end of 1985.

Politics entered the agreement at several levels, including some bitter in-fighting over who heads the ENI group. When the gas agreement was initialled it was supported by the Socialists but the Christian Democrats were unhappy with the terms as they then stood. This problem appears to have been overcome, however, and the government's decision to pay SNAM the rebate was announced last week by Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo and Labour Minister Vincenzo Scotti, both Christian Democrats. The original agreement had been opposed in particular by Italy's powerful *Confagricoltura* farmers' association, which feared that farming costs would be raised significantly by the use of expensive Algerian methane as a feed-stock for fertiliser.

At another level, the delivery of gas through the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline was seen as a powerful stimulus to industrialisation in Italy's under-developed *Mezzogiorno* (southern region) and Sicily, the dream of every Italian government for decades. In addition, there was considerable pressure from Italian exporters of goods and services to Algeria, which virtually froze all dealings with Italy pending completion of the gas agreement. Contracts for about Lire 1.5 trillion (just over \$1 billion) were reported to be in limbo because of the protracted negotiations with SONATRACH. The Algerians have agreed to compensate Italy for some of the price of the gas by importing from Italy.

The desire to put the pipeline to use was another strong inducement to agreement. The line linking Algeria's Hassi R'mel gasfield to Sicily cost \$3.5 billion to build and was mainly financed by Italy. Completed in 1981, it has been idle ever since then.

The Italo-Algerian agreement bears a strong resemblance to SONATRACH's contract to supply the state-owned Gaz de France with liquefied natural gas (LNG) at a price of \$5.12 per 1 million BTUs at the time of signing which was based on a basket of crude oils. The Algerians receive most of this sum from GdF, but 13 per cent of the price comes from the French Treasury and is now used to pay for French goods and services exported to Algeria for development projects. Once again, a portion of the price was recognised to be "political."

On the Algerian side there has been a stubborn determination to get as close as possible to a gas price which is on a par with the price for a similar amount of energy derived from Algerian crude oil. The Algerians have pursued this goal largely on their own and with what can only be described as ruthlessness. But this is understandable when one remembers that they are committing themselves for 25 years to deliver gas to their customers.

Just how close the Algerians have come to winning parity is debatable because of the way in which the price has been split by the buyer. Algeria, to be sure, gets its price and from SONATRACH's viewpoint it probably matters little or nothing whether part of it is met by the

French and Italian governments. But this sort of deal does limit the number and type of customers that Algeria can expect to obtain for its gas and this could prove to be a drawback in the future, notably in deals with American gas companies.

The number and type of customer could become a problem for Algeria when Qatar's North gasfield is developed in seven years' time as a competitor to Algerian gas. Sheikh Rashid Oweida al-Thani, Deputy Director General of the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation, said last week that a decision had been taken to develop the field in partnership with British Petroleum and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles as shareholding partners. The scheme envisages exports of 6 million tonnes of LNG a year from the field over 20 years. The field, located about 40 kilometres off the northwest coast of Qatar, has proven reserves of 100 to 112 trillion cubic feet and the project would use only 10 per cent of known reserves in 20 years. Sheikh Rashid put the cost of developing the field at between \$4 and \$6 billion and Japan is seen as the major buyer of Qatari LNG. Korea, Taiwan and Europe have also shown interest.

The Italo-Algerian agreement still faces two hurdles before it can be signed and sealed and gas begins to flow. The Foreign Trade Minister's mission includes an attempt to set a low minimum for the gas Italy is obliged to receive by the "take or pay" clauses of the contract. The second is to seek from the Algerians a commitment to the possible renegotiation of the entire pricing system when prices are reviewed after three years. The contract stipulates triennial price reviews, but it appears from reports from Rome that the Italians envisage substantially more far-reaching negotiations than the Algerians would be prepared to countenance. The last two hurdles could therefore easily turn into stumbling blocks.

CSO: 4500/130

'MAY' CRITICIZES PALESTINIAN LEADERS

PM86511 Cairo MAY in Arabic 7 Mar 83 p 7

[Article by Sabri Abu al-Majd, chief editor: "To All the Palestinian Brothers: Words of Love and Reproach"]

[Excerpt] When Algiers was chosen to be the venue of the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting and not Tunis, the PLO headquarters, commentators said that the extremists had scored a major victory. When some of those invited to the conference began making provocative statements against Egypt and about Egyptian-Palestinian relations, commentators expected a violent campaign against Egypt both inside and outside the conference. On our part we absolutely did not care for any of this; all that we cared for was to see the PLO emerge from the conference united and free to make its own decisions.

When some of the Palestinian brothers in Egypt began sending invitations to some of the Egyptians to go to Algiers as observers we realized, on looking at the prestige of those individuals, that there was actually a plot to drive a wedge between Egypt and the PLO, for it was inconceivable that invitations were extended to 100 Egyptians without one single invitation to the National Democratic Party (NDP). When those Palestinian brothers realized that the plot was exposed, they sent invitations to some of the NDP members, but in their personal capacity.

From the first moment of the conference opening session there appeared to be many trifling things on the road. First among these trifling things was the report on the report which Faruq Qaddumi submitted to the council. Many people, including some Egyptians, expected that harm to Egypt in such a report would come from George Habash, Nayif Hawatimah, or Ahmad Jibril; but that this report from Faruq Qaddumi was something that nobody ever imagined.

Faruq Qaddumi's fall was the beginning of one of the conference's wrong actions. The invasion of Lebanon was a golden opportunity for the Egyptian regime to rectify the Camp David error and return to the Arab ranks. But this regime failed in the test. Qaddumi also said that hopes were pinned on the Egyptian nationalist movement and the Egyptian Army to rectify this situation.

In addition to the truth and in order to serve the Egyptian-Palestinian relations we will state that:

First, Egypt did not leave the Arab ranks, and there is nothing that can be called Arab ranks without Egypt.

Second, Egypt's Arabism is not a cloak that we wear today and take off tomorrow; it is Egypt's destiny and fate. Egypt's commitment to the Palestinian problem is a lifetime commitment, and there is no way that Egypt will abandon it.

Third, Egypt did not err at Camp David, rather, it executed a good Arab action that was the only one of its kind in the Arab field and that recovered 60,000 square km of land in the interest of Egypt, Palestine and the whole Arab nation.

Fourth, the Egyptian Nationalist Movement, as our President Husni Mubarak has affirmed and continues to affirm, consists of all the 45 million Egyptians. No one among these millions contemplates working against Egypt.

Fifth, the Egyptian Army is the shield and impregnable bastion of Egypt and the Arab nation. It is first and foremost for the service of the Egyptian people--and in defending their land against any external aggression as well as for protecting constitutional legality.

Sixth, although not everything that one wishes comes true--that the PNC members would praise [Abu] Qaddumi for his report and that the Egyptians who were in Algeria would withdraw from the meeting in protest against the lies and "unrealistic" contents of the report which, if anything, show that their author, [Abu] Qaddumi, even after the Beirut massacres and the Syrian regime's betrayal of the Arab cause, lives with the same mentality as his close friends, the members of the Syrian Ba'th Party. Anti-Egyptian propaganda was launched right from the beginning of the conference. Anything said against Egypt was translated and disseminated in all languages and anything said in favor of Egypt was exaggerated so that nobody would hear it.

One of the strongest information campaigns against Egypt was that in which the businessmen were directing strong criticism against Egypt while eating and drinking, and journalists with recording machines were taping all that those leaders said about Egypt as they were eating and drinking.

On the 11th: Regarding what Abu Izid [Salam Khalaf] said, I would like to tell Egyptian, Palestinian and Arab leaders that we in Egypt know nothing about "regimes." We are a stable state that has existed for 7,000 years. Our present government did not emerge as a result of a coup, military intervention or revolution. Rather, it is the government of a parliamentary and popular system. Our officers, gentlemen, are unlike Hafiz al-Asad's or Mu'ammarr al-Qaddafi's. When we are abroad we do not represent the government of Egypt but the whole of Egypt. We represent constitutional and democratic Egypt.

I would like to give the Palestinian brothers a word of advice and warning:

Do not mislead the Jordanian people as progressive and nonprogressive, do not mislead the Lebanese you have also classified the Lebanese people as progressive and progressive and nonnationalist and nonprogressive, do not mislead the Syrian. All that I have to say here is that you are doing a great harm to your cause and, indeed, committing a crime against

your country's rights if you imagine that the defenders of the Palestinian cause in Egypt are those you invited to Algiers. The defenders of the Palestinian cause, gentlemen, are those who offer their lives and have sacrificed 100,000 martyrs for the sake of the Palestinian people. They are never those who are content with burning Israeli flags at a time when Israel is proceeding with building settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. That is, unless you prefer burning flags to pulling down Israeli settlements.

These are the words of reproach. As for the words of love, let every Palestinian man and woman, both inside and outside the occupied territories, know that Egypt with its 45 million people under the leadership of its son Husni Mubarak is a shield and support for Palestinian rights regardless of Egypt's differences with the PLO and some of its leaders. The restoration of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, the liberation of the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state on them is a trust for every Egyptian man and woman. Unjust campaigns against us will not dissuade us from loving Palestine, and attempts to drive a wedge between us and the Palestinians will not weaken our efforts to support Palestine. God is with us and with you in upholding right.

END

## INTERIOR MINISTER HASAN ABU BASHA INTERVIEWED

NC102022 Cairo Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1920 GMT 24 Jan 83

[Interview with Interior Minister Hasan Abu Basha by AL-AHRAM chief editor Salah Muntasir, AL-AHRAM writer Ahmad Bahjat and ROSE AL-YUSUF magazine writer Salah Hafiz on the "Face the Press" program, presented by Hilmi al-Buluk--live or recorded]

[Text] [Hilmi al-Buluk] Ladies and gentlemen, may God's peace and blessing be upon you: Tonight Interior Minister Maj Gen Hasan Abu Basha is the guest of the "Face the Press" program. It is a coincidence that this meeting takes place on the eve of our celebration of Police Day on 25 January. This is an occasion about which we and the homeland are proud and which reminds us of the great efforts that the police made to defend the homeland and its sons. We welcome and congratulate Hasan Abu Basha on this occasion. [Words indistinct] We will begin the program and let the journalists put their questions to Your Excellency.

[Salah Muntasir] This is the second time Your Excellency has been interviewed by the "Face the Press" program. The first meeting took place last October and was devoted to discussing the emergency law on the occasion of its renewal at the time. Today, there are two occasions for meeting Your Excellency. The first is the fulfillment of the promise we had obtained in October to discuss the many other issues of the Interior Ministry and, the second, as colleague Hilmi said, the occasion marking Police Day on 25 January, tomorrow. This prompts me to start discussing a general issue about the police and the public. I believe that the definition of the people is a group of citizens who are divided into good and evil, honest and dishonest, straightforward and deviant. How can this definition be consistent with a slogan that entered our life in the past few years that the police are in the service of the people? How can the police be in the service of this group, which combines the normal and abnormal?

[Hasan Abu Basha] The slogan, that the police are in the service of the people, is an affirmation of the sovereignty of the law, because the people as a whole accept this law. Moreover, any man, whom you called dishonest or a thief, is first of all a citizen. Perhaps certain circumstances and reasons, whether by his own will or not, prompted him to deviate. Deviation has existed since the beginning of life and will

continue forever. If a citizen deviates once, it does not mean that the police become his enemy. The police apply the law, enable the society represented by the judicial authority to punish the deviant and then take care of him if he is sentenced to a prison term and try to reform him. This man will eventually leave prison and join the people. Thus, there is no contradiction in the slogan the police are in the service of the people even if there are some citizens who deviate.

[Salah Muntasir] In such a case, isn't it safer that the police must be in the service of the law? I asked myself if the police are in the service of right or justice. I found out, as Your Excellency says, that the police apply the sovereignty of the law and that, basically, the police must serve the law regardless of the person. In my view this is a broader definition.

[Hassan Abu Sasha] I prefer the slogan to be the police are in the service of the people and the law.

[Muntasir] That is to combine the two.

[Abu Nuh] Yes.

[Amad Bahjat] In the past 30, 40 or 50 years, a number of political and religious acts of violence emerged in Egypt. Perhaps this is new in Egypt, because we have always seen and read that the Egyptian people are meek and have the characteristics of the Mediterranean peoples, who are temperate, normal, moderate and free from extremism. Egypt's history proves this. However, a number of acts of violence, which peaked in the assassination of late President Anwar al-Sadat emerged recently. I want to know Your Excellency's explanation of the emergence of these acts of violence on the political level and their association with religion. I would like to learn your explanation.

[Abu Nuh] The phenomenon of violence is first an international phenomenon that recently emerged. We know that all parts of the world affect one another. No country can isolate itself from what is taking place in the world. A small number of acts of violence appeared in Egypt in the 40's, ceased somewhat in the 50's and 60's and then serious signs of violence began to appear in the 70's. This phenomenon appeared very clearly among certain extremist groups who used religion as an approach. According to an interview that was published in AL-AHRAM, it was clear that a major part of the thinking of these groups came from abroad and was alien to Egypt and had nothing to do with the teachings of the religion in which the Egyptians believe or have learned at the Egyptian institutes or at Al-Azhar Mosque for the past 1,000 years. Then, regrettably, alien people began to look at the Egyptian religious groups. Their thinking is based on the idea that involve a great deal of extremism. Their principles call the current society atheist or pre-Islamic [Jahili], etc. These religious groups then began to believe that the only way to achieve their goals was violence. According to these groups, violence is a means to achieve their goals and to change the society.

As you say, this is not the Egyptians' view of the Islamic religion nor does it constitute any of the traits of the Egyptian people. The Egyptians are tolerant, sympathetic and good. Logic in dialogue can affect the Egyptian people. However, regrettably, these groups, as a result of their alien principles which are characterized by violence and which brand others as atheist and pre-Islamic and so forth, believe in violence. In coping with the international phenomenon of violence, regrettably, the top leaders of some of these groups or those who contact them from abroad and provide them with funds, ideas and plans have political purposes. These groups are characterized by violence. Thus, the Egyptian society showed an aversion to these phenomena that began to appear in the 70's and reached their peak in the events that occurred in October. As I told you, perhaps since the days of Pharaoh Cheops, security has never been attacked so fiercely as what happened in October. This happened during a Muslim feast prayer when a Muslim forgets disputes and enmity. They came out with bombs and machine-guns and killed about 100 people and injured 150 others, some of whom lost their eyesight or parts of their bodies and some have permanent injuries and are still being treated. This incident was very strange to Egyptian society.

[Muntasir] [Words indistinct] Does this have any relationship with democracy, I do not mean just the latest incidents but the phenomenon of violence in general?

[Abu Basha] No, I think that such violence has nothing to do with democracy. What has violence to do with democracy?

[Muntasir] Because under democracy what happens is like the human body when it disposes of bad blood [as heard]. Under democracy there is dialogue and enlightenment and thus the society exposes all hidden ills. This phenomenon of violence exists in some democratic countries.

[Abu Basha] The phenomenon of violence exists in certain democratic societies as you say. We have in Egypt, regardless of the September decisions [September 1981 decisions by Anwar al-Sadat to arrest 1,500 opponents] [sentence as heard]. Some people say that the September decisions were the direct cause of this phenomenon. I maintain that they are not the direct cause, because the documents that have been captured with these groups proved that they had planned [for their action] before September and it should have been carried out before September.

[Muntasir] The September [arrests] might have sparked off (?the events).

[Abu Basha] They had planned to carry out [their plans] before September. Moreover, the weapons that were collected and the groups recruited by the organization could not have been completed in 1 month. It took at least 2 or 3 years to prepare for this process. I believe that during these last 2 years there was a kind of ideological dialogue published in newspapers. Newspapers, including religious newspapers, published what they wanted. Nothing of this sort was raised. During that period we emerged from a period in which there were no parties. The parties then began to be formed

and the democratic exercise started. Despite all of this, the incidents occurred. When a group of people who are a minority decide to influence the fateful status of the whole people who total 45 million [Abu Basha does not complete sentence]. This group does not exceed 1,000 or 2,000 people. Who gave them the right to lead the people in this or that direction? This is completely undemocratic behavior.

[Ahmad Bahjat] The groups' behavior is not democratic. At the beginning of your discussion, Your Excellency specified that violence began to escalate in the 70's, which was characterized by the presence of some forms of laxity, indiscipline and openness. New things were introduced into the society, which was in a state of anxiety and instability. I presume that Salah Muntasir means that if there were a possibility for the expression of views, even the extremist ones, under the canopy of a parliament really elected by the people, these groups of 1,000 or 2,000 people would have had a very slight effect. Of course, the only difference in this case is that they were armed. My question is where were the security organs during the 3 years when these groups were arming themselves, buying or stealing arms? Were the security organs aware of this danger or was it a surprise?

[Abu Basha] I want to say first that these groups actually used to express their views, because they were present in several places. They were present in university colleges and in mosques. Every now and then they held conferences and meetings and several newspapers published their news and conferences. Their views were expressed. They, however, did not want just to express their views, convince others and urge religious guidance, they had another political purpose. Thus, they were carrying their activities underground.

It was not just a matter of expressing views and religious guidance and thought. Hundreds of channels were available to them to express their views. (?Seminars) and conferences were held at all universities, in mosques and in villages and everywhere. Several newspapers published their views. Thus, it was not only a matter of religious thinking, guidance and concepts or even criticism of certain manifestations of the society. Perhaps there were certain aspects of the society with which the youths were dissatisfied. It is possible that anyone may be dissatisfied with certain aspects. But by criticism and recommendations that can be submitted to the leadership which is keen to satisfy the people, we can remedy any erroneous situations. However, leaving all these legal channels and planning [their activities] underground and bringing bombs, dynamite and machineguns and then killing people by the scores is not logical and has nothing to do with the expression of views and the availability of channels to express views. There were channels for expressing their views. What is democracy after all? It is one's ability to express one's views. It is not an entity such that if it is not tangible then there is no democracy. As long as one can express one's views through legal channels, then there is a kind of democracy. As long as there is an opinion and opposite opinion, then there is a kind of democracy. However, if each group hastens to say no, that its views were not achieved and that it wants to achieve its views by force, we will get close to a mob society.

[Hilmi al-Buluk] Ahmad Bahjat has raised the point of whether these people had been given the opportunity to express their views in parliament, for instance, or under the dome of parliament. Did you mean that they should have representatives in parliament or something of the sort?

[Ahmad Bahjat] No, not representatives.

[Al-Buluk] I see.

[Ahmad Bahjat] It is known that in all societies, or when it comes to man himself, people are not all the same. In other words: I might be a moderate, another person might be an extremist and still another might be even more extremist. The viewpoints that were closer to extremism should have found a response, and a dialogue should then have begun. This is the dialogue which afterward was initiated by the Ministry of the Interior. I mean that had this dialogue began earlier, Egyptian society would have confronted this danger. A danger indeed existed. It was clear that there were young men who had come up with new ideas and who wanted to effect a violent change. A violent change is very difficult. Even when revolutions effect such a change, that is, when any revolution emerges and carries out a change, this change itself then becomes the object of another change. Violence aborts the possibility of the authentic development of society. What I want to say is that had this ideology been confronted at an earlier stage and had it been discussed, then its erroneous and sound aspects would have emerged. We know that many religious books contain ideas that proclaim as heretics those who do not pray.

[Abu Basha] Please allow me to answer this point.

[Al-Buluk] Please do so.

[Abu Basha] When it comes to the question of channels, they existed, and viewpoints were being published in newspapers. I believe that some members of the People's Assembly were possibly expressing the views of these groups. However, the point that you have raised is the question of confronting this ideology. Personally, I indeed believe that the confrontation of this ideology was very late. It was imperative that this ideology be faced in utmost clarity and frankness before all the people. Perhaps the work which I now believe features among the most important things at this juncture, is the question of the ideological dialogue that is now underway--a dialogue that is being broadcast on television or published in newspapers, although some critical views are being expressed to the effect that this dialogue is taking place within four walls.

However, what I affirm is that this dialogue is not taking place within four walls. It is being conducted in great freedom that is no less than any freedom that is provided for a dialogue anywhere else. The proof is that the youths who are participating in this dialogue are expressing their views without any pressure being put on them and without having to fear anything.

Consequently, the core of this ideology and the arguments forwarded in its support were submitted for a discussion. Thus, the concepts of this ideology and the arguments forwarded in its support became clear to all of us. Then, parliamentarians and the ulama could begin to discuss this ideology. People would then hand down verdicts. Consequently, this matter is not only of interest to the youths but it is also of interest to the 45 million people, because these people want to institute a certain state of affairs. Therefore, it is imperative that the 45 million citizens of this country be convinced of what is being said. Hence, I believe that we must admit that the confrontation of this ideology was late. Therefore, this ideology should run its course and should be given the interest that it deserves. This manifestation is very important--it affects the youths of Egypt, and would there be a wealth greater than Egypt's youths?

[Salim Hafez:] Is it true that this delay in facing this ideology was deliberate and that some security organs were lax with this trend in order to use it in facing the other leftist extremism, for example, in the universities?

[Abu Alwan:] I do not believe that this was the case--absolutely not. In other words, I do not believe that the delay in facing this ideology was meant for facing another trend or ideology. However, the delay incurred in confronting this ideology had perhaps originated from some sensitivities or from the fact that these groups had made moves that, in many instances, aroused a sectarian and a religious side. Some kind of tense atmosphere reigned in the country many times. However, the confrontation of extremist religious ideologies in general in Egypt was indeed not only 10 years late, but 20 years or more. The crises to which the country was exposed have occurred a number of times within the past 15 or 20 years. There is no connection between this and any other trend. The state [sentence interrupted or inaudible].

[Salim Hafez:] There are two kinds of unofficial ideologies--the religious ideology and the leftist ideology. In Your Excellency's personal opinion, what is the existence of the religious ideology in this manner was determined by Your Excellency as having behind it external factors and elements, such as sectarianism, for argument and such things. In connection with the other ideology, in fact, Your Excellency, subscribe to the opinion that the existence of the leftist ideology in Egypt is natural, or is it an imported phenomenon?

[Abu Alwan:] First, there can be no censorship on ideologies. Any human being can be converted to any ideology. As we have said, the whole world is full of leftist, socialist, communist ideologies and there are all people to see. When would we expect not being convinced of an ideology. It is impossible for a country to be free of a religious ideology or of a leftist ideology, or any kind. However, the sensitive point in this respect is determining the nature of both the religious ideology or the leftist ideology--and let us return to this point, when you say the leftist ideology, do you mean the Marxist ideology, for instance? You mean the Marxist ideology.

Suppose that the extremist leftist ideology, or the Marxist ideology, is not convinced of legitimacy but it pursues an illicit course and seeks to seize authority. In doing this, this ideology is definitely imposing its guardianship on society and it completely disregards all the legitimate and lawful conditions. Any civilized society that has its constitution and its laws will definitely face such an illicit movement. If what is meant is a censorship of ideology, I believe that there is no censorship on ideology in Egypt. However, if what is meant is checking illegitimate movements, then it is the duty of any state in the world to check illegitimate or outlawed movements.

[Hilmi al-Buluk] He means in East and West.

[Abu Basha] But I am saying, in the world.

[Salah Hafiz] Here the remark arises. I am following a number of cases of Marxist organizations. The Ministry of the Interior is very active; it arrests them successively and puts them on trial.

CS: 4500/132

# LIBERAL PARTY LEADERS CRITICIZE PNC RESOLUTIONS

PM11501 Cairo AL-AZHAR in Arabic 14 Mar 83 p. 2

[Unattributed report: "Mustafa Kamil Murad Stresses: Mubarak Statements on the Algiers Resolution Are a True Expression of the Egyptian People's Opinion"]

[Text] Liberal Party leader Mustafa Kamil Murad has emphasized that recent statements made by certain emotional Palestinian leaders do not harm Egypt at all but they do harm the Palestinian cause.

Addressing the Consultative Council last week, the Liberal Party leader said: We were really pained by the PLO statement. Egypt has upheld the Palestinian cause since the 23 July revolution and has regarded it as a national cause.

He added: We will continue to support the Palestinian people until they return to their homeland, but this cannot be achieved through vituperation and condemnation.

He affirmed that wasted time is in the interest of Israel, not the Arabs.

Murad ash-Sabbah, secretary general of the party, said: The words used by the Palestine National Council about Egypt went too far and were out of proportion. On behalf of the Liberal Party he declared our full support for every word uttered by President Mubarak.

Liberal Party deputy leader Muhammad 'Abd ash-Satt said: I had the honor of meeting with President Mubarak before going to Algiers. I would not have gone if the president had advised me not to go, but he blessed our trip to Algiers to support the Palestinian people at the conference. How big and great the conference was: every time Egypt's name was mentioned the hall was filled with thunderous applause.

'Abd ash-Satt added that he met with extremist and nonextremist [Palestinian] leaders and explained Egypt's views to them. He added: I reject the statements issued and subject the categorization of the Egyptian people as patriotic and unprincipled. However, we will not abandon the Palestinian cause and we will continue to play our part aimed at protecting the miserable people of the West Bank and Gaza, who are suffering under pressure and oppression. The PLO should purge itself of the intruders.

Liberal Party deputy leader Ambassador Riyad Mu'Awad expressed the Liberal Party's support for President Mubarak's policy, which stems from a sense of patriotism. He added: We are all patriots and there is no difference between supporters and opposition.

CSO: 4500/140

INTEGRATION COUNCIL SECRETARY DISCUSSES MOVES TOWARD LINKUP WITH SUDAN

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 20 Feb 83 p 6

[Interview with Dr Abu Bakr 'Uthman Salih, Secretary General of the Integration Council, by 'Adil Rida: "What Will the First Council Meeting under the Chairmanship of Mubarak and Numayri Discuss?"]

[Text] Abu Bakr 'Uthman Muhammad Salih, the secretary general of the Higher Integration Council, gave an important interview to AL-AKHBAR in which he described the issues that would be discussed at the first Higher Integration Council meeting between Egypt and the Sudan, under the chairmanship of Mubarak and Numayri.

Ab. Bakr 'Uthman Salih asserted that important steps would be taken with the objective of eliminating all the obstacles that had faced the process of integration between the Sudan and Egypt in past periods. He said, "Important offers have been presented by international and Arab bodies to contribute to the integration processes."

In the course of this interview with Abu Bakr 'Uthman Muhammad Salih, the secretary general of the Higher Integration Council, which lasted for more than 3 straight hours, AL-AKHBAR tried to get a reply to most of the questions that have been and still are being raised on the new integration charter which was signed in Khartoum last 12 October.

The conversation began with a question on the first meeting of the Higher Integration Council: what will it discuss and what is its significance?

He said, "At its first session the first meeting of the Higher Integration Council, which will take place this week, must ratify the statutes and bills on the integration agencies, such as the statutes on the activities of the higher council, the secretariat general, the integration fund and the Nile Valley Parliament. On top of that, it will draw up the technical committee of the Higher Council, which will be in charge of executing the economic, social and political development program and all aspects of activity in the various fields. The higher council will issue a description of its areas of competence and the decrees on its formation and it will approve the budgets for the activities of the integration organizations."

He stated, "In addition, the Higher Integration Council will make a comprehensive evaluation of the recent period from the signing of the integration platform in February 1974 to the enactment of the integration charter last 12 October."

#### A New Stage

He also said, "I might take this opportunity to tell you that the new integration charter differs from the former program on many points. It is true that the previous and present stages are both aimed at consolidating the integration, but the new charter has studied all problems.

"Today we are facing a new stage in which we are striving to create economic, political and social change in the body of the united entity so that we will be able to arrive at the attainment of homogeneity and harmony between the two peoples of the Nile Valley in all areas."

#### The New Things Anticipated

He said, "The people who devoted themselves assiduously to the formulation of the charter thoroughly studied all the obstacles that confronted integration in the platform period and worked to rectify them.

"In addition, the nature of the composition of the higher council, and the participation of the two presidents in it, with all the constitutional powers they possess, will ensure that the decrees are given the necessary rapid execution. Many of the stages of bureaucratic activity that require that decrees be approved by numerous channels before they reach this level are being shortened, and the stage of the new charter has underlined the popular dimension and the role of the popular institutions in the construction process which the charter calls for through the agency and bureaucratic methods."

#### Figures of Significance

Abu Bakr 'Uthman said, "There are new projects to be presented and there are projects which were dedicated in the platform period on which studies have been completed. There are projects under study and there are also projects that have been studied and have progressed to execution, such as the Jonglei Canal project, the giant project which was started in the platform period and is to be considered a brilliant model of joint cooperation among the people of the Nile Valley. Do you know that the longest canal in the world is being excavated, in which the most modern machinery is being used, in the southern Sudan? This project will change the weather in the whole area and close to \$100 million will be spent on it. It will add to the water in the Nile by reducing evaporation by an equivalent of 14 billion cubic meters, and it will add about 1 million feddans of arable land. There is another project, the al-Damazin project, which is 1 million feddans in area, in which fine corn, concentrated fodder and soya will be planted. This project has advanced. It is progressing at a slow pace, but so far it has covered about 70,000 feddans.

"These projects will be discussed and presented at the Higher Integration Council meeting so that they can advance more rapidly, and the obstacles that led to the slow pace of work on them can be reduced."

He said, "In addition, the Higher Integration Council will discuss a number of important subjects, such as amendments to the labor laws and the laws on commercial activity and the right of ownership in the two countries and recommendations by the competent committees regarding the facilitation of the exchange of goods, the elimination of customs barriers, the subsidization of modes of marine, river and overland transport and the establishment of projects for self-sufficiency in food."

Where is the Financing?

Asked, "Where, however, is the financing for these projects?" He said,

"That question has its justifications. There is no doubt that the problem of financing was one of the flaws that marred the platform period, since these projects were financed by the treasuries of the two governments and sometimes procrastination occurred in payment of the two countries' shares and quotas. However, the new charter has remedied this problem, since it has stipulated that an integration fund is to be established which will enjoy financial and administrative independence and for which a special budget will be drawn up in accordance with the statute on it, which the Higher Integration Council will set up. This fund will have its own legal personality and financial and administrative independence."

A Popular Forum

He said, "There is another point the charter has dealt with, which the former platform lacked, and that was the absence of a popular format for advancing the integration process. In the new charter we have laid emphasis on the role of the popular organizations in moving popular, social and economic development forward."

The Arab League and Their Role

Asked, "It is certain that the yield of the results of the application of the integration charter will not apply to Egypt and the Sudan alone but that it will extend to the Arab nation."

He said, "It is certain that integration between the Sudan and Egypt will constitute progress for the Arab nation and the African continent, because Egypt and the Sudan represent the connecting link between Africa and the Arab nation. From the economic standpoint, they represent an assured source of support for the Arabs and the Africans."

"We must remember that the foodstuffs the Arab world imports come to \$14 billion and amount to 20 percent of the Arab nation's national income, the establishment of this integration will constitute a form of support that will have the effect of helping to relieve this predicament."

#### Reasons for Optimism

I told him, "Your discussion is dominated by a spirit of optimism over the success of the new experiment, in the context of the integration charter."

He said, "Assuredly, I am optimistic in the extreme."

#### Duties of the Secretariat General of Integration

I asked him, "What is your conception of the working method of the Higher Integration Council's Secretariat General, which you are in charge of directing?"

He said, "As is well known, the higher integration council is the highest authority in charge of exercising the areas of competence stated in the integration charter, and it is the council which is in charge of setting out higher policies for integration programs. The secretariat general is, in addition, the executive arm that cooperates with the higher council in the performance of its task, and it vigilantly watches over the execution of the decrees issued by the council and represents the connecting link between it and the committees that have arisen from the council and the other integration organizations, such as the Integration Fund and the Nile Valley Parliament."

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EGYPT

PROBLEMS FACED IN DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CITIES DISCUSSED

CAIRO, 1969, 10-11-69, p. 1

In the past week, Salah al-Kafrawi, Minister of Reconstruction and Housing, and Chief of the State Board for Architectural Planning, and Engineer Salih al-Kafrawi, Deputy Chief of the Board of New Communities, and Engineer Salih al-Kafrawi, a Specialist in Soil Mechanics, and Engineer Salih al-Kafrawi, a Specialist in Soil Mechanics, by AL-AHRAM: "Spirit of the New Cities!" date and place not specified.]

What are the problems concerning the rumors about the new cities, six of which were begun on them? And after 223 million pounds have been spent

What was made in choosing their locations? Why were the nature of the soil unable to uncover the foundations of these cities and require them? Is it true that the city of 6 October is due to the transiting of the SUMID oil pipeline?

What replies to these questions from Engineer al-Kafrawi, the minister of reconstruction and housing.

What are the problems concerning the rumors about the new cities, six of which were begun on them? And after 223 million pounds have been spent

What was made in choosing their locations? Why were the nature of the soil unable to uncover the foundations of these cities and require them? Is it true that the city of 6 October is due to the transiting of the SUMID oil pipeline?

[Question] Why was the decision made to build the new cities?

[Answer] From 1975 until now, the ministry has been making studies, in which international consulting firms and Egyptians experts have participated.

All the studies have stressed that the utilities of the existing cities, and especially Greater Cairo and Alexandria, which are currently overcrowded with more than a quarter of the country's total population, probably cannot be expanded horizontally, which adds new burdens onto these utilities. Therefore, there were recommendations against expansion in the city of Gizah and the areas north and east of Cairo, especially in agricultural lands. The studies also recommended the need to begin to build several "satellite" cities around Cairo, whose utilities and services would be completely independent of the "mother" city. Therefore, the decision was made to build the cities of 6 October, al-'Abir, and al-Amal. As for the city of 15 May, its construction was certainly to provide the necessary housing and services for the workers of the factories located in the area, as well as to lessen the load on the "mother" city, since the new city would rely on its independent utilities. Based on that, the expansion west of Cairo in the city of al-Awqaf and along the Pyramids Road, or east of Cairo, for example al-Salam City must not be encouraged in the present stage until substitutes can be found for the utilities of Greater Cairo, and until the needs of the present population of existing areas can be satisfied. Any attempt to expand now would certainly be at the expense of the exhausted existing utilities.

The Industrial Project Department

Engineer Husein H. al-Kurawi explained how benefit was derived from England's experience in building new cities after the destruction of World War II. They built 92 new cities, completing them over a period of 35 years. The first stage of this took a full 10 years, whereas we were able to start life in the city of the Tents of Ramadan within only 3 years, and we are still working inside the city starting production.

[Question] But what is the role of the state in encouraging the establishment of factories within the new cities?

[Answer] The government plays a comprehensive role, through establishing the infrastructure at government costs. So far, as happens in all the new cities in the world, the investor in the first stage of the city pays for the infrastructure, i.e., the cost of utilities per meter. In that stage, the government plays a subsidy for each meter sold. The cost per meter of 1980 and 1979 average - 1980 and economic player has not as far exceeded 12 pounds per meter. As for land whose costs were increased, because of a reduction in the land offered by the state, this was land to be used for industrial and commercial projects that would yield a profit. Their prices were increased when construction increased in the city. The price of this land has not increased as much as it should, as evidenced by the great increase in the number of factories for establishing their projects there.

It is noted that the first stage of the city of 10 Ramadan, as an example, was built in the first stage of the city was composed of four districts as a part of the city's center. The districts were divided into 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 126, 129, 132, 135, 138, 141, 144, 147, 150, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 171, 174, 177, 180, 183, 186, 189, 192, 195, 198, 201, 204, 207, 210, 213, 216, 219, 222, 225, 228, 231, 234, 237, 240, 243, 246, 249, 252, 255, 258, 261, 264, 267, 270, 273, 276, 279, 282, 285, 288, 291, 294, 297, 300, 303, 306, 309, 312, 315, 318, 321, 324, 327, 330, 333, 336, 339, 342, 345, 348, 351, 354, 357, 360, 363, 366, 369, 372, 375, 378, 381, 384, 387, 390, 393, 396, 399, 402, 405, 408, 411, 414, 417, 420, 423, 426, 429, 432, 435, 438, 441, 444, 447, 450, 453, 456, 459, 462, 465, 468, 471, 474, 477, 480, 483, 486, 489, 492, 495, 498, 501, 504, 507, 510, 513, 516, 519, 522, 525, 528, 531, 534, 537, 540, 543, 546, 549, 552, 555, 558, 561, 564, 567, 570, 573, 576, 579, 582, 585, 588, 591, 594, 597, 600, 603, 606, 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2667, 2670, 2673, 2676, 2679, 2682, 2685, 2688, 2691, 2694, 2697, 2700, 2703, 2706, 2709, 2712, 2715, 2718, 2721, 2724, 2727, 2730, 2733, 2736, 2739, 2742, 2745, 2748, 2751, 2754, 2757, 2760, 2763, 2766, 2769, 2772, 2775, 2778, 2781, 2784, 2787, 2790, 2793, 2796, 2799, 2802, 2805, 2808, 2811, 2814, 2817, 2820, 2823, 2826, 2829, 2832, 2835, 2838, 2841, 2844, 2847, 2850, 2853, 2856, 2859, 2862, 2865, 2868, 2871, 2874, 2877, 2880, 2883, 2886, 2889, 2892, 2895, 2898, 2901, 2904, 2907, 2910, 2913, 2916, 2919, 2922, 2925, 2928, 2931, 2934, 2937, 2940, 2943, 2946, 2949, 2952, 2955, 2958, 2961, 2964, 2967, 2970, 2973, 2976, 2979, 2982, 2985, 2988, 2991, 2994, 2997, 3000, 3003, 3006, 3009, 3012, 3015, 3018, 3021, 3024, 3027, 3030, 3033, 3036, 3039, 3042, 3045, 3048, 3051, 3054, 3057, 3060, 3063, 3066, 3069, 3072, 3075, 3078, 3081, 3084, 3087, 3090, 3093, 3096, 3099, 3102, 3105, 3108, 3111, 3114, 3117, 3120, 3123, 3126, 3129, 3132, 3135, 3138, 3141, 3144, 3147, 3150, 3153, 3156, 3159, 3162, 3165, 3168, 3171, 3174, 3177, 3180, 3183, 3186, 3189, 3192, 3195, 3198, 3201, 3204, 3207, 3210, 3213, 3216, 3219, 3222, 3225, 3228, 3231, 3234, 3237, 3240, 3243, 3246, 3249, 3252, 3255, 3258, 3261, 3264, 3267, 3270, 3273, 3276, 3279, 3282, 3285, 3288, 3291, 3294, 3297, 3300, 3303, 3306, 3309, 3312, 3315, 3318, 3321, 3324, 3327, 3330, 3333, 3336, 3339, 3342, 3345, 3348, 3351, 3354, 3357, 3360, 3363, 3366, 3369, 3372, 3375, 3378, 3381, 3384, 3387, 3390, 3393, 3396, 3399, 3402, 3405, 3408, 3411, 3414, 3417, 3420, 3423, 3426, 3429, 3432, 3435, 3438, 3441, 3444, 3447, 3450, 3453, 3456, 3459, 3462, 3465, 3468, 3471, 3474, 3477, 3480, 3483, 3486, 3489, 3492, 3495, 3498, 3501, 3504, 3507, 3510, 3513, 3516, 3519, 3522, 3525, 3528, 3531, 3534, 3537, 3540, 3543, 3546, 3549, 3552, 3555, 3558, 3561, 3564, 3567, 3570, 3573, 3576, 3579, 3582, 3585, 3588, 3591, 3594, 3597, 3600, 3603, 3606, 3609, 3612, 3615, 3618, 3621, 3624, 3627, 3630, 3633, 3636, 3639, 3642, 3645, 3648, 3651, 3654, 3657, 3660, 3663, 3666, 3669, 3672, 3675, 3678, 3681, 3684, 3687, 3690, 3693, 3696, 3699, 3702, 3705, 3708, 3711, 3714, 3717, 3720, 3723, 3726, 3729, 3732, 3735, 3738, 3741, 3744, 3747, 3750, 3753, 3756, 3759, 3762, 3765, 3768, 3771, 3774, 3777, 3780, 3783, 3786, 3789, 3792, 3795, 3798, 3801, 3804, 3807, 3810, 3813, 3816, 3819, 3822, 3825, 3828, 3831, 3834, 3837, 3840, 3843, 3846, 3849, 3852, 3855, 3858, 3861, 3864, 3867, 3870, 3873, 3876, 3879, 3882, 3885, 3888, 3891, 3894, 3897, 3900, 3903, 3906, 3909, 3912, 3915, 3918, 3921, 3924, 3927, 3930, 3933, 3936, 3939, 3942, 3945, 3948, 3951, 3954, 3957, 3960, 3963, 3966, 3969, 3972, 3975, 3978, 3981, 3984, 3987, 3990, 3993, 3996, 4000.

#### 1. The city of 10 Ramadan is being built in the city of 10 Ramadan, as an example, we want to see that the first stage of the city was composed of four districts as a part of the city's center. The districts were divided into 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 126, 129, 132, 135, 138, 141, 144, 147, 150, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 171, 174, 177, 180, 183, 186, 189, 192, 195, 198, 201, 204, 207, 210, 213, 216, 219, 222, 225, 228, 231, 234, 237, 240, 243, 246, 249, 252, 255, 258, 261, 264, 267, 270, 273, 276, 279, 282, 285, 288, 291, 294, 297, 300, 303, 306, 309, 312, 315, 318, 321, 324, 327, 330, 333, 336, 339, 342, 345, 348, 351, 354, 357, 360, 363, 366, 369, 372, 375, 378, 381, 384, 387, 390, 393, 396, 399, 402, 405, 408, 411, 414, 417, 420, 423, 426, 429, 432, 435, 438, 441, 444, 447, 450, 453, 456, 459, 462, 465, 468, 471, 474, 477, 480, 483, 486, 489, 492, 495, 498, 501, 504, 507, 510, 513, 516, 519, 522, 525, 528, 531, 534, 537, 540, 543, 546, 549, 552, 555, 558, 561, 564, 567, 570, 573, 576, 579, 582, 585, 588, 591, 594, 597, 600, 603, 606, 609, 612, 615, 618, 621, 624, 627, 630, 633, 636, 639, 642, 645, 648, 651, 654, 657, 660, 663, 666, 669, 672, 675, 678, 681, 684, 687, 690, 693, 696, 699, 702, 705, 708, 711, 714, 717, 720, 723, 726, 729, 732, 735, 738, 741, 744, 747, 750, 753, 756, 759, 762, 765, 768, 771, 774, 777, 780, 783, 786, 789, 792, 795, 798, 801, 804, 807, 810, 813, 816, 819, 822, 825, 828, 831, 834, 837, 840, 843, 846, 849, 852, 855, 858, 861, 864, 867, 870, 873, 876, 879, 882, 885, 888, 891, 894, 897, 899, 902, 905, 908, 911, 914, 917, 920, 923, 926, 929, 932, 935, 938, 941, 944, 947, 950, 953, 956, 959, 962, 965, 968, 971, 974, 977, 980, 983, 986, 989, 992, 995, 998, 1001, 1004, 1007, 1010, 1013, 1016, 1019, 1022, 1025, 1028, 1031, 1034, 1037, 1040, 1043, 1046, 1049, 1052, 1055, 1058, 1061, 1064, 1067, 1070, 1073, 1076, 1079, 1082, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1094, 1097, 1100, 1103, 1106, 1109, 1112, 1115, 1118, 1121, 1124, 1127, 1130, 1133, 1136, 1139, 1142, 1145, 1148, 1151, 1154, 1157, 1160, 1163, 1166, 1169, 1172, 1175, 1178, 1181, 1184, 1187, 1190, 1193, 1196, 1199, 1202, 1205, 1208, 1211, 1214, 1217, 1220, 1223, 1226, 1229, 1232, 1235, 1238, 1241, 1244, 1247, 1250, 1253, 1256, 1259, 1262, 1265, 1268, 1271, 1274, 1277, 1280, 1283, 1286, 1289, 1292, 1295, 1298, 1301, 1304, 1307, 1310, 1313, 1316, 1319, 1322, 1325, 1328, 1331, 1334, 1337, 1340, 1343, 1346, 1349, 1352, 1355, 1358, 1361, 1364, 1367, 1370, 1373, 1376, 1379, 1382, 1385, 1388, 1391, 1394, 1397, 1400, 1403, 1406, 1409, 1412, 1415, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1427, 1430, 1433, 1436, 1439, 1442, 1445, 1448, 1451, 1454, 1457, 1460, 1463, 1466, 1469, 1472, 1475, 1478, 1481, 1484, 1487, 1490, 1493, 1496, 1499, 1502, 1505, 1508, 1511, 1514, 1517, 1520, 1523, 1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1541, 1544, 1547, 1550, 1553, 1556, 1559, 1562, 1565, 1568, 1571, 1574, 1577, 1580, 1583, 1586, 1589, 1592, 1595, 1598, 1601, 1604, 1607, 1610, 1613, 1616, 1619, 1622, 1625, 1628, 1631, 1634, 1637, 1640, 1643, 1646, 1649, 1652, 1655, 1658, 1661, 1664, 1667, 1670, 1673, 1676, 1679, 1682, 1685, 1688, 1691, 1694, 1697, 1700, 1703, 1706, 1709, 1712, 1715, 1718, 1721, 1724, 1727, 1730, 1733, 1736, 1739, 1742, 1745, 1748, 1751, 1754, 1757, 1760, 1763, 1766, 1769, 1772, 1775, 1778, 1781, 1784, 1787, 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, 1805, 1808, 1811, 1814, 1817, 1820, 1823, 1826, 1829, 1832, 1835, 1838, 1841, 1844, 1847, 1850, 1853, 1856, 1859, 1862, 1865, 1868, 1871, 1874, 1877, 1880, 1883, 1886, 1889, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1901, 1904, 1907, 1910, 1913, 1916, 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934, 1937, 1940, 1943, 1946, 1949, 1952, 1955, 1958, 1961, 1964, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021, 2024, 2027, 2030, 2033, 2036, 2039, 2042, 2045, 2048, 2051, 2054, 2057, 2060, 2063, 2066, 2069, 2072, 2075, 2078, 2081, 2084, 2087, 2090, 2093, 2096, 2099, 2102, 2105, 2108, 2111, 2114, 2117, 2120, 2123, 2126, 2129, 2132, 2135, 2138, 2141, 2144, 2147, 2150, 2153, 2156, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2168, 2171, 2174, 2177, 2180, 2183, 2186, 2189, 2192, 2195, 2198, 2201, 2204, 2207, 2210, 2213, 2216, 2219, 2222, 2225, 2228, 2231, 2234, 2237, 2240, 2243, 2246, 2249, 2252, 2255, 2258, 2261, 2264, 2267, 2270, 2273, 2276, 2279, 2282, 2285, 2288, 2291, 2294, 2297, 2300, 2303, 2306, 2309, 2312, 2315, 2318, 2321, 2324, 2327, 2330, 2333, 2336, 2339, 2342, 2345, 2348, 2351, 2354, 2357, 2360, 2363, 2366, 2369, 2372, 2375, 2378, 2381, 2384, 2387, 2390, 2393, 2396, 2399, 2402, 2405, 2408, 2411, 2414, 2417, 2420, 2423, 2426, 2429, 2432, 2435, 2438, 2441, 2444, 2447, 2450, 2453, 2456, 2459, 2462, 2465, 2468, 2471, 2474, 2477, 2480, 2483, 2486, 2

of water available, whether underground water or sources of water from the Nile and canals. Sources of energy and its potential use as far as industry and tourism in these communities were also taken into consideration. In addition the economic feasibility of providing energy services to the population were also considered. There were special studies of the geotechnical properties and nature of the soil, upon which the city would be built, and environmental studies to determine the climatic and natural factors which would have an impact on dealing with the environment and adapting to it. Finally, there were studies of defense strategy on the national level.

In accordance with all these planning factors, the site for 6 October City was selected in light of all these studies, which were made by a specialized group of advisors to the Architectural Planning Board.

The surface area of the city's location is some 10,000 feddans. The consulting engineers in soil mechanics made some 41 probes in the city along the surface, ranging between 50 and 1000 meters. This was done to determine the nature of the soil, and to determine the suitability of the location from the technical point of view, especially with regard to foundations. A group of consulting geotechnical experts participated in the general planning studies of the city, along with specialists of the board. There were some 15 experts, including university professors and advisors with international experience. There were 12 experts who held educational degrees in their field of competence.

On the technical side:

Geotechnical engineering and soil mechanics was vital, which could be determined from a "profile" of the soil depths before choosing the location of the new city, then there is an important question about the water table in the soil at 6 October City.

Dr. Hassan El-Dars, Deputy Chief of the Board of New Urban Communities, said:

The various engineers were tasked with making studies of earth properties and soil mechanics. The total number of probes was 100, in addition to the 41 probes made by the contracting construction companies, to determine the nature of the soil and its suitability. These were made by numerous specialists and geotechnical engineers in this field. The total number of probes made by the various contractors was 191 in the six districts of the city. It was clear to the engineers from the results of the probes and the views of the professors that the water table had been found in some of the districts, and that the water table could be confined in specific locations. The various studies that carried out the planning and detailed design of the city, and the studies of these advisors, studies to determine the water table in the soil, and the studies of the various districts of the city.

Previously, the minister and the chief of the board issued a decision to form a technical committee in March 1981, to review the general, structural plans for the city and the soundness of the location. This committee decided that the State Board for Architectural Planning, which had prepared the general plan for the city, had considered all conditions in order to ensure the soundness of the area. It recommended that, in light of what was reported to the effect that the Egyptian desert is permeated with pockets of clay, it was necessary to make concentrated probes before making the detailed plans for each area. This is what was done by the Board of New Community Construction." Dr Muntah 'Ali Sabri, a specialist in soil mechanics, stated: "All the probes turned up some pockets of clay, with a thickness of not more than 2 meters. This does not represent any danger, nor does it necessitate any special precautions. "Some saline properties were found in the soil. They were analyzed, and then some 150 probes were concentrated to learn the size of the areas containing severe salinity. We found that 90 percent of the probes had salinity that did not represent a danger, since the proportion of harmful salts was within internationally permissible limits. As for the other 10 percent, it was in scattered areas; dealing with this will now according to the type of installation built on them. "The nature of the desert soil in Egypt makes it possible to find pockets of clay in almost all areas, which could vary from one area to another according to its geology. Treating the salt might be done by plastering the areas of the foundations or with bitumen paint or by using sulphate-resistant cement. Both solutions are commonly used, where the building after the saturation with water during the construction stage. Often, the exteriors of public buildings are painted with bitumen, and sulphate-resistant cement is used in many of them. That does not represent a great expense in view of the total costs. It is also worth mentioning here that some of the installations near-Sadat City for example required the use of sulphate-resistant cement and bitumen paint."

#### Investment Areas Are Limited

At the same time, the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Planning, through its Soil Engineer Salah El-Din El-Sayid, Ministry Engineering Office, who took part in supervising the construction of the villages near Sidi Barrani City, stated that the Ministry had carried out a detailed study of the districts, which are supposed to have a water content of 10 percent of the total of these areas. The study was carried out in the first, second, third and fourth districts, which are supposed to represent an urban with regard to construction requirements. The reason for that is that they were used for the open areas and they are not in the plan.

Dr. Muntah 'Ali Sabri, a specialist in soil mechanics, stated that in some districts, some of their buildings were constructed by engineering methods in accordance with the requirements of the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Planning, and that the Ministry had carried out a detailed study of the districts, which are supposed to have a water content of 10 percent of the total of these areas. The study was carried out in the first, second, third and fourth districts, which are supposed to represent an urban with regard to construction requirements. The reason for that is that they were used for the open areas and they are not in the plan.

entire district. As for the probes pertaining to the area earmarked as the center of the tourist area, no clay pockets were found there. In the industrial zone, where detailed planning for the first stage has been accomplished for an area of about 700 feddans, out of a total for the industrial zone of 1500 feddans, it was found that there are some areas with relatively high saline-content soil. The surface areas did not exceed 10 percent of the total land area. The treatment of this type of soil, in terms of construction, varies according to types of buildings involved. Cumulatively from our viewpoint, this does not constitute a heavy burden with regard to industrial projects. Our expertise in architectural planning, new cities and buildings, in all parts of the republic, deals with the soil in accordance with its various types."

#### SUMID: Line of Danger Through 6 October City

One question remains about the SUMID oil pipeline.

Dr Eng 'Abd al-Halim al-Ramali, deputy chief of the Board of New Community Construction, said: "There have been discussions between the State Board for Planning and the SUMID Company regarding this matter. These discussions revolved the point of defining the security precautions required and technically acceptable by the SUMID Company. All these precautions were adopted in the structural and detailed planning for the city. The SUMID Company has approved these plans, which will ensure the security and integrity of the line and the neighboring areas."

TAM

ASU: 4524/145

## NEW SUPPLY CARD DISTRIBUTION PROCESS BEGINS

Cairo AL-AZHAR in Arabic 14 Feb 63 pp 1, 14

[Article by 'Ali al-Munragi: 'The Operations Room for the New Supply Cards Will Start Its Work Today...]

[Text] It has been decided to form a main operations room to carry out the project of the new supply cards. The room will start its work today under the chairmanship of the Fakhri 'Abd-al-Hamid, the director general of distribution and foodstuffs. It will include among its members Mustafa Shakir, the manager of cards, Samir Isma' Salamah from the Supply Office in Cairo, and 'Abbas 'Abd Razi, the director of financial and administrative affairs. The committee will start its work today.

Amr al-Haj, the minister of supply, has also determined that major committees in the government will be subordinate to the room. These will monitor the course of economic activities and will have powers that will enable them to solve the economic problems at once.

In order to make matters easier for citizens who are unable to go to the supply office, it has been decided that a branch committee will be formed to go to the citizens' homes or residence in order to draw up supply cards immediately.

Amr al-Haj, the minister of supply and the general supervisor of the card project, stated that the printing of about 10 million new supply cards of the green and red kinds has started. The delivery of these cards to the supply offices will take about 10 weeks, preparatory to their distribution to the citizens. When the green cards will be handed over to employees of the government and the general authorities, people within in the private sector whose families must pay to general revenue tax, and farmers who own land. When the red cards will be distributed to other groups of citizens.

It has been decided to form a committee to study the working conditions and select the best workers and determine their salaries. The formation of branch committees in the government and private sector will be carried out in regions of citizens.

requests for information. A system for receiving information will be set out, and the higher committee will prepare rules for discontinuing individuals' cards in cases of marriage and divorce, adding newborn children, converting cards from one format to another, and drawing up replacements for cards that have been lost or destroyed. These rules will be announced in a few days.

11887

CSO: 4504/217

## YUGOSLAVIA OFFERS AID FOR DEVELOPMENT OF TOURIST FACILITIES

Cairo AL-AKHAMR in Arabic 21 Feb 83 p 6

/Article: 'Signature of an Agreement with Yugoslavia To Provide \$500 Million for Tourist Projects in the New Towns' /

/Text/ Yesterday the cooperation agreement was signed by Egypt and Yugoslavia in the area of reconstruction, ordinary housing and land reclamation in Belgrade. In accordance with this, Yugoslavia will perform works valued at \$500 million in the context of the new 5-year plan for 1983-87.

This was announced by Ing Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of housing and reconstruction, who is currently visiting Belgrade. He said that this agreement has come about in execution of the agreement reached in the course of President Hosni Mubarak's recent visit to Yugoslavia to give a forward thrust to cooperation between the two countries in all areas.

## Tourist Villages

In a similar statement he made yesterday to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY correspondent in Belgrade, the minister of reconstruction added that agreement had been reached with Yugoslavia on participation in the establishment of a large number of well-equipped tourist villages along with the erection of basic facilities for them such as water plants, sanitary drainage systems and roads, in three governorates, Matruh, Sidi Barrani and Matruh and the Red Sea.

Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi stated that the Yugoslav party would provide the hard currency loans for the tourist projects, which would be paid off over 10 years at an interest rate of 3 percent with a 5-year grace period. Egypt would provide land and use the capital for these projects in local currency. In the case of the ordinary housing and land reclamation projects, the principal amount of the loan for these projects would be paid off over a period of 10 years at an interest rate of 3 percent.

## The Projects in the New Towns

Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi stated that the Ministry of Reconstruction had agreed with the Yugoslav party in order to contribute

to the construction of the towns of 6 October, 10 Ramadan, al-Salam and al-'Ubur.

Eng Hassaballah al-Kafrawi arrived in Belgrade last Thursday on a visit to Yugoslavia that will take 4 days.

11887

CSO: 4504/217

## BRIEFS

MALDIVES PRESIDENT ARRIVES IN CAIRO--Cairo, 17 Mar (MENA)--Maldives President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom arrived in Cairo today on a 3-day visit to attend the Al-Azhar Millenium celebrations. [Excerpt] [NC171326 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1258 GMT 17 Mar 83]

CULTURAL COOPERATION PROTOCOL SIGNED--Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali is expected to meet tomorrow with GDR Deputy Foreign Minister (Joseph Kuhn). They will review international questions and bilateral relations. The second session of talks was held today between Assistant Foreign Minister Ambassador 'Umrān ash-Shafi'i and the GDR deputy foreign minister. They reviewed international questions and means to bolster bilateral relations. Meanwhile, a cultural cooperation protocol was signed today between Egypt and the GDR. It stipulates the activation of Egyptian-German cooperation in the domains of culture, sciences and tourism and the exchange of expertise as well as of radio and television programs between the two countries. [Text] [NC161336 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1231 GMT 16 Mar 83]

ROMANIAN LOAN--The Egyptian government has provided an \$100 million loan on easy terms to finance the purchase of equipment for projects to install electricity in Sinai. This was stated yesterday by Eng Mahir Abazah, the minister of electricity and power, following his meeting with the Romanian ambassador in Cairo. [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Feb 83 p 6] 11867

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## NATIONALIST LEADER CRITICIZES CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 272, 7 Feb 83 pp 24, 25

Interview with Abdelkrim Khatib: "Dr Abdelkrim Khatib, First Chairman of the Moroccan Chamber of Deputies, to AL-DUSTUR: Democracy Has Been a Failure in Morocco"

Text Dr Abdelkrim Khatib is a prominent figure on the Moroccan political scene. He divides his days and nights between political meetings and operations. He is one of the first founders of the Moroccan Army of National Liberation against the French and Spanish occupations, and he was the chairman of the Higher Council of the Resistance, the secretary general of the Popular Union Movement Party, the first chairman of the first chamber of deputies in the history of Morocco and, on a number of occasions, a former minister. He supervised the arming of most of the African liberation movements, in Mozambique and elsewhere. Dr Khatib, the doctor, politician and fighter, is a man who severed his relations with the regime at the time the state of emergency was declared, and he has refused to have any dealings outside the context of democracy. He declares that democracy has failed to solve existing problems and demands that the democratic scheme to promote the Consultative Council be halted. This is the text of the conversation that took place between AL-DUSTUR and Dr Abdelkrim Khatib:

AL-DUSTUR: What is your evaluation of the recent parliamentary period of Moroccan history and the emergence of new parties that has accompanied that?

Dr Khatib: The first lesson we can draw from the legislative period that has reached its conclusion, which the political class is preparing to resume, is that if we really do want to attain sound democracy in the country, we must liberate democracy itself from the puzzles, symbols, slogans and erroneous notions that have started to be fixed to it.

It has become clearly apparent to any objective analyst--indeed even to many of the deputies themselves--that democracy is the noblest and loftiest of the promises presented to voters during election campaigns, and is, consequently, as far removed as can be from bearing the responsibility of solving the problems attached to it. All the problems in Morocco since it is a distortion of the true nature of things for us to make the voters believe that the composition of parliament, regardless of the formations at which it is composed, will

alone suffice to realize our aspirations. We are not exaggerating when we say that the solution of most of our problems has no connection with democracy. This, in my view, is a point that all political officials must devote great attention to so that a wrongful and deceptive notion about democracy will not be implanted in the minds of the citizens.

AL-DUSTUR: Perhaps you are presenting a new view here of the most proper method, which might as a consequence not arise from the democratic option.

Dr Khatib: I believe that the estrangement of the current notion of democracy from our actual situation has been confirmed. Democracy is not an Arab expression--it is a Greek word that means the rule of a class of citizens as masters who alone have rights, which the other class, which was like slaves, had no rights to run the affairs of the Athenian republic.

The notion of the social order that should be followed proceeds from the holy verse, "We have honored mankind, borne him on land and sea, sustained him on the good things and favored him over many of our creatures." Freedom, security, confidence, work for everyone and housing for everyone are the true concept of the method that is desired, and to designate that as democracy is only to consecrate a verbal falsification. In the face of the escalating proliferation of certain slogans which have the aim of making democracy take every field by storm and throw it onto the stage as a sole solution to every problem has stripped the essence of its significance of any meaning, and it has become imprisoned and confined to the demand for and acquisition of free, honest elections, while the nature of this freedom is always relative and limited. The voter who is safe from administrative pressure is not safe from the pressure of speeches and campaigns heavily loaded with enticements and promises of employment, promotions and the creation of solutions, all of which are for all problems, whereas the candidate knows for a fact that he is making false promises and that the government cannot bear all the commitments of the candidates. As a result, after the elections the person who has made the promises can only exploit his positions to satisfy his personal interests. Here we have wasted 20 years on propaganda and promises and the problem remains. Deception and interloping are becoming more blatant in every field.

AL-DUSTUR: Does that mean that the experiment of democracy has failed?

Dr Khatib: It means that we must review the organization of political relations in the context of the regime and restore to the political parties the national responsibility as instruments of enlightenment.

AL-DUSTUR: What then will be left for the people?

Dr Khatib: I am not questioning the freedom to vote and the need to prevent the election from any excesses in order to insure that granting the freedom to vote will be protected from anything that will result in the loss of the sanctity of the vote. I believe in the need to have the freedom to vote, and I have pointed to the types of discrepancies in national feeling, which prevent the parties to assume responsibility for a larger role.



...of the ... the ... is ... in the ... of ... and that will ... at least ... a period of ...

... your ... with ... Algerian leaders qualifies you to ... of the ... and ... of the ... Where do we ... today in the ...

Dr. Khattab: In fact, I am ... by ... friends in the struggle, ... Unfortunately, however, a new group ... its ... through motives of personal ambition, especially after ... in a group which participated in the ... at a ... and ... the ... to a government which had ... as a ... of ... to colonialism for ... with the presence of the ... that they ... that the ... with which they had ... in Algeria would enable them to expand their influence ... and they ... against Morocco, ignoring its ... and ... thousands of years that joined it to ... I am certain that the ... by which this ... the ... and the ... that has characterized all ... all the ... that the individual ... brought us into.

... later; if our generation does ... The Algerians have recently ... territorial ... the north, the south or ... on behalf of ... is preserved.

... the Moroccan liberation ... and one who ... the ... that a peaceful ... reached through ...

... relation that will ... fighting ... in particular, that ... by the ...

... and the ...

... or secretariat ...

can play a decisive role with respect to issues such as Eritrea or Afghanistan which constitute a frank confrontation between Islam and the enemies of Islam.

The Moslems must arm themselves most warily in the face of an enemy who for a long time has decided--and the history of Islam is witness to this--to oppress Islam and thwart all its movements, by numerous means from which we must not exclude the use of Moslems themselves, knowingly or unknowingly, to perpetrate disturbances whose purpose in reality is only to extinguish the flame of Islam, with an awareness on our enemy's part that the only spiritual and moral force that is able to overcome the crisis of the void that mankind is suffering from today, including the countries of the eastern and western camps and the capitalist and communist camps, is the true Islam. My fear is that the Moslems might become over confident over the Islamic awakening and stop at the limits it has reached.

AL-UDSTUR: What about the Iraqi-Iranian war?

Dr Khatib: If the Islamic countries are able to set forth a new rule and concept of Islamic unity, putting into practice the experiences and trials to which Islam has been exposed since its emergence, they will come up with a final resolution to the war that is going on between Iraq and Iran. The enemies of Islam alone are the ones who are benefiting from the continuation of the war.

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(Arriving at Mikataji)-Miyagi: "Doubtful Announces the Formation of a New Party"

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On other words, the Chinese political system is already filled. There is no room for any change.

[illegible]





the independent Part were to continue to be under the leadership of the same person. The founding of a party after these circumstances? At this point, Manti Koulaid step into the field as the new secretary general of the new party, and ask the permission of the country's people to go to fight with those parties whose birth had not been recognized with a single kind word.

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President Gambia's Lt. General Sir David D. Gray has been elected to the Saharabank board, the first non-Africanist to be elected. The bank has not yet started its operations, but is now 90% complete. President Dadiou Ndiaye has also been elected to the board. The bank is the first of its kind in Africa.



agrees that the agreement and the sale of arms to Morocco are being  
done in the interests of the state's interests.

FRANCISCO FRANCO (1939) - reminds Moron speaks of the need to have a policy  
starting from a pro-Moroccan viewpoint. The Spanish plebiscite  
shows of Franco between 1939 and 1941, but these have no territorial  
value over the Sahara. What must be mentioned is the need to balance Franco's  
policy between the SAR and Morocco.

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but be captivated by the impression that even the visit of President Carter inadvertently also contributed toward heating up feelings in the Judea and Samaria towns.

Jimmy Carter no doubt did not have this in mind, but his indiscreet remarks against the Israeli Government and its policy in Judea and Samaria served as a match to a powder keg.

Jimmy Carter evidently overlooked the main objective of the "interim period" mentioned in the Camp David Accords, which he himself signed.

There was a reason why an agreement was reached for a 5-year interim period for the autonomy, until the final status of Judea and Samaria is determined, and those 5 years were to be counted not from the signing of the Camp David Accords, but from the day the Administrative Council in Judea, Samaria and Gaza was set up. This determination means that a period of calm was allocated for Judea and Samaria during which peace and quiet would prevail along Israel's border. Only then, against the backdrop of calm between Jews and Arabs in Eretz Yisra'el--and on the foundations of the growing peace between Israel and Egypt--would it be possible to decide--with the consent of the governments of Israel, Egypt and Jordan as well as the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el--on the desirable final status of Judea and Samaria, a final status that would guarantee the rights of the Arabs and also the security and rights of the Jewish people. This was the basis on which Camp David was founded. Anyone wishing to put the cart before the horse is not allowing for the 5-year peaceful period, which is the only basis for reaching an agreed-upon arrangement among all parties for this complex problem of conflicting interests in Judea and Samaria.

The opponents of Camp David--and they are numerous in the Arab world--have been instigating the population to throw stones, and have been adopting resolutions whose sole aim is to encourage riots in Judea and Samaria.

But anyone who is proud of the Camp David Agreement as being one of his prime achievements ought to be more careful and cautious in speaking in this explosive area. When criticizing the Israeli settlements, branding them as illegal, he unconsciously encourages illegal acts by the Arabs of Judea and Samaria, and without noticing it lends a hand to those who are trying to undermine the entire package of the Camp David Accords. There is no shortage of rocks in Judea and Samaria, and so one need not add stumbling blocks to the process of determining the interim period of peace and quiet, which is the precondition for an arrangement on the final status of those areas--a process set down at Camp David.

## HADDAD'S CAREER, INFLUENCE IN LEBANON SURVEYED

TA111417 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 11 Mar 83 p 4

[Report by H. Menahem]

[Text] The commander of southern Lebanon, Maj Sa'd Haddad, was and still is an enigma. The ruddy major from Marj 'Uyun has cast his shadow upon, or more precisely, has had people's fear of him influence events in southern Lebanon.

Recently we learned of the major's initiative in deploying his forces from the Israeli border to the banks of the Al-'Awwali River, inside the 45 km zone. This was not another deployment meant to "show a presence," but a significant deployment of armor and artillery.

This deployment is well planned and has a single purpose: to integrate Haddad's forces as an organic force in southern Lebanon as part of a dense layout, be it intended either to forestall problems or create accomplished facts in the fields.

Haddad began by deploying his troops in Sidon, then in An-Nabatiyah. Meanwhile, he had an eye on Jubb Janin. His forces include tanks, armored personnel carriers and light cannons.

The deployment of forces was preceded by enlistment among the thousands of Christian and Shi'ite villagers scattered throughout the hundreds of villages in southern Lebanon.

Haddad's demonstration of power shows that Haddad's army was and remains the dominant force in southern Lebanon. This demonstration also signals both the authorities in Lebanon and the inhabitants that no settlement is possible in Lebanon without taking Haddad into consideration.

Even Haddad himself does not hide his intentions. It is true that he speaks of his uncompromising struggle for Lebanon's freedom and the Syrians' and terrorists' removal from its territory. But at the same time he intends to hint to the authorities in Beirut about his power and presence in the field.

Haddad does not even hide his close alliance with Israel. However, he explains this clearly: "Lebanon's interests coincide with those of Israel."

"The removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and the restoration of the government in Lebanon to its true rulers is the goal."

This slogan is repeated and is expressed faithfully by Haddad. It also captures the heart of the inhabitants of southern Lebanon from all the communities. Haddad appears to them as a national patriot who has sacrificed his life for Lebanon's freedom.

It is not for nothing that Haddad is listened to attentively by the historic enemies of the Maronite Christians, the Shi'ites, who are renowned for their fanaticism in the Muslim world.

It is worth noting that in realms in which many rulers in Lebanon have failed, the major from Marj 'Uyun has succeeded in establishing joint Christian-Shi'ite militias. "We are fighting for our homes and land. This is what all of us have in common," Haddad stresses to the villagers.

The Sunnis and the terrorists are responsible for the catastrophes that have afflicted the Lebanese. The terrorists demonstrated this well for the inhabitants of the south, whose land and homes became a wide field of activity for the terrorists.

Haddad, who began his career with the control of several Christian villages, while maintaining small-scale cooperation with Israel, has now expanded his kingdom from a narrow sector of several square kilometers to an extensive area encompassing nearly half of Lebanon.

It is an open secret that Haddad derives nearly all of his power from his alliance with Israel. It may be presumed that Israel will not abandon him in the future either, all the more so because it sees a unity of interests between its struggle for peace and security and those interests Haddad represents.

CSO: 4400/188

## ISRAEL

### ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS IN ISRAEL

1. Introduction: The situation in Israel is characterized by a

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The Likud branch in Nazerat 'Illit published an even more extreme statement in which it called on the residents of the city to avoid any contact with their Arab neighbors. MK Uri Saviv, former secretary of the Pe'er Sheva Workers Council, proposed that the Bedouins of the Negev be settled in Judea and Samaria.

Much more severe were the comments of Rabbi Kahane who called for the eviction of the Arabs from the country. One still remembers the statement of the Likud minister who declared his readiness to pay for the travel expenses of every Arab who would leave Israel.

These few examples which I have cited from Jewish public figures intensify the fears of Israeli Arabs who are in a state of national distress even without this. Their feeling of being second-class citizens in all areas of life in the country is deepened.

Of course, there is extremism in the Arab community. Members of the RAKAH do not miss an opportunity to enflame the passions of the Arabs against the state and turn local and even personal problems into national focal points of tension. They include those who do not hesitate to speak about "the Israeli Arabs' right of self-determination to the point of separation from the state." One also cannot ignore the extremists of the Villagers group and the National Progressive Movement who do not hesitate to call on the Arabs of Israel to join in a violent struggle against the state.

It is clear that extremism on both sides is likely to lead to [word meaning unknown] and even to degenerate into violence. The extremists on both sides are the most vocal and their language exceeds their real strength which represents a minority in society. Nevertheless, most of the Israeli Arabs, who are loyal citizens of the state, complain about the discrimination directed against them by most of the Jewish citizens who conduct themselves with passiveness and do not accept the Arab citizens as a community with which to coexist, with all that that implies.

The Arab minority today numbers about 650,000 people, about 17 percent of the population of the state. More than 80 percent of this community were born in the state, that is their maximum age is thirty-four! It is a community which compares favorably with that of the total population by most of the standard criteria (income, education, health, et cetera). The modernization process of this community is at the height with all the characteristic crises that this entails and that involves the overthrowing of the traditional structures (the family), the transition from rural to urban occupations, the increase in professionals, and the most prominent of all -- the replacement of the traditional leadership by young leaders who speak in the current vernacular and are sensitive to the new winds which are blowing in the region and in the state. The young Arab leadership which has been freed from the chains of tradition is capable of guiding the Arab community toward integration and making a contribution to Israeli society, but it can to the same extent serve to stress the separateness, strangeness, and struggle between Arabs and Jews.

The Arab minority in Israel is caught up in a position of the most acute dual loyalty of the severe and constant struggle between his country and his brothers against the world, and through this, the members of the Arab community who demonstrate loyalty to the state want to take their proper place and be partners in its life.

to bring us together, and we must draw the positive from this because the alternative to this course is extremely dangerous. An interim condition of physical separation and the Jewish populations ignorance of the Arab one brings us closer to a hazardous incline. Such conduct is contrary to the values and interests of the State of Israel.

The present government has not held one discussion of the subject of the Arabs of Israel since it came to power. It has not even addressed this population. In contrast, we must emphasize the improvement of Arab-Jewish relations and their integration into the life of the state as one of the most important challenges facing us. Therefore, we must by word and deed work for the bringing of Jews and Arabs closer together, the meeting of students from both populations, the taking of initiatives on the employment and economic level, and for coping with this problem in a free dialogue -- despite the complex problems.

The Arab minority should no longer be viewed as a separate, self-contained structure but rather as an active element which must be given consideration in the development of policy in all areas.

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## ISRAEL

### PRO-PLO ISRAELI ARAB ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 15 Dec 82 pp 22-23

[Article by Rafiq Halbi: "We Are the Natives"]

[Text] The signs of protest are evident in the streets of Umm al-Fahm: Palestinian flags drawn on the walls and houses on which inscriptions have been painted -- "We are all Fedayeen," "The blood of the revolutionaries calls on you to strike," and "One people, one way." In Shekhem, Ramallah, and Hebron, the residents are forced to erase the slogans. This also happens in East Jerusalem. However, in Umm al-Fahm, in the Israel of the green line, the story is different. In a mass demonstration after the massacre in Sabra and Shatila, the demonstrators attacked the local police station and set it afire. It is not difficult to imagine how the security authorities would have acted had this occurred in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip.

Those who set the tone in the demonstrations in Umm al-Fahm, the largest of the Arab villages in Israel, were "The Villagers," a group that was established in 1970 in the wake of the events of Black September in Jordan. Leading the instigators was Muhammad Qiwan, then a law student at Tel Aviv University and today a lawyer with an office in Hadera. He lost a year of study at the university because of a confinement order issued by the commanding general of the Central Command, and he put all his effort into organizing the group. He says that the name "The Villagers" does not exactly express the idea. "We are natives," he says. "ruled by colonialists. Our official name in Arabic is Abna' al Balad, and this is misleading at times. Balad means village, country, and also homeland. We are not only villagers, we are also natives of this country, natives of the homeland. . . ." Qiwan is now called Abu 'Arafat. "Three months ago I had a son, and I named him 'Arafat," he relates.

The Villagers organization is small, but its influence extends beyond Umm al-Fahm. The leaders of the organization refuse to reveal the number of the "Muntasibun" (registered members), but they are proud of their national influence. They have sister groups in many of the Arab settlements -- in Taiyiba, Tirah, 'Ara, and 'Ar'ara in the Triangle; in Kavul, Shefaram, Kafr Kanna, 'Araba, and Sakhnin in the Galilee; on the campuses of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Be'er Sheva, and even in Lod, which has a relatively small number of Arabs, and in 'Akko. The rest of the details are top secret. The Villagers do not readily open their hearts to reporters. They are suspicious of strangers and are convinced that "the establishment is searching for them."

On 10 April 1981 the then minister of defense, Menahem Begin, signed an order prohibiting the convening of the National Coordinating Committee, which is the national representation of the extremist organizations among the Arabs of Israel. Not all of the organizations and groups are called "The Villagers." On the campuses they are called the "National Progressive Movement" or the Hebrew acronym Telem (as distinguished from Telem, the Movement for Zionist Realization), and in Tayyiba they are called Al Nahda (The Revival). The minister of defense based his order on Section 84 of Regulations for Defense in Time of Emergency which were issued during the Mandatory period and which were used at the time against the Irgun Tzva'i Le'umi and the Lohamei Herut Israel. Lawyer Qiwan says with a smile: "This is the irony of history."

#### The Law of Return -- also for Palestinians

In the Villagers branch of Umm al-Fahm there is a seven-member Operations Committee and an official spokesman. The spokesman, Hassan Jabarin, a bookstore owner in the village, married and the father of two children, was confined to his home for 2 years (from June 1980 to June 1982). Before that he was in prison for about 3 years after having been convicted of a security crime. "I advocate the return of the Palestinian refugees to their country," says Jabarin, "but not precisely to their homes. The Jews who came here should remain here, but the Law of Return must be applied equally to the Palestinians, and they must be granted similar rights to those of the new immigrants."

The Operations Committee is divided into several subcommittees: a Local Committee which handles municipal matters (two of its members are members of the Umm al-Fahm local council who were elected on the Villagers list), a coordinating committee, and a control committee. The members are organized in open cells. There are special cells for the youth and the women, there is community activity in the framework of a nursery school and a cultural center. There are red flags and national slogans on the walls of the center. The pattern of organization in Umm al Fahm has been copied in other villages. Qiwan says: "We have risen in order to deal with matters on the local level -- the stealing of land and the abandonment of schools and community services. In these areas there is no difference between the Likud and the Alignment just as there is no difference to us between what is called the 'development of the Galilee' and the 'Judaization of the Galilee'." And indeed Umm al Fahm is an abandoned settlement. Sewage water flows in the alleys, and the streets are in bad condition. There is a giant garbage dump at the entrance, mud, and a stench. The "village" -- it can properly be called a municipality -- is experiencing a population explosion with over 25,000 residents. There is no master plan for development, and there is a chronic shortage of land. It is a hotbed for frustrations and bitterness. This is perhaps the reason why recently more and more residents have been listening to the Villagers and the Muslim Brotherhood, which represent a new "hit" with a very old format.

The Villagers meet with those from the outside who share their views in accordance with current events. They try to coordinate positions with the students from the National Progressive Movement (headed by Lawyer Ibrahim Nasir who lives in Jerusalem) and with the Al Nahda group from Tayyiba (headed by Salah Barnasi, one of the veterans of Al Ard who spent 10 years in jail for security crimes). Another close

group is called Al-Sawt (The Voice) -- intellectuals and thinkers who see their purpose in the areas of culture and who are involved in the dissemination of Palestinian literature and in the fostering of Palestinian folklore (headed by Mansur Jardush, a businessman from Nazerat and a veteran of Al Ard). This group recently published a book by Dr Hatem Abu-Ghazalah of Shekhem which discussed the Camp David Agreements and the distribution of which was prohibited in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Villagers have connections with personalities in the territories. Muhammad Salamah (Abu Salamah), who was the owner of an electrical shop in Umm al Fahm, was the one who coordinated the contacts with Bassam Shak'a and the one who invited the deposed mayor of Shekhem to speak at the Villagers' club. Shak'a came -- and stopped. The monitoring of him was increased, and an order was issued forbidding Abu Salamah from crossing the green line. Today the connections between Shekhem and Umm al-Fahm are kept at a low profile.

#### Arab Fund-Raising Campaign in America

By the order of Begin under the authority of his position as minister of defense, the National Coordinating Committee was declared illegal. The reason was that "it is an organization which has the purpose of fighting the State of Israel and Zionism and establishing a Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO in the territory of Eretz Israel." The Villagers reject this charge. According to them, "the Palestinian people recognize the PLO as its sole representative, and we are part of the Palestinian people. . . every decision and every position of the PLO must take us also into account. . ." They maintain that a secular and democratic state is an appropriate solution for the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and propose that the Israeli Jews begin a process of dezionization of the State of Israel. "We are proposing a democratic-socialist society, without national oppression." When one asks the spokesman, Hasan Jabarin, if he really believes in a secular, democratic, and socialist state, he smiles and responds: "If you want it, it is no legend."

They do not have a written political-ideological program, but there is oral agreement, a consensus. There is also an economic-financial basis through foreign ties: with the American-Palestinian Fund, headed by a PLO activist in the United States, Dr Hisham Shar'abi and with the Organization of Palestinian University Graduates in the United States. On the recommendation of the Villagers, the Fund contributed \$6,000 to the Umm al-Fahm local council, and it is providing thousands of dollars of aid to Arab students from Israel who are studying in the United States. The linkage between Dr Shar'abi and the Arabs from Israel is through two Palestinian intellectuals, Dr Shuqri al-'Abd, who is also the secretary of the Fund and is from the village of Maaliya in the Galilee, and Dr Halil Nahla from the village of Arna in the Galilee who is now living in Boston in the United States. One of the Villagers activists relates that Arab students studying in Israel also receive financial assistance from the American-Palestinian Fund, primarily those who are active in the National Progressive Movement. The Fund has invested money in the production of films on the condition of the Arabs in Israel, and from time to time it orders material photographed in Israel. A Villagers spokesman is concerned that his organization will be accused of being funded by PLO money. "We live on the contributions of the residents," he says.

The Organization of University Graduates does not provide financial assistance, but its support is important. Three weeks ago, Hasan Jabarin, the Villagers spokesman, returned to Israel after a lecture campaign throughout the United States. He was invited to America by the Organization of Palestinian University Graduates. On his return, he gave a public report during which he said: "Regardless of the military results of the war in Lebanon, the Israeli aggression did not succeed in destroying the Palestinian resistance movement. They tried to exterminate the Palestinians, but there will be no compromise on the demand to establish a Palestinian state under PLO leadership on the national land and to raise the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem." These words were greeted with thunderous applause.

#### Out of Fear of the Security Arms

The ties between the Villagers and the Jewish community are limited. There are connections with Matzpen in Tel Aviv. "We are for ties with every Jew who understands our interest and who struggles for respect for our basic rights." There was an attempt to confer with Peace Now. According to the Villagers, "the Peace Now representatives, Orgad Vardimon and Elisha Yellin-Mor, were afraid because the communications media have denigrated us."

When I visited Umm al-Fahm this week, the Villagers were interested in knowing why there have been attempts to expose them. Out of fear of the security arms, they emphasize that they are satisfied to express opinions and make suggestions, but they are not taking action to achieve their goals. They repeat to every visitor that they are a political movement functioning in accordance with the law and active only in elections for the local authorities. As was stated, the Villagers do not have a written platform, however their political spectrum is broad, and it encompasses all the views and leanings found in the PLO. Every change in the PLO is clearly reflected here. In the context of the abandonment of the Arabs in Israel and as long as the conflict continues in the region, I believe that the Villagers have a major potential in the Arab street. This is apparently the reason for the change in the RAKAH's attitude toward the organization which through the years has been the object of its insults and abuse. RAKAH is taking the Villagers seriously; it is making an attempt at consultation and cooperation, primarily on the municipal and local council level.

END

4423/78

BETHLEHEM MAYOR INTERVIEWED ON PLO, ISRAEL

TA110832 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Mar 83 p 2

[Interview with Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj by 'Aqiva Eldar: "You and the PLO Are Too Intransigent"--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] What has been happening recently with you in the West Bank?

[Answer] It is because of the settlements and the settlers' activities.

[Question] They have already been there for years.

[Answer] Not like this. The settlers are covering the West Bank in a provocative way and trying to take the law into their own hands. You cannot imagine how angry these people are; when an Arab boy throws a stone, the gates of hell open up. When a settler shoots, the authorities try to find excuses. This discrimination is increasing the tension.

[Question] In your view, should the settlers be banned from bearing arms to defend themselves?

[Answer] Is there a police force in Israel? Is there rule of law in Israel? Are there different laws and different hands, one with a whip and one with a glove? What do you expect the reactions to such a situation to be. Who placed bombs in the mosque and school in Hebron? Has the defense minister tried to exhaust the resources of the law in Qiryat Arba', will he ever do so? When a stone was thrown at a car from a refugee camp, a curfew was imposed at once. For 16 years they have been imposing curfews. Has this had any positive results? On the contrary.

[Question] Is there any change of you living in peace with Levinger and his people?

[Answer] No. Levinger wants the Arabs to leave here. Like Kahana, he does not want to see an Arab face.

[Question] They say that the Arabs do not want to see their faces.

[Answer] When Levinger was given the right to live in Qiryat Arba' the Arab lost his home in East Jerusalem and Qatamon [suburb of Jerusalem] and can no longer return there, why should this be so?

[Question] Some people say that the PLO supporters are working up people's feelings in support for the extremist decisions of the Palestine Council.

[Answer] The majority of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip want peace with Israel. The difference between us and Israel is that for us peace is freedom, a homeland and a state of our own in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, beside the State of Israel.

[Question] But the Palestine Council does not believe in this approach.

[Answer] The PLO position is unclear. I believe that they know that this is what really will happen. They will accept it. My advice to them has always been to call for peace with Israel and a Palestinian peace delegation.

[Question] Do you still have hopes for a change in the PLO?

[Answer] I have no hopes of any of the sides. They are more than obstinate. Israel is intransigent, but it has the power to implement its policy and there lies the danger.

CSO: 4400/258

IDF COMMANDER SAYS STONE-THROWING PROBLEMATIC MORAL ISSUE

TA111920 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1820 GMT 11 Mar 83

[Interview with Commander of the Central Command Major General Ori Or by Gil Sadan; date and place not given--videotaped]

[Text] [Question] General Or, what is the source of the unrest in the last few days?

[Answer] Nothing exceptional or substantially different from last year has occurred. Those creating the disturbances have remained in Judaea and Samaria. There are external elements such as the Palestine National Council [PNC] which convened in Algiers. Of course, this was accompanied by Carter's visit and the appointment of a new defense minister. From our experience, we know that all sorts of events of this nature soon raise the level of activity in Judaea and Samaria.

[Question] Who is behind it?

[Answer] It is backed by PLO bodies. For example, every students' council in schools includes a respectable PLO representation and a larger representation of the rejectionist front. There are six universities and many high schools in Judaea and Samaria. This means that there are student councils in which the PLO--as well as the rejectionist organizations--is the strongest representative and receives clear instructions to create unrest.

[Question] To what extent has the activity of Jewish inhabitants in Judaea and Samaria against Arab inhabitants led to this recent unrest?

[Answer] There is a certain sector of the public, a small, militant and fanatic group, and we are dealing with it. For example, the shooting in Yattah, the shooting of the girl in Hebron--the people who committed these acts were apprehended and are now in prison and will be brought to trial.

[Question] The Jewish settlers claim that the army is not sufficiently coping with the stoning problem.

[Answer] An army of such a high moral level as ours has a problem when it has to cope with stone throwers, who are 16-year-old boys or 20-year-old

youths. Due to the standards I adhere to of a Western, liberal and moral country in which the soldiers are being raised, it certainly becomes a problem to tackle this. We think about and discuss this issue and additional ways have been raised with the defense minister. Were the army to proceed in an immoral manner it could perhaps overcome this problem. But we will not change the system and we will look for other means.

From their viewpoint, one may understand the settlers' arguments. However, all in all, those who choose to and recognize the value and importance of living in Judaea and Samaria must realize the complexity of the problems, as well as the problems the army encounters when dealing with stone throwing.

[Question] In other words, they must reconcile themselves to the fact that when they drive on the roads, they risk stones being thrown at them.

[Answer] They must struggle, demand and maintain a dialogue with us and know that the army will do everything it can. They are not allowed to take the law into their own hands and carry out actions that are outside their authority. We are doing a great deal about this problem. However, to tell you that we are doing everything--there is nothing like that.

[Question] The Arab inhabitants claim that there are many instances of collective punishment, that innocent people are punished for the deeds of a few.

[Answer] That is true. One of the issues on which we hesitate a great deal is when to go only for individual punishment and when there is no other choice but to go for collective punishment. As a rule, the purpose is to spot the man who threw the stone and to deal with him. However, as I said before, not just one person is involved. In most cases, he is backed by organizations and people who push him to act [interrupted].

[Question] However, there is also a large sector that is innocent.

[Answer] That is true. We really try to isolate those responsible.

CSO: 4400/258

## DEMOCRATIC WOMEN'S MOVEMENT PRAISED BY PALESTINIAN WOMEN

TA121849 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1810 GMT 12 Mar 83

[Text] Haifa, 12 Mar (ITIM)--"The Soviet people cry for the victims falling in Lebanon, by they Lebanese, Palestinian or Israeli," the representative of the Soviet Women's Movement, (Lilya Kuseleyva) said last night. She was bringing the message of the Soviet delegation to the Conference of Democratic Women in Israel, held at the "Betenu" audience in Haifa.

Women's delegations from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Cyprus participated in the conference. The opening session was attended by Hadash-Rakah MK's He'ir Wilner, Tawfiq Tubi, Tawfiq Zayyad and hundreds of delegates from the Movement of Democratic Women in Israel, Jewish and Arab, from all over the country, as well as a delegation on behalf of the Organization of Palestinian Women Working in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

Last week, the secretary of the Moscow trade unions, (Lyudmila Yuliyanova), the representative of the Soviet Women's Movement, (Lilya Kuseleyva), the representative of the World Federation of Women, (Maria Salamitan) from Finland, (Anna Kisch), the deputy president of the Women's Movement in Hungary, (Panka Ashetedzova) from Bulgaria and (Christine Arkarodova) from Cyprus all arrived in Israel. The opening session was also attended by Haifa Mayor Arye Gur'el and the representative of the Haifa Municipality's Committee on the Status of Women, (Y. Chernobroda) as well as Na'amat [Histadrut-affiliated women's movement] Hava Kopolevich.

The representative of the Soviet delegation, (Lilya Kuseleyva), brought the congratulatory message of the president of the Soviet Women's Union, Valentina Tereshkova, who was the world's first female cosmonaut, and said that the Soviet Union believes that the way out of the Lebanon crisis will be in the elimination of the Israeli-Arab conflict by way of an international conference attended by representatives from Israel and the PLO, toward achieving a just peace for the benefit of the people of Israel and the Palestinian people.

(Amal Harisha), the representative of the Palestinian women, thanked the Democratic Women's Movement for their solidarity actions with the Palestinian women, and said that the Palestinian people in the territories reject the Reagan plan and protest Jimmy Carter's visit to Israel and the territories.

She said that the Palestinian women laud the Palestine National Council resolutions and believe that the solution in the area would only be possible through the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, which would secure peace which the Palestinian and Israeli women need.

At the opening of the convention, the President of the Israeli Democratic Women's Movement Sonia Eidelberg, and the Secretary-General of the movement Ruth Lubich, criticized the government for the war in Lebanon and the cause of martial legislation.

The deliberations ended today with the election of the institutions of the Democratic Women's Movement in Israel as well as with the adoption of resolutions that call for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

At the end of the conference, the democratic women held a demonstration in the streets of the Hadar Hakarmel neighborhood to mark International Woman's Day.

CSO: 4400/258

## BRIEFS

**FOREIGN MINISTRY SANCTIONS**—The Foreign Ministry staff has decided to step up their sanctions as of next Monday by refusing to travel on official business outside Jerusalem. According to the staff committee, this will mean that the diplomatic mail will not be taken to or fetched from Ben-Gurion Airport, that visiting dignitaries will not be welcomed at the airport or escorted there on their departure, and that ministry officials will refrain from attending public or diplomatic events outside of the capital. The measure is to be applied in addition to the work-to-rule, ordered by the staff committee three weeks ago, under which all work by ministry personnel in Israel and abroad ceases at 6 p.m. each evening—the only exception is in the negotiation with Lebanon. The sanctions are designed to support longstanding demands by the staff for equalization of their pay and conditions to those prevailing in the defence establishment. A general staff meeting has empowered the staff committee to step up the sanctions if no progress is achieved in talks with the treasury. The next step may be advancing the work-cutoff deadline from 6 p.m. to 2 p.m. [Report by the diplomatic correspondent] [Text] [TA110723 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Mar 83 p 3]

**'PEACE CENTER' DELEGATION IN BUDAPEST**—A delegation representing the Israeli Peace Center has arrived in Budapest. It is comprised of seven members, including Mordekhay Bar'on, Hana Zemer and (Walid Hajj Yihyah). The Hungarian News Agency has issued a communique saying that a Peace Now delegation arrived, and also mentioned in the same context that a PLO delegation also came to Hungary. The Peace Now Movement has reported that movement member Mordekhay Bar'on did not go in order to confer with the PLO members, and that the delegation does not represent the movement. The PLO delegation whose arrival was reported is headed by Salah Khalaf. [Text] [TA111836 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 11 Mar 83]

**BEN-PORAT RESIGNATION POSSIBLE**—Minister-without-portfolio Mordekhay Ben-Porat may resign from the government and the coalition. Reporter Amnon Nadav has learned that at a meeting of Ben-Porat's party, the Movement for Zionist Renewal, there was criticism of the slim achievements resulting from Ben-Porat's cabinet membership. It was decided to reexamine the continuation of the alliance with the coalition within 1 month. It was also decided that the movement would support the candidacy of Professor Elon for the presidency. [Text] [TA131252 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1200 GMT 13 Mar 83]

ARIDOR'S SECRET VISIT TO JAPAN--Finance Minister Yoram Aridor, who is touring the Far East, also visited Japan in secret. His visit was kept confidential and the Finance Ministry yesterday refused to divulge details on the purpose of the visit. The minister is scheduled to return to Israel with his wife on Tuesday. Prior to his tour of the Far East, Aridor visited South Africa, where he signed a series of economic agreements. The Finance Ministry spokesman reported that the reason Aridor's planned visit to Japan was not publicized was for security considerations, but he still refused to elaborate on the reason for the visit and said the minister could talk about it when he returned. Economic circles in Tel Aviv believe that in the course of his visit to Japan, the finance minister tried to thaw the "cool" relations that prevail between Israel and Japan. The two countries have commercial ties in various fields, but Japan--fearing the Arab boycott--has been maintaining these contacts in a low profile. It is believed that this is one of the reasons why Aridor's visit was held in such secrecy against the background of an explicit condition the Japanese hosts had presented. [Report by Dror Sharvit] [Text] [TA 131109 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Mar 83 p 1]

ATTEMPT ON BURG'S LIFE--The police have acquired information that there was a plan to make an attempt on Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg's life last week. This has been learned by our correspondent Shlomo Raz. The police are checking whether there is a connection between this plan and those who hurled the grenade at the Peace Now demonstration. In the wake of the information received, Minister Burg's home has been put under heavy guard. [Text] [TA130521 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 13 Mar 83]

GOVERNMENT COMPULSORY ARBITRATION LEGISLATION--At today's weekly cabinet session the government accepted the proposal of Energy Minister Moda'i to legislate compulsory arbitration in state services. The proposal was worked out in the Ministerial Committee for Legislation and was brought up when the government discussed the doctors' strike. Compulsory arbitration was a plank of the Likud's manifesto. [Text] [TA131248 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1200 GMT 13 Mar 83]

W. BANK INDUSTRIAL SITE--Kefar Sava--MK Pinhas Goldstein (Likud) on Friday visited Habbah in Samaria, six kilometres east of here, to examine the possibility of establishing an industrial zone. Goldstein's visit came at the invitation of (Isma'il Marzuq Ada), head of the area's village leagues. Leaders of 35 villages affiliated with the leagues also attended the meeting, including the leader of the Nablus Region Village League. According to Goldstein, a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, the villagers are willing to sell land to Jews. There is a scarcity of land for industrial development in Kefar Sava, he said. Goldstein, Likud candidate for Kefar Sava mayor in the upcoming elections, said that the leaders assured him that there is no pressure or threats on them to sell. He noted that Arab landowners had previously offered parcels of land for sale, without finding any takers. [Text] [TA130730 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Mar 83 p 2]

ACTS AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN SIDON DECRIED

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 26 Feb 83 p 25

[Text] The Phalangist militias are continuing their systematic campaigns of terrorism against Palestinian citizens in the cities and villages of south Lebanon with the aim of expelling them from their homes, which they either own or rent in these cities and villages, and forcing them to live in the camps.

The Palestinian citizenry fear that these measures by the Phalangists are a prelude to another massacre to be carried out by the militias in the manner of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, or, under the best of circumstances, are the first step toward confining them to the camps and restricting their activities, thus forcing them to emigrate or to deal with the occupation authorities to secure a livelihood for themselves and their families.

The Phalangist terrorism campaigns began in the city of Sidon and its environs about 2 weeks ago and forced a number of Palestinian families to flee the homes which they owned. The scope of these campaigns has expanded to include the regions of Tyre and al-Zahrani.

In 'Adlun eight Palestinian families living in the orchards outside of the 'Adlun camp were forced to leave their homes after they received threats signed by a fascist gang giving itself the name "Unity of Lebanon." The threats demanded that the Palestinian families leave their homes within 24 hours or their lives would be in danger.

The gang stated that the 'Adlun camp was the place that these families must move to.

In al-Sarfand the Phalangist militias perpetrated a new crime when they killed Muhammad Farhat, a Palestinian citizen, and kidnapped his son after they had warned him several days earlier to leave his home, which he owned, within 24 hours.

In al-'Abushiyah, 15 kilometers from Sidon, nine Palestinian families from the al-Sa'di family were forced several days ago to leave their homes, which they owned, after Phalangist militiamen entered the homes and threatened to kill them if they didn't leave. They told them that they should go and live in the 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp. It is worth mentioning that the nine families had purchased their homes 8 years ago as a result of 15 years' work in the area's orchards.

The people of the town were very angry at these measures and went to the Phalange party headquarters to protest. The response given them by the officials was that the decision came from a very high level and that these families must obey.

In the al-Miyah wa Miyah camp fascist Phalangist gangs bombed the homes of two Palestinian families 3 days ago.

It is worth mentioning that these two houses were on land belonging to the camp and paid for by UNRWA.

In this context, the deputy from Sidon, former Minister Nazih al-Bazri condemned the terrorist practices in Sidon and vicinity which were aimed at Palestinian civilians.

The Lebanese authorities asked that the Palestinians be protected according to what was agreed upon after the departure of the Palestinian fighters from Beirut.

This came after an extensive meeting in the home of Dr al-Bazri which was attended by the mayor of the Sidon municipality Ahmad al-Kalash, the deputy chairman of the General Workers Union Husayn 'Abd-al-Jawwad, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the south Muhammad al-Za-tari and the chairman of the Lebanese Grouping in Sidon Dr Labib Abu-Dhahr.

After the meeting Minister al-Bazri issued a statement saying that "the city of Sidon and its environs are exposed to operations aimed at forcing emigration, forcing changes of residence, threatening families, threatening workers and threatening property owners not to sell, rent or conclude transactions concerning their properties except with the knowledge of those people who are issuing the threats."

He added that "the repeated incidents of murder and what might result from them in terms of the complete collapse of security is not in the people's interests, especially the people of Sidon and vicinity. Therefore, I have met with my brothers and we have considered the prevailing situation and how to deal with it in a rational and effective way. We have decided to hold a second session tomorrow, Sunday, to pursue the matter and to come out with public resolutions."

He said, "We only want a peaceful national life which does not discriminate between one citizen and another and we hope that the opinions of others will agree with this position which we have taken."

Al-Bazri added that the state of Lebanon is responsible for the Palestinian civilians present on Lebanese territory and is charged with their protection according to the law and according to what was agreed upon after the departure of the Palestinian fighters from Beirut. He added that the Geneva and Vienna accords are clear concerning the protection of civilians and that this is the responsibility of the occupying army. Therefore, this army must protect those present on Lebanese territory and this includes non-Lebanese.

END 1404 199

AL-JUMAYYIL SHUNS PHOTOS IN MILITARY UNIFORM

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1373, 25 Feb 83 p 7

[Text] It was impossible for journalists to see President Amin al-Jumayyil in the military uniform he was wearing when he came to the airport area to review the Lebanese army, which was preparing to deploy into greater Beirut last week.

The photographers and, for that matter, the Lebanese and all others in the Arab states lost the opportunity to see the first Lebanese president to appear in military garb in his capacity as supreme commander of the army.

One special picture was taken of the president in military uniform, but it was quickly withdrawn from circulation before it could reach any local Lebanese newspapers.

President al-Jumayyil wanted to keep photographers and journalists away from the area where he was in the al-Ramilah district along the road to the Beirut International Airport. Standing beside him was the commander of the army, General Ibrahim Tannus, and senior army officials. The president said that he did not want the occasion to be viewed as being for propaganda or show.

Despite this, President al-Jumayyil learned that a picture had been taken of him in a military field uniform, so he quickly ordered that the picture be confiscated before being published.

Foreign newspapers that published news of the Lebanese army's deployment into greater Beirut accompanied the story with a picture of the president wearing military clothes.

Despite the fact that an army beret and medals are standard fare for the majority of third world leaders, especially in the Middle East, President al-Jumayyil wanted to distance himself from such a specious image. He did, however, want to appear with the soldiers and officers in army uniform to confirm to them that he is on their side and will lead them in carrying out their mission of restoring sovereignty across the homeland and spreading the legitimate government to every inch of it.

In this context, the president addressed them at dawn saying, "This is the first time that a purely Lebanese decision uninfluenced by any other party

has been implemented. You must make all citizens feel that you are on their side and that you are their army. Your role is to succeed. Be up to the standard of your mission and make the citizen sympathize with the country. Affirm to him that the army is for all Lebanon and that you are not for one group against another."

After this, Commander Amin al-Jumayyil gave an order to the army to move and deploy. They carried out his order two hours ahead of schedule. The populace considered this a welcome "violation."

CSO: 4404/265

PEACE EFFORTS IN SAUDI ARABIA

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 309, 22 Jan 83 pp 28-29

[Article: "Increased Diplomatic Efforts Regarding Regional Issues Expected. Arab Conflict Deepens and Saudi Mediation Increases. An Important Saudi Move on Two Fronts: The Iraqi-Iranian War and the Middle East Crisis... Plans for a Big International Move Aimed at Increasing U.S. Efforts To Solve Conflicts in That Region"]

[Text] Last week, the Saudi capital witnessed extensive political activities and Arab consultations carried out by Saudi diplomacy in spite of the silence maintained by Saudi official circles about details, preferring to wait until the final results of these activities have evolved. However, all available indications and information point to the fact that Saudi Arabia is currently leading a widespread Arab initiative aimed at clearing the Arab atmospheres in preparation for a new phase of Arab international diplomacy concerning the Middle East crisis.

When AL-MUSTAQBAL asked a leading Saudi official about the details of the active diplomacy witnessed in Riyadh, he said: "It is preferable to wait until the results come out." However, this official pointed out to the Saudi monarch's emphasis during the meeting with his cabinet, last Monday on the importance of maintaining the thrust for the peace process generated by the Arab peace proposal plan, which met with widespread international approval as being the first unified position toward bringing comprehensive and just peace to the area. The official also mentioned the time factor and its importance in rallying the Arabs together so that they can confront the Israeli conspiracies and expansionist plans (at the expense of Arab lands) and the attempts to bury all signs of the Palestinian cause.

This significant Arab political move, led by the Saudis in Riyadh in the last few days, was started by the important visits of Crown Prince 'Abdullah Bin 'Abd al-'Aziz to Baghdad and Damascus where he met with each of the Iraqi and Syrian presidents. Nevertheless, all events indicate that Saudi Arabia has started a new phase of Arab political activity since the beginning of this year after King Fahd returned from his trip abroad. This effort started when the Saudi monarch made his well known appeal to the people of Lebanon on the 6th of this month [January 1983] to stop fighting in Tripoli and in the other Lebanese regions, promising that Saudi Arabia

will make every effort to back Lebanon's independence and realize reconciliation among the Lebanese. Following this appeal, the Saudis initiated a number of contacts with various Lebanese factions and other capitals to reach agreement on ending the bloody battles in the northern city. Informed sources in Riyadh mentioned that those contacts by King Fahd had contributed to softening hardline positions in Tripoli, thus restoring calm to this city after the fierce fighting it witnessed. This Saudi attention to the issue of Tripoli was in fact part of a Saudi interest in the problem of Lebanon, a country which is presently involved in a difficult battle with the Israeli enemy, through the negotiations now taking place in Khaldah and Qiriyat Shemona. A reliable Saudi source reiterated to AL-MUSTAQBAL that the objective behind Riyadh's efforts is not to leave Lebanon alone to face the negotiations with its invader, so that Israel is not given the opportunity to impose its conditions on Lebanon, the most important of which are the normalization of relations, and the signing of new agreements similar to the Camp David accords.

Other political observers report that Riyadh looks with intense interest at the ongoing negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, as it is possible that these negotiations may become a "test" of Washington's real intentions in achieving peace in the Middle East. However, Riyadh is requiring from the Lebanese government that Lebanon not be led into signing a peace treaty with Israel, and thus falling in the same trap in which Egypt fell when it signed the Camp David pact.

Although Saudi Arabia has acted to provide a suitable Lebanese climate to enable the legitimate government in Lebanon to enter its political battle against the Israeli enemy from a strong position, there is no doubt that Riyadh also wants the Arab climate [atmosphere] to be clear of any differences in order to strengthen the Arab position in the next phase, which will be full of political diplomacy related to the Middle East crisis. Arab political sources in Riyadh report that in the Saudi capital, it is believed that the next 2 months will witness the end of the subject of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and the beginning of a new phase of active diplomacy in the area aimed at resolving the Middle East crisis. While others await the results of negotiations in Lebanon for an Israeli pull-out from the country, the Saudis want the Arab countries to be ready for the next stage with a cohesive Arab strategy for future action and diplomacy based on the Arab peace proposal agreed upon during the last summit meeting in Fez. Therefore, observers admit that the active diplomacy witnessed in Riyadh this week was actually aimed at preparing for a unified and strong Arab stand so that the Arabs can face all the proposed solutions expected during the coming spring with a clear vision and a unified position. As far as Riyadh is concerned, the only way to achieve a unified and strong position among the Arabs is to smooth out the disagreements they have between themselves from time to time. This is what King Fahd 'Abd al-'Aziz pointed out during his cabinet meeting, saying that the kingdom through its unrelenting strive for the Palestinian cause, the prime Arab cause, was intent on surmounting marginal conflicts, which might hinder Arab ties, and elevating the Arab relations to meet the challenges facing them from Zionism and its deliberate ploys.

Thence, an observer can understand the value of such an active Arab diplomacy as seen in Riyadh this week, starting with the visit of Prince 'Abdallah Bin 'Abd al-'Aziz--who had cut short his vacation in the desert--to Baghdad and Damascus where he met with each of the Iraqi and Syrian presidents.

Informed sources in Riyadh say that the objective of Prince 'Abdallah Bin 'Abd al-'Aziz's mission in Baghdad and Damascus is to achieve some sort of an accord between both the Iraqi and Syrian capitals, which could contribute to resolving a number of problems in the area, primarily the Iraqi-Iranian war. These sources further emphasize that the efforts of the Saudi crown prince has led to some success; for example the Iraqi president Saddam Hussain visited Riyadh last Tuesday, when Prince Abdallah 'Abd al-'Aziz returned along with him from Baghdad. The same sources also indicate that the Saudi efforts in Baghdad were not limited to the Iraqi-Syrian conflict only, but were also related to the Saudi endeavors aimed at finding a peaceful settlement to the Iraqi-Iranian war, especially after optimistic signs appeared about the possible successes of Algerian mediation efforts in this respect. The visit of the Saudi Minister of State Muhammad Ibrahim Al-Mass'ud to Algeria last Monday and his return to Riyadh a few hours before the arrival of the Iraqi president was linked to the statement made by the Saudi Arabian News Agency [SPA] that the Iraqi-Saudi talks had dealt with the Iraqi-Iranian war issue. Thus, political circles expect that, in the next few weeks, important developments will take place in the mediation efforts between Baghdad and Teheran. Sources also say that some Syrian involvement in the Algerian mediation, which is highly approved by Saudi Arabia for ending the war in the Gulf, is not unlikely.

Informed political sources in Riyadh also say that the active Saudi diplomacy on the Arab stage, aimed at preparing the Arab mood, will be followed by similar diplomacy on the international level, especially with respect to Washington in preparation for the next Arab political battle concerning the Middle East crisis. This is to prompt the American administration to continue its efforts to find a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue. This subject was at the center of the Jordanian-Saudi talks, held in Riyadh between the Jordanian and Saudi monarchs last Sunday and Monday. An informed Jordanian source told AL-MUSTAQBAL that King Husayn revealed to the monarch the results of his talks with President Ronald Reagan. This Jordanian source also added that the Jordanian-Saudi talks aimed at coordinating Arab collective action during the next stage.

Political circles in Riyadh do not eliminate the possibility of an Arab summit in Riyadh next month, in which all future Arab steps would be agreed on.

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CSG: 4404/220

SAUDI MAGAZINE ASSAILS IRAN'S INTRANSIGENCE

GF160719 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 16 Mar 83

[From press review]

[Text] Commenting on the Iranian intransigence and insistence on carrying on the war against Iraq, the magazine AL-YAMAMAH wrote:

The voices of hundreds of wounded and dying people, and the cries of bereaved women and orphans who were victimized by this damned war were expecting a solution to be made in the coulisse of the nonaligned summit of New Delhi--a solution that would have restored security to the countries and peoples of the region and led to the return of life and reactivation of the human and economic development machine that was put out of commission by the war. Nonetheless, the Iranian regime insisted on dashing all these hopes and aspirations. The least that can be said about Tehran's recent stand is that it insists on carrying on this crime at a time when the Iraqi representative announced Iraq's readiness to accept any arbitration committee the summit would choose. Instead of helping their country themselves before any one else would by adopting a positive stand on that important occasion of the non-aligned countries and the third world in general, the rulers of Tehran sought to make the war look legitimate and push the region on the verge of further tension, conflicts and dismemberment.

Furthermore, Iran, which had already aborted all recent Islamic, international and Arab efforts for peace, dealt a blow to the entire nonaligned movement at the recent summit. The Iranian stand was a large black mark for the nonaligned countries while they were preparing for a new start in a new phase that required an influential effective and coherent presentation.

Finally, the magazine AL-YAMAMAH concluded: The Iranian idiocy will not lead to the surrender of Iraq or the submission of its people. Neither will it realize the dreams of expansion and hegemony that fill the heads of certain Iranian leaders. The Iranian idiocy will return woes and calamities to the Iranian people who have suffered a great deal and lost thousands of young men and faculties in the war that lost legitimacy long ago.

CSO: 4400/254

CROWN PRINCE ADDRESSES NATIONAL GUARD EXERCISE

PM161437 Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 13 Mar 83 p 5

[Ayman Habib report: "His Highness Amir 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz at 'Al-Yamamah' Mobilization Exercise"]

[Excerpts] His royal highness the crown prince, deputy minister and commander of the national guard last night attended the mobilization exercise code-named "Al-Yamamah" at a location outside the town of Riyadh.

The crown prince's motorcade arrived at the location at 1930 hours last night, accompanied by His Royal Highness Amir 'Abd al-'Illah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, amir of Al-Qusayim area, and was received by a large number of national guard officials.

At the beginning of the ceremony held on this occasion his highness listened to a detailed briefing by Deputy Commander of the Fifth Joint Services Division Maj Muhammad Abu Sunayn. Afterwards the night attack of the last stage of the "Al-Yamamah" mobilization exercise began, in which the Muhammad Ibn Saud first mechanized brigade and some advanced units took part. After the exercise commanders of the units participating in the exercise had the honor of greeting his highness.

Afterwards the speech of His Royal Highness Amir 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz was delivered. It was read on his behalf by His Highness Col Mut'ab Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, commander of King Khalid Military College.

On this remarkable occasion I convey to you the greetings of our supreme commander and his pride in you. As one of you, I share responsibility with you, responsibility in an age in which God's wisdom and will have decreed that we, the sons of this generation and children of this good land, be the contemporaries of a material and secular civilization whose sciences had deeply penetrated the surface of the earth and looked toward space travel.

What we hold sacrosanct, our countries and even our livelihood, we the sons of the Arab and Islamic nation, are the target of attack. We are the target of attempts to sow division and incite hatred amongst us. What is happening in our Arab and Islamic lands, whether in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan or elsewhere in the Arab and Islamic homeland, is due first and foremost to the

divisions and differences that have dispersed us and scattered us in a world that has no self-respect.

We in this kingdom are watching the grave events and trying with every honorable means to gather together what has been dispersed, to bring the brothers together, and to put an end to estrangement between brothers in this Arab and Islamic world. We fully believe that our strength lies in this. It is not in arms, in oil, or in emotionalism, anger or tagging along behind the powerful ones that our strength lies. Never. Our strength lies in our unity and in speaking with one voice. Once we realize this truth and make it our objective, all the invading and covetous forces will give up attacking our legitimate rights in this area. Today's world has no respect for small things. When will we realize this truth?

This is the perplexing question for which a great country and a nation with an ancient civilization and a human message is awaiting an answer.

CSO: 4400/254

SYRIA

# WINTER MILITARY TRAINING FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS BEGUN

Damascus AL-Ba'Th in Arabic 21 Jan 83 p 4

[Article: "University Winter Military Training Camps Started; Students Achieve Qualitative Leap in Absorbing Military Sciences"]

[Text/ Damascus--The first phase of the university winter military training camps for academic year 1982-83 was started in all of the country's universities yesterday morning. This phase lasts 15 days.

In Damascus, the university training camps were opened yesterday and the students of the theoretical colleges of Damascus University, namely the literature, law, economy, business, Shari'a and education colleges, were divided among four camps according to the specialization of the colleges. The camps are the infantry, special tasks, armor and administrative affairs camps.

Comrade Staff Brig Gen 'Izz al-Din Suqur, the University Training Center commander, will conduct an inspection tour of the camps to supervise the progress of work and to check the full readiness to start the camps within the framework of the set program and to achieve the plan and the goal it seeks to realize.

A word of guidance by the comrade brigadier general commanding the center on the importance of the winter camp will be broadcast at all the colleges of Damascus University. The comrade brigadier general's address includes an explanation of the current political conditions and events and of the country's steadfast position under the leadership of President al-Asad who has foiled and will foil all the plots of the traitors and the reactionaries, especially since Syria will, with the struggle of its sons, achieve its rights and impose the war or peace it wants.

Our country, led by President al-Asad, is a flame of struggle that will not capitulate and will not waver in the face of any force, regardless of how oppressive.

The winter military training programs include varied and intensive lessons on all military sciences of all specializations. Varied lectures will be given on political guidance and on implementing military exercises under real /sic battle conditions for each branch according to its specialization. Target shooting with various kinds of weapons will also be carried out.

GRADUATION OF ARMED BA'THIST PLATOONS REPORTED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Jan 83 p 5

Article: "New Batch of Armed Ba'thist Platoons Graduated in Damascus"

Text/ A ceremony was held yesterday to graduate a batch of armed Ba'thist platoons--anti-armor specialization--comprised of Ba'thist comrades from the Damascus branch of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party.

At the conclusion of the training course, the participating comrades carried out practical exercises with live ammunition, using various anti-armor weapons.

The comrades participating in the course have proven their ability to use the weapons well and to absorb the theoretical and practical lessons they received during the course. The instructors and supervisors from the Popular Army Command have lauded the results of the shooting exercises which have proven the theoretical and practical ability of the Ba'thist comrades to score accurate and direct hits against the targets.

This reaffirms the eagerness of the Ba'thist comrades to assume their struggle role through constant training in the courses for the specialized Ba'thist platoons so that they may participate in defending this homeland and in performing their sacred duty of protecting it from all the ferocious imperialist and Zionist plots and schemes.

This training course comes within the framework of the combat training and preparation achieved through conducting the armed Ba'thist platoons courses that are open to the comrade Ba'thists in order that they may safeguard the security and safety of this country and may defend it against whoever tries to undermine it.

The graduation ceremony was attended by a number of members of the leadership of the Damascus city branch of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and by the course supervisors.

On the other hand, the leadership of the Idlib branch of the Revolution Youth Federation has inaugurated 11 courses for combat preparation in which more than 2,000 male and female comrades have enrolled.

This was announced by the comrade secretary of the Idlib youth branch who added that all the male and female military training instructors have volunteered to take part in these courses which are spread throughout all parts of the governorate.

Participants in these courses receive, in addition to their training on weapons and combat sports [sic], numerous pan-Arab, national and cultural lectures from capable comrades.

These courses come within the framework of the intensive activity by the youth branch leadership during the mid-year school holiday.

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## BRIEFS

CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS--Hamah--The Hamah Technical Services Directorate is implementing a project for the construction of no less than 150 elementary, junior high, and high schools including more than 600 classes at a cost of 50 million Syrian pounds. Nizar 'Attar, the directorate's general director, has stated this to AL-THAWRAH correspondent, adding: "The construction of these schools will be completed this year and most of the schools will be built by the public sector companies and establishments in the various parts of Hamah Governorate." Attar added that this year's technical services budget amounts to nearly 100 million pounds allocated for the construction of schools, road and drinking water projects in the governorate. /Text/ /Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Jan 83 p 1 8494

HOMS SERVICE PROJECTS--Homs--Fu'ad al-'Absi, the governor of Homs, yesterday discussed with the director of the military housing branch the progress of work in the projects for which contracts have been concluded with the school buildings branch, considering that a 97-million Syrian pounds contract has been concluded in this year's plan for building new schools and completing the schools already under construction. The contract also includes service projects for the city of Homs, project No 1, al-Wa'r utilities, the city's corniche project and the new (ponds) in Homs, Zaydal and al-Wa'r, in addition to al-Walid housing quarters project on the Damascus road and the projects to provide water, roads and utilities to al-Sukhnah town. The governor stressed to the branch director and technicians the need to intensify the efforts and to increase the workshops in all the projects so as to complete them on schedule. The governor also asked the branch to begin immediately construction of the first housing project on the Damascus road and to speed up construction of the Homs City Corniche which is considered the city's main artery, keeping in mind that the costs of the projects being implemented by the Housing Branch exceed 100 million Syrian pounds. The governor then made an on the spot tour of the industrial zone controlled by the military housing branch in Homs. /Text/ /Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Jan 83 p 5/ 8494

ESC: 4474 136

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

STATEMENT AT NONALIGNED SUMMIT SCORES ISRAELI ACTIONS

GF101138 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 10 Mar 83 p 1

[Excerpt] New Delhi--The UAE yesterday appealed to the non-aligned movement and the world community at large to end the Zionist entity's 35-year-old aggressive actions in the Middle East.

It also called upon the powers supporting the Zionist entity to stop their military and economic assistance to Israel.

The UAE reiterated its belief that the Palestine issue was at the core of the Middle East problem and without restoring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and statehood, no peaceful settlement could be achieved in the region.

The appeal was contained in a statement circulated as a conference document at the non-aligned summit. The president, His Highness Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, earlier yesterday waived his right to address the summit, which is running behind schedule despite an extended sitting on Tuesday that continued until 2 a.m. on Wednesday.

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who is chairman of the conference, thanked Shaykh Zayid for his gesture, pointing out that it would be difficult to fit all business into the programme.

Shaykh Zayid left New Delhi yesterday. The amir of Kuwait, the amir of Qatar and the leader of the Omani delegation also left.

The UAE statement urged the movement to take effective measures to force Israel to accept the principle of peace and comply with the UN resolutions calling for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including Lebanon, and for restoration of the usurped rights of Palestinians.

It drew the attention of the conference to the latest Zionist aggressive actions--the invasion of Lebanon, the savage bombing of Beirut, the massacre of innocent, defenceless Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, and the continuing occupation of Lebanon.

The UAE also expressed its concern over the 30-month-old Iraq-Iran war, and appealed to the two neighbouring Muslim states to resolve their dispute through peaceful means. It also noted its appreciation of Iraq's favourable response to peace efforts.

The UAE affirmed its belief that the security of the Gulf was the responsibility exclusively of the regional states. "For this reason, the UAE refuses to join any military pact and has vowed not to interfere in the internal affairs of any country."

The statement condemned foreign intervention in Afghanistan as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of human rights.

He called for a political solution of the Afghan problem based on respect for the country's political independence and non-aligned status.

The statement expressed concern over developments in South Africa and strongly condemned the apartheid policy being pursued by the Pretoria regime in complete disregard of the UN Charter and human rights.

It expressed the hope that efforts being made to achieve a peaceful settlement in Namibia, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 435, would be successful.

The resolution endorses the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence under the leadership of the South-West African People's Organisation.

The UAE statement also voiced support to other African liberation movements struggling for independence from racist minority rules.

It urged the non-aligned states to confirm the basic principles of the movement embodied in the Bandung and Belgrade Declarations to confront the super-power machinations that threatened the movement's unity and its efforts to overcome the explosive crises in the world.

It said the Bandung and Belgrade principles were the ones followed by the UAE as they also guaranteed the restoration of the movement's role as "balancing force" between power blocs.

The UAE appealed to the movement's member-states to continue their important role in international relations and to support the UN effort for complete and comprehensive disarmament.

It expressed concern over interference by superpowers in the internal affairs of other states. Such interference was violating the UN Charter and the principles of non-alignment, the statement observed.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

PLO'S 'ARAFAT CONVEYS MESSAGE TO UAE PRESIDENT

GF131524 Abu Dhabi Domestic Service in Arabic 0930 GMT 13 Mar 83

[Text] UAE President His Highness Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sulatn Al Nuhayyan has received a message from PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat dealing with current Arab issues and developments in the Palestinian arena. This was reported when heir apparent and Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Lt Gen His Highness Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Zayid received today PLO Executive Committee member Mahmud 'Abbas, alias Abu Mazin.

WAM has learned that His Highness Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah reviewed with Abu Mazin the results of the 16th Session of the Palestine National Council which were recently held in Algiers in addition to the difficult circumstances that prevailed during the convening of the council and the resolutions reached. Abu Mazin stated that he discussed with His Highness Lt Gen Skaykh Khalifah the developments dealing with the Palestinians who reside in the UAE with regard to work and residence, particularly those Palestinians who have Lebanese travel documents.

Concluding his statement, Abu Mazin referred to His Highness Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah's concern and continuous care for the Palestinians who live in the UAE. He said: We get from his highness all the sympathy and understanding so that the Palestinian community in the UAE regards the country as if it were in its homeland.

The meeting was attended by PLO representative in the UAE Anis al-Khalib.

CSO: 4400/256

GOVERNMENT CONSIDERING TAXATION PLAN

GF171200 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 16 Mar 83 p 1

[By Raman Kapur]

[Text] Taxation is being considered by the UAE Government, Mr Ahmad al-Tayyir, assistant under-secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Industry, told KHALEEJ TIMES in an exclusive interview. "We are studying ways and means of taxation, though no clear decision has been arrived at yet," he said.

He did not think taxation was likely this year, but "We're going into the whole question of the type of taxation--whether it should be tax on imports or services or income tax."

The government would cut subsidy, especially on fuel, as a first step, he revealed.

The UAE is one of the few countries in the world without taxation.

"There is no way to face the budget deficit and to control expenditure unless we take a decision on taxation," Mr al-Tayyir said.

The budget deficit was Dh. 4.5 billion in 1982--expenditures amounting to Dh. 22.565 billion against revenue accruals of Dh. 20.275 billion. The fall in returns from oil exports due to the world oil glut was responsible for the situation.

The current year's budget is expected to be smaller. The minister of finance and industry, Shaykh Hamdan Ibn Rashid, has asked various ministries to cut spending by half the average monthly level last year until the budget is introduced.

About the current year's budget Mr al-Tayyir said, "It's too early to state figures on the budgetary deficit, it will depend on the oil price and the production scenario in the country."

He said the government planned to levy fees on health services from this year or early next year, and arrangements were being made for this; special cards

would be issued for nationals and separate ones for expatriates. A fee might be charged on medicines also. A draft law concerning this is before the Federal Cabinet.

About the Industrial Bank, Mr al-Tayyir said it would start lending this month. The bank would charge an interest of four percent on loans, and the extent of lending would depend on the merit of individual cases. It could finance up to 60 percent of the total project cost or 20 percent of the bank capital, whichever is less.

Asked about the possible level of lending this year, Mr al-Tayyir stated it would depend on the needs of the industrial sector and the lending capacity of the bank. The bank had Dh. 600 million for lending this year, and an additional Dh. 500 million would be available from the government by year-end.

Both new and old projects qualify for assistance, "We are going to study each project from all aspects--financial, production and technical--before financing," he said. Some projects faced difficulties in cash flow, others in marketing and still others with regard to know-how and technology. The bank's experts would visit each project, study its problems, and suggest solutions.

Mr al-Tayyir said units seeking assistance had been asked to contact the bank and submit the necessary documents.

Information on the type of projects eligible for assistance can be had from the bank.

Mr al-Tayyir said that after the enactment of companies law, the government proposed to draw up an insurance law.

CSO: 4400/256

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

CLAMPDOWN ON FOREIGN BANKS--UAE Central Bank sources said that 41 branches of foreign banks operating in the UAE will be shut down. The closure of these branches, which will take place in 1983, is in implementation of the second phase of the UAE Central Bank's decision to reduce the number of foreign bank branches in the UAE to eight branches each. [Text] [GF160830 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0815 GMT 16 Mar 83]

CSO: 4400/256

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

CHAIRMAN RECEIVES MESSAGE FROM LEBANESE COMMUNIST POLITICIAN

GF141702 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 14 Mar 83

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium and chairman of the Council of Ministers, received in his office at the Central Committee Secretariat Brother Nasir al-As'ad, member of the Political Bureau of the Lebanese Communist Action Organization, who conveyed him a verbal message from Brother Muhsin Ibrahim, secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Action Organization.

During the meeting, views were exchanged on developments in the Middle East. The brother secretary general listened to a report on the efforts being made to speed up the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the role the Lebanese nationalist and progressive movement is playing in this regard.

Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad reiterated the support of the PDRY--party, people and government--for the fraternal Lebanese people in completing the Israeli withdrawal and in defending Lebanon's unity and Arab character. Brother Nasir al-As'ad expressed the Lebanese people's and their nationalist movement's appreciation of and gratitude for the stand the PDRY adopted in solidarity with the Lebanese people and their nationalist movement.

CSO: 4400/256

## WOMEN LAUDED FOR RESOLUTE STRUGGLE AGAINST INVADERS

Brussels LE PEUPLE in French 23 Feb 83 p 4

[Article by Christiane Glinne-Wyffels: "The Two Challenges for Afghan Women"]

[Text] For more than 3 years now, since the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan people have been subjected to terror and repression.

For, it is the entire Afghan population which is struggling, resisting and fighting an underhanded and fascist enemy to recover its freedom and dignity.

The Soviets are launching massive bomb attacks on villages, destroying homes, crops and herds. They are poisoning wells and accusing the rebels of this. They are spraying napalm and poison bullets, using chemical weapons, setting mines in the form of ordinary objects and sowing little yellow and green balls which mix in with the vegetation but are actually all small mines which tear off feet or hands when they explode.

Babrak Karmal himself acknowledges that of the 17 million inhabitants, more than 1 million Afghans have died; 3 million have sought refuge outside the country, chiefly young men between the ages of 17 and 35 attempting to avoid military service; and 4 million have had to leave their destroyed villages. More than 100,000 political prisoners are counted.

### The Various Facets of the Resistance

In the 1960's under Zahir Shah, a party called the "Moslem Brothers" was formed which had fascist tendencies behind its Islamic facade: for example, during a demonstration of women, high school and university students, they threw sulfuric acid at the demonstrators.

When Daoud took power, some representatives of this party sought refuge in Europe, Saudi Arabia, and mainly in Pakistan.

After Taraki's coup d'etat in April 1978, the people revolted completely spontaneously, without being led by any organization. However, the fundamentalists, regrouped into three parties (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Eslami, Yunis Khalis' Hezb-e Eslami and Rabbani's Jami'at-e Eslami), presented themselves as the representatives of the Afghan rebel movement and have thus been the beneficiaries

of any international assistance. Profiting from this situation, they have made the receipt of any assistance subject to possession of a party membership card (both aid to refugees and weapons for soldiers).

In addition to these three parties, which are against any form of democracy and want to establish a dictatorial regime similar to Khomeyni's Iranian regime, other parties were formed after April 1978. (Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi's Harekat-e Enqelab-e Eslami, Sa'id Haddad Gilani's Ma'azi-Melli Eslami and Sebqatullah Mujaddadi's Jabeh-Ye Neajate Melli). These parties are more "liberal" in the sense that they favor a western-style democracy.

However, they do not believe in mobilizing the population. They want to conduct the struggle using their own members and do not want to involve and mobilize the masses.

In the 3 years of fighting, these 6 parties have not managed to unite themselves; basically due to personal quarrels. Of course, on two occasions they announced that they had achieved an alliance, but it was nothing more than a facade. Even more important, they have not managed to unite the massive internal opposition movement.

But, on the other hand, little by little the rebels inside Afghanistan are organizing themselves into patriotic movements which are adopting a totally different policy from that of the fundamentalist parties located in Pakistan. It recognizes more and more that the fight against the Soviets will be a long one.

And, consequently, they have recognized the need to break the economic stranglehold and to mobilize the people in production and to provide the Afghan rebels with an awareness of politics, military affairs, health matters, etc.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Essential Role of the Afghan Women

Without the active and effective participation of the women, the Afghan revolution could not take place.

They are leading a fierce resistance to the Soviet invader. But, these women who have been oppressed, humiliated, veiled and kept silent, except for a small aristocracy, are simultaneously proclaiming that the Dark Ages are over.

"We women are not uninvolved in the current revolution; to the contrary, we are in the very front lines. The burden of this revolution weighs more heavily on our shoulders than on the men. It is not just that we are not spared from the crimes of the Russians and their lackeys; but, more than that, it is we women who are most often the victims."

"We women are not just demanding freedom and independence, for which we are ready to fight to the last drop of our blood, but we are also demanding equality for women."<sup>2</sup>

The women are united in the "Revolutionary League of Afghan Women." This is an underground and independent political organization.

They made themselves public in April 1979. On this date many women gathered in front of the prison in Kabul to demand news of their relatives. They were slain by Soviet soldiers in a bloodbath.

#### The Women's Struggles

These women are participating in the struggle at different levels.

Overnight they became the heads of households when the men fled the villages to conduct the armed struggle or to avoid being forcefully enrolled in the "official" army.

It is they who provide for the survival of the people and their families. In certain areas, especially in the northeast, they participate in combat directly.

It is they who pay the heaviest tribute in demonstrations: they are wounded, killed, imprisoned, even raped and then abandoned. Some are even sent to the USSR.

In the liberated areas, in a country where only 3 percent of the population is literate, they work to educate women politically and care for more than 250 families of prisoners or orphans. They have training and reeducation projects.

#### The Brazen Resistance of A Tiny Woman

"Small and frail, with short hair and fiery eyes, 22 years old, a 4th-year medical student, she resisted torture for 6 months without ever confessing."<sup>3</sup>

#### Farida's Testimony

Arrested in April 1981, carrying pamphlets intended to mobilize women to pay homage to the women killed by the Soviets in 1979, after 2 days of torture she was brought before the prime minister's secret police. This is the place where the torture is the most "refined."

She relates what she survived and her eyes reflect the scenes of terror that she mentions. Physical and mental torture are meted out in equal measure.

For example, prisoners are made to walk past human hearts and hands which have been cut off.

They are hit with human arms.

Children, even babies, are tortured in front of their mothers.

They cut out a rebel's eyeballs in front of Farida and threatened her with the same treatment if she did not speak.

They prevented her from sleeping by beating her for a period of 8 days; then they tortured her with electric shocks.

Listen to Farida Ahmadi:

"After the electrical torture, I had to remain standing without moving, not making a single motion, for 2 weeks. This is a torture worse than electric shocks; my legs swelled up at the end of the second week, the veins in my legs burst. I could not wear shoes any more and had to remain barefoot. Throughout my stay I was showered with abuse that is impossible to cite here."<sup>4</sup>

Like the Nazis, the Soviets also use medical means: intravenous injections, fake vitamin tablets which cause internal hemorrhaging--all these administered by doctors. The prisoners were also threatened with hypnotism. During all these tortures, the torturers were singing Russian songs. (Remember, they sent the Jews to the gas chambers to the sound of music.)

After a 6-month stay at secret police headquarters, Farida Ahmadi was released without having spoken. The secret police were hoping that by having her followed, they would be led to the revolutionary women. But, Farida veiled herself and secretly fled Kabul to take refuge in Pakistan.

Thus she came to bring her story to the Human Rights Tribunal in Paris. She is still under care for lesions due to abuse suffered at the secret police headquarters.

Afghan Secret Police Trained by the KGB

The secret police are divided into 6 groups, each one corresponding to a rebel organization.

Each group has its own spies.

The torturers are trained in the USSR.

The prisoners are first "worked over" by the Afghans; if they are really "un-cooperative" they pass into the hands of the Soviets.

Most of the women arrested are not involved in rebel activities; they are arrested as hostages, as a form of retaliation because a member of their family or of their village is a rebel.

Back in 1981, Mrs Kamal had alerted European public opinion to the fierce determination of the Afghan women and was calling for international democratic solidarity.

Today, a women marked by torture and repression is renewing this appeal.

A new Afghan society is being forged under a ruthless heel and within a population deprived of its intellectuals. The women are conducting a twofold struggle: for the liberation of their country and for their own liberation.

At the end of the long tunnel of occupation, might the women's struggle not be recouped, as was the Algerian's 20 years ago, the Iranian's under the Khomeyni regime?

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Excerpt from the manifesto of the Revolutionary League of Afghan Women.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Excerpts from "Les Femmes dans la resistance Afghane" [Women in the Afghan Resistance], published by the Belgian Afghanistan Committee.

9693

CSO: 4619

# BAKHTIAR DISCUSSES IMPORTANT ISSUES DURING EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW

Brussels SPECIAL L'EVENEMENT in French No 152, 10-16 Dec 82 pp 4-6

[Interview with former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar by Chantal Schaller]

[Text] The Shah of Iran's last head of government, Shapur Bakhtiar, had been scheduled to come to our capital last week at the invitation of the Commission on French Culture to present his book "Ma Fidelite" [My Constancy] (published by Albin Michel), which retraces the itinerary of this man and his struggle for his country's freedom. To appease the untimely zeal of a minister-counselor of the Belgian embassy in Paris, Bakhtiar was requested to abstain from any political or religious discussion while on Belgian territory-- doubtless out of fear of the Ayatollah Khomevni's mullahs!

The former Iranian prime minister called off his trip but agreed to receive us in Paris (where he lives in exile) to make those "notorious statements" so feared by our political authorities.

[Question] The conclusions and comments found throughout your book could well lead us to attempt to predict the future, and to ask you for your evaluation of the Iranian situation since the advent of the mullahs.

[Answer] The 3 years that have passed should be cause for reflection on the part of those Iranians who have a measure of culture and an understanding of the Western world.

Khomevni--who despite all the propaganda and money he disseminates left and right is a detestable creature--has succeeded to date in keeping himself in power. But his revolution has no policy line to guide it: it is increasing the economic chaos and disorder within the country, the polycentrism, and--above all--the contempt for international law. How then is it possible, within this context, that the Khomevni regime has been able to survive?

Without a measure of complaisance--if not actually of complicity--on the part of the West it would have been impossible. We may take the example of the

United States, which--despite the sacking of its embassy and the detention of its diplomats for more than a year and a half--can still reach an accommodation with the Teheran regime. Is it not complaisance when one is willing to "make do" with a fascist regime that does not respect any of the ideals common to the countries of the West? In my view such an attitude is indefensible. Why should anyone prostrate himself before a regime that respects no rules and no agreements?

I went to Belgium 2 years ago to give a lecture and to meet the press. At that time, however, Khomeini had not shown himself to be as repugnant as he is today. Today we see the true visage of a monster, but people are yielding to his demands nonetheless. Regardless of the aid--primarily food--that the Eastern bloc countries procure for him, I believe that he would not have been able to maintain himself in power without this complaisance on the part of the West.

[Question] Would this mean that with the disappearance of Khomeini from the scene, the situation would remain unchanged in Iran--to the extent, perhaps, that the Shiite "revival" is truly genuine?

[Answer] No; there is no organization that is founded on firm bases and capable of continuing along the same road. May I say, however, that there has been--for the past 2 or 3 years--a perception that intrigue, alibis, or mystification have been present in the treatment of this subject in the Western press. An effort is being made to make us believe that an Islamic revival is under way in the world. There are those who declare that Islamic fundamentalism is pushing forth from the depths of a heretofore unknown wellspring. More accurately, statements of this sort reflect obscurantism, ignorance and absurdity. There are journalists in France who genuinely believe that there is something new and novel in Khomeini's Islam. This is fundamentally absurd. It disturbs me on the philosophical level, however, for I wonder whether this complacency on the part of certain commentators is not a deliberate effort to keep Iran outside the mainstream of civilization. To live at today's pace, however, a certain level of technology would be necessary--and this is not the case. We have an obligation to resist this interpretation, which has become popular in the countries of the West.

[Question] What is the reason for Iran's exclusion from the mainstream?

[Answer] This situation is found not only in the case of Iran but also in the case of all countries that are lagging behind in respect to technological progress. The Soviet Union, for example, attempts to keep a certain distance between itself and its satellite, Bulgaria.... The dervishism into which Iran has regressed is a source of pleasure to the West. I also have religious convictions, but I cannot agree that these ignorant, greedy, bloodthirsty mullahs are entitled to place a country of 39 million souls outside the mainstream of a civilization that has the right to experience progress.

[Question] In your book you accuse Great Britain--and the BBC in particular--of having helped to defame the Iran of the last days of the imperial era.

[Answer] From the first time the "Khomeyni scourge" appeared on the scene the BBC was discreetly taking its side, and this attitude has not changed today. The TIMES published, a few days ago, an article by an Iranian in Iran in which the writer declared that he no longer listened to the BBC on grounds that it openly supported the Khomeyni regime, from which we are suffering daily. This situation is all the more inconceivable in that the British Government maintains it has no connection with the BBC, which it says is an independent organization. Realistically, one must be loyal. Is it possible for a national radio broadcasting system subsidized by its government to be truly independent? It's impossible. And it's absurd for the Western countries to persist in believing that we are like the Iranians of 20 years ago, or even like those of the era preceding the Mossadegh affair. The day we realized we were being systematically looted, however, your fellow countryman, Professor Rolin, defended us at the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Mystification was still possible 50 years ago. This is no longer the case, though: witness the fact that the attitude of the BBC is understood inside Iran itself by a certain class of Iranians. It would be more correct for a radio broadcasting or television system to say to us: "Please understand that we have problems," as for example the director of a French network who one day told me: "We have 200 French citizens over there; please refrain from making certain statements." I agreed, in the name of fair play. What has just happened in Belgium is an indication that terrorism does pay.

[Question] Do you believe there is any chance of a restoration of the monarchy?

[Answer] What kind of monarchy are you talking about? My hope is for a social democratic system, which is not incompatible with monarchy. Any system, including monarchy, can be accompanied by the foulest dictatorship!

[Question] In other words, it is conceivable that if the Shah had abdicated several years before in favor of his son, Iran would have evolved differently?

[Answer] Yes, certainly. And even if the king had taken the same action 3 or 4 months earlier than he took during the last days, Khomeyni would not have returned to Teheran. Our monarchy is in theory copied after yours, and some articles of the constitution are a literal translation of yours. By tradition the monarchy is acceptable in Iran. I have nothing against the monarchy or against the King, insofar as it is a constitutional monarchy. If I fought, it was against the dictatorship. It so happens that in the case of Iran it was the dictatorship of a King. The monarchy, in and of itself, cannot be a bad thing for Iran. If the young king acts in Iran as his father did, however, he would encounter opposition.

[Question] Can one at the present time speak of an Iranian government in exile? Is that conceivable, given the diversity of factions that are opposed to Khomeini: your own, Bani Sadr's, and that of the royalists?

[Answer] First of all, you have spoken the name of Bani Sadr. He's finished. He is the former president of the Islamic republic: that is to say, a monster but an insignificant one who has nothing to say and nothing to hope for.

He has the gall, however, to deny the crimes he has committed. Moreover, there are--in the group--persons of a democratic tendency who call themselves patriots and desire the advent of a republic, hoping to become president themselves. This is something that would be impossible in a monarchic situation. On the other hand, you can find extremists who want a king who will govern and reign at the same time. These are basically corrupt men, undesirables who want a center of absolute power so that they can do as they see fit. They would use the young king to achieve their own purposes. Lastly, there is a third group who say that sovereignty is national and is found in the constitution itself. This is my point of view, and I believe I have the distinction of never having changed my opinion or altered my judgment in the past 3 years. I believe I deserve a little credit for not having contradicted myself at any time beginning with the period preceding Khomeyni's arrival in Iran up to the present period of my exile in Paris. I shall therefore cooperate with anyone in accordance with the constitution based on national sovereignty. The present regime of the Islamic republic, however, is out of the question. It is what I would call the "black parenthesis"--a parenthesis that should be closed once and for all.

[Question] Did Shiism play the decisive role in the Iranian revolution? Or was it the social demands?

[Answer] Iranian Shiism is based on two historical principles: first, a nationalism in opposition to Arab power and Arab domination, and second, resistance to the extension of Ottoman power. Present-day Shiism, however, wishes to govern through the medium of religion in order to win the minds of the citizenry. It seeks no more and no less than to create caliphs: that is to say, kings who are both temporal and spiritual.

[Question] Can it be said that the Iranian population fell so easily into Khomeyni's arms because it was on the verge of exasperation?

[Answer] That's an exaggeration, even though it is true that favoritism, exasperation, and the discrepancies between rich and poor were the daily lot of imperial Iran. The population did not fear Khomeyni. He did not present himself initially as a bloodthirsty dictator, for he had declared: "I want to apply the constitution." He was believed. I can readily pardon the people for doing so, but not the intellectuals. Did not Bergson say, "Beware of those 'enlightened' men who overnight take into their hands the destiny of a society?" Unfortunately, Khomeyni was promising the security that Iran had not experienced. Today we know that he has not created a happy society.

Editor's Note: Because the above is an interview, Bakhtiar is solely responsible for his remarks.)

10040

CSO: 4610/11

MINISTER OF GUARDS CORPS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT WAR

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 3 Feb 83 p 3

[Text] Mohsen Rafiqdust, minister of the Revolution Guards Corps, gave an exclusive interview to our reporter and provided answers on the war, the Ba'thist assaults, the overall assault, the establishment of the joint Nuh base, the martyrdom of six guard commanders, and coordination among Committee guards and Corps guards, etc.

Mohsen Rafiqdust, minister of Guards Corps, was asked: In view of the anniversary of the revolution and the 10-day Fajr, what changes and transitions do you think will take place on the war fronts?

He answered: With greetings to the Imam and followers of the Imam and with greetings to the self-sacrificing combatants of the army of Islam. Praise to the souls of all those martyred in the Islamic Revolution, the imposed war, and those recent martyrs, who were among Islam's great commanders.

The effects of the 10-day Fajr and the arrival of the anniversary of the revolution's victory are reminiscent of the days of God. According to the Imam, and as we can witness, a greater clamor is easily noticeable among the masses of the nation. And, God willing, we must, in these days of God, give the good tidings of victory to our people.

God willing, our brothers are getting prepared to convey their final message to the governments of the world, and to the entire world, that they cannot fight Iran with military power.

Ba'thist Assaults on Residential Sections and Cities

Minister of Revolution Guards Corps was asked: Recently, Ba'thist assaults on residential sections and cities have been escalating; how do you assess these enemy activities?

Mohsen Rafiqdust answered: "It is obvious that the enemy, observing its own weakness and injuries sustained in the battlefield, is trying to damage our morale by attacking our residential sections and cities.

"This point has been repeatedly proven: When a city adds its own martyrs to those of the revolution as a result of enemy bombardments, its citizens become more determined to fight Saddam and the enemy.

"There is no doubt that we will shortly attack the enemy. We believe this. The late martyr Raja'i, at the onset of the war said that combatants at the front will determine the fate of the war. And we believe this.

"We will attack Iraq to obtain our rights and attain our goal. And we believe, God willing, it will turn into such action that it will probably lead to the final words.

"A nation which provides its own manpower for combat, and makes its own preparedness for the front, will continue the same trend, and will soon hear good news of the great victory.

#### Joint Base for the Corps and the Navy

Brother Mohsen Rafiqdust, answering a question on the impact of establishing the joint base Nuh (God's peace be upon him), its role in defending the waters of the Persian Gulf and those of the Sea of Oman, and in containing aggressive superpower intentions, stated: The successful experiment with the joint Karbala base, established for the Ground Forces and the Guards Corps--this union and solidarity between the Corps and the Army--provided continuous victory for this nation."

He added: Since we can witness the presence of global oppressive powers in the Persian Gulf and we do know that our struggle against these powers has no end, we are faithful to this Islamic principle of our revolution: We will never under any circumstances, conclude any relative ceasefire with the United States. Therefore, we are preparing ourselves to fight the United States in any place. The objective in establishing the Nuh (God's peace be upon him) joint base for the Navy and the Corps is a better utilization of the Navy's and Corps' resources in the war against the United States and satanic powers in the Persian Gulf. And, God willing, this experience, like the joint base for the Ground Forces, will be a success.

#### Coordination Among Revolution Committees, Committees, Police, and Etc. in Confronting the Minigroups

Brother Mohsen Rafiqdust, minister of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, was asked about the charter of the Islamic Revolution Committees, which was discussed and approved by the Council of Ministers, where a chapter is included on internal security, combating illegal groups and parties. He was asked to state the way this coordination among Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and Islamic Revolution Committees, Islamic Republic's Police and Islamic Republic's Gendermerie will take place.

The esteemed Minister of Guards answered: Revolution Committees have been and still are the principal organs of the revolution. And other revolutionary organs have been derived from these Revolution Committees. We respect their jurisdictions as stipulated by law. Currently, the corps and the committee share a joint base in combating counterrevolution. And similarly, they have sincere cooperation with the police and other law-enforcement forces, and there is unity among them. And, God willing, minigroups are passing through their last minutes, and, we hope, the problem of security will soon be 100-percent resolved.

From the tragic event of 28 June, following the martyrdom of that great, oppressed martyr, Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, who was the engine of this movement, to this day we have been able to place the minigroups either in the position of repentance, or they have been eliminated and are gasping their last breath.

#### Martyrdom of the Commanders of the Corps of Islam

When asked whether the martyrdom of the commanders of the Corps of Islam will have any impact and influence on the overall frontal assault, the esteemed minister of the Corps responded that: these commanders were among Islam's great military leaders. This is particularly so since in this incident we lost six persons, including our own commander; in spite of that not only will it have no negative impact on the course of the war but, on the contrary, it will no doubt have a positive effect.

The great martyred brother Baqeri was a 27-year-old young man, who went to Khuzestan during the first days (on the second day) of the war. In the course of two and a half years of war, he did not depart from the scene for one moment. He was diligent, an emulator and follower of the Imam. Majid Rāfa'i was an officer of the Army of Islam. He was a committed young man from Khuzestan. We have many officers and warriors like him. They both had mastered the military ranks on the battlefield.

We have many such commanders in the fronts, (West and South); we have the great swarm of surging Hezbollahis, and, as the Imam has said, any flag falling to the ground from the hands of one commander is picked up by another soldier and is driven through the enemy's heart.

Our combatants are waiting for the order to attack. It is not the case that there is anxiety in the Army of Islam when a commander in the Army of Islam is martyred. Rather, in the course of the war, we see that anytime such events have occurred--Chamran, the great commander of Islam was martyred, military commanders were killed in the plane crash--there has always been victory. We do not witness any shortcomings in the course of the war. We believe this blood will serve to promote and expedite the final victory.

9996

CSO: 4640/111

## FAILINGS OF ELECTION PRACTICES DESCRIBED, ASSESSED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 8 Feb 83 p 3

[Article by Sayed Assad Gilani: "Western Democracy: The Principles of Elections and Proportional Representation in Islam"]

[Excerpts] Now that the entire nation is demanding elections so that a clean, representative government can be elected to solve the country's problems and resolve the true issue of an Islamic system for the people and the country--at this juncture we want to focus attention on that aspect of the elections held in Western secular democracies that is hideous and regrettable, even though every individual in our country has seen this reprehensible element many times over and has been terrified by the future prospects.

### Political Parties and Independent Candidates

Even though there is a proliferation of parties here, there is a great scarcity of parties with true ideologies, clear-cut principles, programs and nationwide appeal. In the absence of parties based on ideology, a large number of independent candidates usually comes forward, candidates with no established objective except the desire to become representatives and satisfy their personal motives. This fact is well known by both the candidates and the voters, so that while the independent candidates participate in the elections purely on the basis of self-interest, the voters, keeping in mind their special interests, get what they can for their votes. Neither side does or can possibly have in mind such concepts as service to the country and the people, individual ability or high standards. It is important for every citizen to realize that in party politics, independent candidates cannot be beneficial for the country and the people under any conditions because such candidates follow no rules and hence their presence in national social issues becomes highly dangerous.

### Communal Prejudice

In the absence of ideology, two factors--kinship and wealth--play the most important roles. Inspired by purely group prejudice, communities totally disregard any question of ability or lack of it and work for candidates on the sole consideration that "they belong to our clan, let us get them elected." The candidates also inflame these clan prejudices to get votes for

themselves. Such an attitude may not be injurious in other countries, but when one sees various racial groups in Pakistan, which was wrested by the Muslims from the non-Muslims under the slogan of religion alone and the principle of a separate culture and traditions, campaigning on the basis of their racial origins alone, Pakistan's ideological foundations are destroyed, the idea of Islamic unity and brotherhood disappears and one begins to think that these upholders of the banner of tribal communities are striving to obtain separate territories for themselves. It is heart rending to see Muslims canvassing for votes not on the basis of Pakistan's ideology and of individual capability but instead appealing to race and kinship for votes. One sees countless such instances during elections as a result of which assemblies are filled not with the most capable but rather with the least qualified individuals who think not in terms of nation but put greater emphasis on regionalism and kinship. Obviously, kinship should be the basis of social relations; but when such considerations begin to dominate political decisions and tribal groups gain power over various areas, such ignorant prejudice can break a nation based on ideology into small pieces. We have inherited these prejudices from the Hindus, and these feelings have not the slightest connection with Islam. If such prejudices are allowed to continue, innumerable factional entities will be created within Pakistan, first dividing the country into districts and then into even smaller entities.

#### The Destructive Nature of Money

Up to now, money has been the deciding factor in our elections. Whoever has the greatest buying power gains the most success; it is as though money can buy conscience and put a price on honesty. In these times of moral deterioration, there are only a few voters who are not interested in this kind of transaction, with the result that humans are sold like cattle.

Once money becomes the strongest factor in elections, a proportionately high number of rich individuals get elected and poor candidates fail. Once this system becomes established, it becomes impossible for sincere and intelligent individuals belonging to the middle class, who know the real problems of the people, to enter campaigns and win elections. That is why the people are both disgusted with the wealthy and the feudal landowners and still vote for them each time and continue to carry their yoke.

#### The Policy of Intrigue

The practice of intrigue and machinations has destroyed our political life and elections. Candidates for provincial and central seats strike bargains on the basis of their mutual interests, whether there is any ideological point of agreement among them or not. At such times, the intrigue between clannishness and money becomes obvious, aimed at compensating for the deficiencies of one with the help of the other. These bargains are made purely on the basis of dishonesty. Most candidates who win seats in the national assembly desert their old companions and seek new ones in line with group and personal interests, and promises and agreements are broken like unbaked earthenware. Muslims have learned and introduced among themselves these worst traditions of politics advocated by an atheist such as Machiavelli.

Muslims have now become so badly entangled in these evil traditions that even on the level of purely national issues they interject their limited and clannish interests and harm the interests of the country; they never raise their sights above their own personal profit.

As long as a straightforward and clear-cut course of action based on the honest foundation of wisdom and foresight is not adopted, it would be the basest kind of dishonesty to represent outright deception as political bargaining. If it were possible to represent this political approach as a sign of the inability of Muslims to participate in politics, that would constitute a great service to the nation. Certain political parties and their leaders come to terms with individuals opposed to their announced programs and manifestos in their own interests, which they prefer to the interests of the country. They obtain votes by impressing the people with their impending accession to power. This is the worst kind of treason--against the country and their own principles. If regulations were included in election laws to apply to such intrigues and the parties and individuals perpetrating them, that would be a significant political reform.

#### Force and Pressure

Various influential candidates exert pressure and force on their voters, such as pressure through the community, wealth, influence and the administration and pressure by means of legal prosecution on false charges and threats of evil consequences if votes are withheld. As a result, even those individuals who vote according to their conscience are afraid to express their views or speak out in favor of their candidates. The only exceptions are those who find their strength in their honesty and hold their faith and convictions dear above all other things. The behavior of election officials sometimes has a destructive effect. During the 1962 assembly elections, the commissioner of elections at the time told a newspaper that there was no need for those lacking resources and facilities to participate in the elections. His statement seriously discouraged candidates from the middle class. Individuals who stand by their ideals and whose objective is to serve their country are people of worth. Such an attitude on the part of corrupt officials encourages wealthy and crooked candidates to indulge in trickery and utilize their resources in every legal and illegal fashion. As long as a voter does not feel as free to vote as he is to buy groceries, free and equitable elections will remain a dream.

#### Abduction of Voters

An election crime that was first committed during the Ayub years and continues to be perpetrated is voter abduction. It is now practiced on such a large scale that in certain areas the majority of the voters is abducted a day before the polling starts. During Bhutto's autocratic rule, influential capitalist candidates used trickery, appealed to greed, flattery, threats and plain force to gain control over voters and loaded them on trucks and abducted them. These people were threatened or bribed, plied with good food to persuade them to vote for the candidate and sell their conscience. Word was then circulated that Muslims did not betray those whose salt they had

tasted, implying that individuals abducted and then fed ill-gotten food against their will were expected to fulfill the obligation of this loyalty forced on them even in the secrecy of the ballot chamber, but were expected to betray their conscience and God, who is the keeper of their conscience and whose blessings they had enjoyed all their lives. The correct punishment for such candidates is for the voters to cast their ballots against them and to punish them for their crime.

#### Oppression by Candidates

In our elections, a voter does not receive good treatment at the hands of the candidates. A voter faces force and violence and lives in a state of siege. He encounters force and pressure so often that he begins to feel that by becoming a voter he has committed a crime, that no one can save him and that all the forces of providence have turned against him. In other countries, voters are cajoled, served and flattered to get them to cast their votes. But in our country, voters are kicked and beaten into voting, as a result of which the voter gets no chance to judge for himself what is good and what is bad and what is desirable and what undesirable in a party's program. He does not get a chance to develop an understanding of democracy and gain confidence in himself. Democracy is buried in the hearts of the people and at the polling stations. If candidates did not oppress the people they might be able to develop political conscience and understanding in a healthier climate. The use of force and violence by candidates and election frauds have made the people afraid of going through any more election circuses. If elections had been held more frequently, they would have become an ordinary occurrence; no one would then have spent money on the elections, no one would have taken bribes and hoodlums would not be hired.

#### Official Interference

If we look at the 1951 local elections, we see that their greatest shortcoming was official interference. These were the first sample elections in our country, and the series of government interferences started with the petition forms and continued through the vote counting. The requests for election campaigning by individuals not favored by the government were rejected from the start. The petition forms were more difficult to fill out than to solve puzzles; and when the votes were being counted, ballots were shifted from one box to the other. The government paid inordinate attention to the elections and great care was taken to separate the insiders from the outsiders. During elections in the Northwest Frontier Province, an opposition candidate who was the victim of fraud raised an outcry, whereupon the election official asked him, "Tell me honestly, who can save me in Pakistan from the vengeance of the chief minister?" The opposition candidate had no reply. During the 1962 elections, which were held under martial law, the government remained impartial to a certain extent, which proved useful inside the country but was harmful outside. Every citizen expected the martial law government to regard the holding of elections in this stricken country as its most important task and to subdue elements who used various undemocratic methods to repress and stir the public. Unfortunately, the martial law authorities of 1962 did not have honest intentions. They had their own political objectives and knew that they could stay in power by perpetuating the crooked

conditions initiated by the politicians. The martial law authorities also aimed for government, not service; power, not reform.

The deeds perpetrated in the elections of 1965 and of March 1977 by the government party and the administration were unique and proved that when those who come into power through force and violence become corrupt, their corruption is greater than that of any other individuals for whose removal the nation has finally to resort to force. Government officials became sticks [to be used for violence] in the hands of government candidates and proved that our imperial bureaucracy can break all records for heartlessness. The people thus lost all faith in the bureaucracy.

9863

CSO: 4656/106

'JASARAT' EDITORIAL ASSAILS ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDE OF U.S., USSR

CF151500 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 13 Mar 83 p 3

[Editorial: "The Soviet-U.S. Enmity to Islam"]

[Text] The U.S. Defense Department has reported that the Soviet Union would not win its war against the Afghan Mujahidin until it has increased its army in Afghanistan. What is more the Soviet Union will have to send in modern planes and adopt new ground tactics. This has been said in a booklet published by the Pentagon entitled "The Soviet Military Power" which further says that the Soviet Union is surrounded by the resistance forces after 3 years of war because they cannot be defeated with the present strength of Soviet forces. At present, there are 105,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan and this number represents an increase of 30,000 soldiers over the figures in 1979.

To whom is this Pentagon report addressed and what purpose is that report supposed to serve? A categorical answer to this question may lie with the Americans; however the open hints given to the Soviets in this report and the methods suggested clearly point to a existing "cooperative society" existing between these two colonial powers. The report in no way shows any sympathies for the Afghan people.

According to results derived from its military analysis "the honorable United States" seems to be saying to the Soviets that "you cannot succeed with the present conditions: if you want success bring more soldiers to Afghanistan, bring in new fighter planes and adopt new ground tactics. Your 3 years experience there, according to our experience, has been unproductive because you have failed to establish your control over the Afghan countryside. In fact you have been cornered by the other side. Therefore, you must understand that you cannot defeat the Afghan resistance with your present strength. Although you have added 30,000 soldiers since 1979, this number is not enough. Therefore, bring more troops."

Is the advice based on the analysis made by the U.S. military experts meant to be a compliment to the Afghan freedom fighters or a whip against them? We would call this report a help from one colonial power to the other colonial power which seems to be so weak in face of an oppressed and unarmed people and strongly protest against this technical aid.

However, the report seems to indicate the comprehension of the Muslims the world over that the Soviet Union and The United States are both staunch enemies of Muslims.

Although both, while pursuing their respective interests in other parts of the world, present themselves as friends of the Muslim people. The Soviet Union is doing the same thing with the Afghan Muslims as the United States is doing to the Palestinian Muslims. However, in one way the United States is presenting itself as a friend of Muslims where Afghanistan is concerned while the Soviet Union is showing itself as a friend of Muslims in the Middle East. But behind the screen they are friends with each other. Both have the common aim of cutting the Muslim throat. They do not want Muslims to be strong.

On the one hand, the United States is pointing out the weaknesses of the Soviet military strategy in Afghanistan and is seeking ways to overcome it, while on the other hand the Soviet Union, by providing Israel with more manpower following Soviet Jews to be in Israel, is removing weaknesses in the U.S. campaign against the Muslims. God knows when the Muslim world will open its eyes and begin to understand the anti-Muslim attitude of these two colonial powers.

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## ATTACKS ON FRENCH MISSION CONDEMNED

GF101258 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 22 Feb 83 p 4

[Editorial: "The Ugly Face of Terrorism"]

[Text] The bomb blasts in Karachi and Lahore which targeted French installations, including their diplomatic mission, have shocked all since these pre-meditated acts of violence are without precedent in this country. Given the manner this operation was carried--timing, proximity of installations, absence of casualties--it is not difficult to conclude that this "operation" was carried out by a professional "hit squad." [as received] Such heinous crimes recur frequently in European countries but it deserves strong condemnation that the ugly face of terrorism is being manifested in our country as well.

Twelve Iranian students have been taken into custody. Our investigators are prone to take action on hastily formed premises. In this case they appear to have read a motive in the supply of French armaments to Iraq to strengthen its sinews of war against Iran, and therefore pounced on Iranian nationals. But arresting people on the mere plausibility of certain extraneous circumstances motivating a crime is not an investigator's way of going about his job.

Although some Iranians have been arrested, it is too early to conclude the identity of the real perpetrators of this heinous crime or their motives. One thing is, however, quite clear: the political battles and conflicts being fought between groups and countries overseas are now being brought in closer to home into our territory. An additional element of concern, related to this incident, is the question of security of foreign diplomats of Pakistan for whose safety the government has to bear an ultimate responsibility. We hope that there will be a thorough investigation of these acts of violence and those responsible will be exposed by the government. If the government does not take timely effective measures, such terrorism would conceivably become a recurrent pattern of behavior, as it is in European states.

## SECTARIANISM CONDEMNED, TERMED SERIOUS THREAT

JF101328 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 25 Feb 83 p 4

[Editorial: "The Scary Spectre of Sectarianism"]

[Text] The recent unfortunate developments in Karachi will cause serious concern to all those who are interested in maintaining harmony and unity among all sections of our people. Mob violence has resulted in a number of deaths, damage to public installations and transport and even cases of burning of mosques and other places of religious worship. This breakdown of public order has forced the government to call in the army to prevent mob frenzy from getting out of hand and led to enforcement of curfew in large areas of Karachi. Additionally, precensorship has been imposed on all newspapers in Karachi.

Although sectarian friction and infighting is not uncommon in Pakistan, perhaps even a recurring feature during certain religious occasions, the recent riots in Karachi are of a qualitatively different character. While extremism and fanaticism exist on both sides which deserves strong condemnation, the possibility should not be overlooked that there is more to it than meets the eye. The manner in which the Muslims set out to perpetrate violence against their co-religionists and went to the extent of willfully burning places of worship, suggests that they might even have been conceivably egged on by certain vested interests who are interested in destabilizing the country by fanning the fires of sectarianism. It is, perhaps, a remarkable coincidence that the timings of these riots and blasts of French installations in Lahore and Karachi have been linked. The blasts seem to be a handiwork of highly-sophisticated professional hit-squads who have performed their nefarious task with clockwork precision and insuring that there is no loss or injury to human life. Almost immediately after these acts of terrorism a number of Iranians were arrested, most of whom have been released. Their arrest invariably tended to give the impression that it was Iran which was sponsoring these acts of terrorism on Pakistani soil and soon before and after these violent incidents, we have had sectarian riots. The timing of these two separate incidents could well be a remarkable coincidence, but the government needs to look into this matter with the gravity and seriousness that they merit.

While political agitation can be handled, this issue can be uncontrollable as it may divide Pakistani society right down the line. While no words are too strong to condemn the reprehensible acts of violence undertaken by both sides, we cannot help demanding that those responsible should be punished and the government carry out a detailed and thorough inquiry to insure that no hidden hands are behind what is potentially the most serious threat to public order in Pakistan.

PNP DEMANDS RETURN OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

GF071844 Karachi DAWN in English 6 Mar 83 p 12

[Text] Quetta, March 5: Defunct Pakistan National Party [PNP], Baluchistan, has called for immediate withdrawal of martial law, restoration of democracy and announcement of a definite date for general elections in the country.

A meeting of provincial party office-bearers, held recently at Sibi under the chairmanship of its President Malik Faiz Mohammad, resolved to demand lifting of restrictions imposed on political parties and release of all political leaders and withdrawal of cases instituted against Jam Saqi, Meera Khan, Ali Haider Shah, Shams Gochang, Ghuas Ali Shah, Mutahro Dehri, Lal Mohammad, Karim Baluch and Ghansham Parkash.

In one of the resolutions, which were released to the press yesterday, the party further demanded that restrictions imposed on political leaders' inter-provincial movement and confinement of defunct PNP chief Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo within district Khuzdar should be withdrawn.

The meeting also resolved to demand withdrawal of all amendments made in the 1973 Constitution. It called for ending censorship and withdrawal of government controls on the press.

The meeting also demanded that Afghan refugees should immediately be sent back to their country.

In another resolution, the party demanded that increase in prices and transport fares should be withdrawn immediately and tendency of double budget system should be brought to an end. It also called for denationalising of taken-over industries particularly ghee units, stopping retrenchment in PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] and other institutions, and withdrawal of MLR [martial law regulation] 52 and restoration of trade union activities.

CSO: 4600/417

## BRIEFS

PRESENCE OF U.S. BASES DENIED--Islamabad--President Ziaul Haq yesterday denied there were six U.S. military bases in Baluchistan as alleged in a statement by top MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] leaders before his departure for New Delhi to attend the Nonaligned Summit. "It is false and baseless," Gen. Zia told newsmen on return from New Delhi yesterday when asked to comment on the statement which challenged his credentials to represent Pakistan at the summit saying he had violated nonaligned principles by allowing foreign military bases. President Zia said he was pained by the statement, adding "even if for a second we believe it to be true, is it necessary to wash our dirty linen in public?" He said the MRD was making mischief. Regarding the Gulf war, President Zia said in New Delhi he conveyed the ICO Peace Committee's appeal to Iranian Premier Mir-Hoseyn Musavi who promised to discuss it with his colleagues back home. The appeal, however, did not contain any concrete or fresh proposal for an end to the fratricidal war, he told another questioner. Describing the Nonaligned Summit as "very successful" with all its moral and political impact, President Zia said Pakistan was fully satisfied that all its positions on various issues, including Afghanistan, were duly accommodated. [Text] [GF131122 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 13 Mar 83 p 9]

MRD ON FOREIGN POLICY--Leaders of the eight constituent parties of the MRD, [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] in a joint statement on the eve of a NAM [Nonaligned Movement] summit conference in New Delhi, said that the people of Pakistan would not be bound by "any treaty or commitment" made to any country by the Pakistan Government. They criticised Pakistan's present foreign policy, specially in the context of regional scenario which, they said, "threatens to engulf the countries of this region in the conflict of the superpowers." The MRD leaders reaffirmed their commitment to work for the relaxation of tension and promotion of peace among the immediately-concerned countries in the region, namely, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, on the basis of the principles of the Nonaligned Movement. The signatories to the statement are Khwaja Khairuddin, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Mr Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Mr Musheer Ahmad Pesh Imam, Mr Fatehyab Ali Khan, Maulana Mohammad Shah Amrothi and Mr Musthtaq Mirza. Meanwhile, Mr Obaidur Rahman, a federal councilor, in a rejoinder, said that the MRD leaders' statement was "unfortunate and ill-founded." [Text] [GF071908 Karachi DAWN in English 6 Mar 83 p 4]

ZIA ON FOREIGN POLICY--The president, Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq, had an hour-long informal meeting at the Pakistan embassy in New Delhi today with journalists covering the Nonaligned Movement Summit Conference. The president explained to them the main objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy. In this connection, he referred to Pakistan's principled stand on Afghanistan and its efforts for improving relations with its neighbors and the superpowers. He said the nonaligned movement can play an important role in improving the worsening situation of world peace. The president said Pakistan wanted lasting peace in the region in order to improve the living standard of the people of the area. He referred to Pakistan's relations with India and said it was the desire of the two countries to bring normalcy between them and to cooperate with each other in different fields to achieve this objective. [Text] [BK120441 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 11 Mar 83]

PROFESSORS CHARGED--Rawalpindi, 1 Mar (PPI)--Three lecturers of Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, facing military trial for allegedly possessing objectionable pamphlets, were served with amended charge sheets on the orders of the special military court on Tuesday. All the three lecturers, Jamil Umar, Dr Mohammad Salim and Tariq Ahsan, were arrested in November 1981, for possessing objectionable pamphlets aimed at creating hatred against the government and the armed forces. [Excerpt] [GF041338 Karachi DAWN in English 2 Mar 83 p 12]

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